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INTRODUCTION 
In a disturbing development in tort litigation, defendants use detenninistic, 
genetics-based ideas about individuals and their families to undercut and de­
flect attention from personal injury claims. This development has arisen in 
lead exposure litigation, which generally involves claims for cognitive inju­
ries I brought on behalf of children who have ingested lead paint. 2 The most 
extreme manifestation of this development to date has been the efforts in 
several states to compel non-party relatives of lead-exposed children to sub­
mit to IQ and· psychological testing. 3 
1 Numerous studies show that lead exposure causes cognitive injuries in children, in­
cluding brain injury, lowered IQ, and death. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text 
(discussing the hannful effects of lead exposure in children). 
2 Ingestion ofold, chipping paint and paint dust is the major source of lead for children. 
See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., PREVENTING LEAD POISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN 18-19 (1991) [hereinafter 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL) (stating that lead-based paint remains the major source of 
lead exposure for young children, and explaining that children ingest lead paint when they 
ingest dust and soil contaminated with lead from paint that flaked or chalked as it aged); 
Jane E. Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of lAws on Lead-Based Pain/: From Code 
Viololion to Environmental HazJJrd, 45 S.C. L. REV. 511, 515-16 (1994) (noting that resi· 
dential lead, including lead-based paint, threatens young children). This litigation is gen­
erally brought on behalf of lead-exposed children against landlords of properties where 
lead paint has been found. See SEAN F. MOONEY, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
LEAD LIABILITY (1995), reprinted in 4 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP., LEAD 15, at C2 (May 3, 
1995) (noting that the typical lawsuit is brought against the landlord of the residence of the 
lead-exposed child). 
3 See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases from the District of 
1027 1997] GENE17CS, IQ, DETERMINISM. AND TORTS 
The Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services called lead poisoning "the No. 1 environmental threat to the health 
of children in the United States. "4 Lead poisoning affects African-American 
children in numbers disproportionate to their numbers in the population. s 
Although federal law bas banned lead paint for residential use since 1978,6 it 
continues to be the subject of a significant amount of legislation.7 In addi­
tion, a substantial amount of litigation is brought against landlords for chil­
dren's lead-related injuries,8 and a 1995 insurance industry report predicted 
massive claims in the future. 9 To date, however, relatively little legal schol­
arship has been published in this area. 10 
Columbia, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, in which defendants 
have sought the IQ testing of the plaintiffs' non-pany relatives). Defendants have also 
sought to compel production of medical, educational, and employment records of the 
plaintiffs' relatives. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving 
production of the personal records of plaintiffs' relatives). 
4 Louis Sullivan, Speech at First Annual Conference on Childhood Lead Poisoning 
(Oct. 7, 1991), in WASH . TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A4. 
~ See infra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing surveys of the incidence of blood 
lead levels in children and finding that the incidence is significantly higher among African­
American children than among white children) . 
6 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that interior lead­
~ paint was available until the 1970s). 
7 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4851-4856 (West 1995) (Residential Lead-Based Paint 
Hazard Reduction Act of 1992). About half of the states have statutes dealing with lead 
paint and lead ingestion. See Jennifer Bush, The Federal uad Poisoning Prevention Pro­
gram: Inadequate Guidance for an Erpeditious Solution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 
645, 649-50 (1996) (noting that as of 1994, 25 states had legislation regulating lead-based 
paint for residential housing). 
• Lead poisoning cases for injuries to children have gone to trial in at least ten states. 
See generally Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Landlord's Liability for Injury or Death of Ten­
ant's Child from Lead Paint Poisoning, 19 A.L.R. 5TH 405, 412-38 (1995) (discussing 
cases regarding landlords' liability for injury or death of an infant caused by lead paint 
poisoning). 
9 See MOONEY, supra note 2, at C2 (estimating that the total insurance payout over the 
next decade would be three billion dollars, not counting defense costs). 
10 Most law review anicles on lead paint concern specific provisions of various state 
and/or federal laws. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 7, at 645 (discussing the federal Resi­
dential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992); Jane E. Schukoske, uad Paint 
and the Warranty of Habitability in Pre-1950 Rental Housing: Maryland's uad Poisoning 
Prtwntion Program Creates a Presumption of the Presence ofuad Paint, 4 U. BALT. J . 
ENVTL. L. 22, 22-23 (1994) (reviewing arguments that Maryland's lead law creates pre­
sumption of lead paint in older buildings); Jennifer Tiller, Note, Easing Lead Paint Laws: 
A Step in the Wrong Direaion, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 265, 275-76 (1994) (arguing 
against proposed relaxation of Massachusetts Lead laws); Susan A. Winchurch, Recent De­
velopments, 54 Mo. L. REv. 924, 934-41 (1995) (analyzing Maryland's 1994 Lead Paint 
Poisoning Prevention Act). 
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In recent years, legal scholars have begun to examine various aspects of 
tort law, trying to understand how issues such as gender and race are at 
work. 11 One of the lessons of such work is that gender and race often have 
an important role in tort law, but this role can be obscured by law's stance of 
neutrality. I believe that gender and race play a significant role in the lead 
exposure litigation discussed in this Article. For example, the fact that ef­
forts to compel IQ tests of non-party relatives have been directed at mothers 
but not fathers, raises gender issues. 12 The fact that the only families where 
a non-party has been ordered to have her IQ tested have been African­
American families, raises race issues. 13 These issues, as this Article shows, 
are submerged but nonetheless present in this area of law. 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the effects of lead exposure. Part II 
focuses on several ideas involved in a shift occurring in childhood lead expo­
sure cases, which is likely to extend to other types of personal injury cases. 
Several articles discuss theories of market share liability as applied to lead paint manu­
facturers. See, e.g., David P. Swenson, "Market Share Recovery for Risk" as a Preemp­
tive Remedyfor Childhood Lead Poisoning, 11 LAw & INEQ. J. 585, 608 (1993) (proposing 
"market share recovery for risk" theory to be applied to lead poisoning litigation); Ken­
neth R. LePage, Note, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and the Problem ofCausation: Toward 
a Unified Theory ofMarket Share Liability, 31 B.C. L. REv. 155, 174 (1994) (arguing that 
a unified theory of market share liability is consistent with principles of corrective justice). 
Other articles approach lead poisoning from various perspectives. See, e.g., Deborah 
W. Denno, Considering Lead Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
377, 393-98 (1993) (examining the idea of allowing lead poisoning to be raised as a crimi­
nal defense); Donald E. Lively, The Diminishing Relevance of Rights: Racial Disparities 
in Distribution ofLead Exposure Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 309, 314-26 (1994) 
(discussing envirorunental rights and their relation to minorities and lead exposure); Tho­
mas J. Miceli et al., Protecting Children from Lead-Based Paint Poisoning: Should Land­
lords Bear the Burden?, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 9-19 (1995) (arguing that duties 
imposed on landlords by some state and federal laws are inconsistent with economic effi­
ciency). 
11 See generally Leslie Bender, An Overview ofFeminist Tort Scholarship, 78 CORNELL 
L. REv. 575 (1993) (examining feminism and tort law); Martha Chamallas, Questioning 
the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Con­
stitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73 (1994) (arguing that lost wage data used to 
calculate damages in tort cases should not be race or gender specific); Lucinda Finley, 
Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Refomz for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 
(1997) (discussing gender impact of tort reform proposals); Elizabeth Handsley, Mental 
Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist Critique, 14 LAw & INEQ. J. 391 
(1996) (arguing that tort law involving mental injuries "reflects a fundamentally masculine 
world view"); Amy Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Con­
sciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CrN. L. REv. 269, 282-86, 
289-93 (1994) (discussing racial assumptions in application of tort doctrines). 
12 See infra notes 76-93, 165-67, 206-13 and accompanying text. 

13 See infra notes 99-111, 196 and accompanying text. 
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The first idea 14 is that of "genetic essentialism," the notion that a person's 
characteristics can be explained, in a deterministic fashion, through her 
genes.ts The second idea 16 is that of "maternal determinism," the idea that 
mothers and mothering are responsible for all characteristics possessed by 
children, bolstering the cultural emphasis on genetic explanations. 17 These 
two ideas are used to explain children's characteristics through either the ge­
netic contribution of the parents, the environment created by the mother, or 
both. Both ideas exaggerate and reify the influences of genetics and moth­
ering, and distract from other influences such as economics and, in this con­
text, lead exposure. IS 
Part mdiscusses the history and current debates surrounding intelligence 
research. As Part III discusses, this history is steeped in race, gender, re­
ligious, and class prejudice. The 1994 publication of The Bell Curvel9 pro­
voked much discussion about these matters, and several key issues pertinent 
to that book are discussed in this context. This history forms a complex 
backdrop to lead exposure claims because lead exposure cases, which in­
volve various kinds of cognitive harms, are often brought on behalf of Afri­
can-American and Hispanic children. 20 Part Ill argues that the conclusions 
14 See infra Part II.A. 
1~ See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelldn, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 
VAND. L. REv. 313, 320-21 (1992) (defining genetic essentialism as a concept that posits 
that personal traits are "predictable and permanent, determined at conception, 'hard-wired' 
into the human constitution"). 
16 See infra Part Il.B. 
17 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supro note 15, at 321 (noting that genetic essentialism 
stresses the importance of biological qualities and minimizes the importance of social con­
text). 
11 See infra notes 65-93 and accompanying text (arguing that the use of IQ and genetic 
information as explanations for human behavior is beyond the scientific basis for such ex­
planations). 
19 RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCfURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (analyzing intelligence testing data and dis­
cussing the correlation between scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test and educa­
tional level, income, anti-social behavior, and ethnic background); see also infra notes 
115-26 and accompanying text. 
20 In a six year survey of the health of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population two 
months old and older, the incidence of elevated blood lead levels among African-American 
children between one and two years old was 2.5 times higher than for white children. See 
Debra J. Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in the U.S. Popu141ion, 272 JAMA 277, 279 
(1994). A study of metropolitan areas of more than one million people determined that in 
1988, in households earning less than $6,000 aMually, approximately 68% of African· 
American children and 36% of white children had blood lead levels above 15 micrograms 
per deciliter. See KAREN F. FLORIN! ET AL., LEGACY OF LEAD: AMERICA'S CONTINUING 
EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD PoiSONING app.1 tbl.A-1 (1990) (noting the increased inci· 
dence of potentially harmful lead levels among poor African-American children as com­
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of The Bell Curve authors regarding the significance of IQ scores for social 
policy are unjustified, but acknowledges that IQ scores have legitimate uses 
in some contexts. 
In Part IV , the ideas of genetic essentialism, maternal determinism, and IQ 
come together in the context of pretrial discovery in childhood lead exposure 
cases. Traditionally , in personal injury cases, causation and damages in­
quiries are plaintiff-centered. Discovery inquiries are accordingly directed 
almost exclusively at the plaintiff, because the plaintiff's condition is at issue. 
Therefore, determinations as to any harm suffered resulting from defendant's 
actions are made with reference to the plaintiff, regardless of the nature of 
the injury.21 In lead exposure cases, however, a significant departure from 
these traditions is taking place, shifting the focus of discovery to the plain­
tiff's family . 22 Where claims are brought on behalf of lead-exposed children, 
defendants have argued for major departures from the traditional scheme, 
based on broadly deterministic arguments. 23 This departure has immense 
significance in litigation, yet because it takes place in discovery, it has 
largely gone unnoticed by commentators. 
Finally, Part V argues that the shift from plaintiff-centered discovery to 
maternal and sibling-based inquiries and tests is likely to continue. The rea­
sons for the construction of this shift are the expansion in acceptance of no-
pared with poor white children); see also infra note 30 (discussing the blood lead levels 
that are considered dangerous). In households with incomes between $6,000 and $14,999, 
approximately 54% of black children and 23% of white children had blood lead levels 
above 15 micrograms per deciliter. See FLORINI ET AL.• supra, at app.1 tbl.A-1; see also 
Lively, supra note 10, at 312-13 ("The high proportion of minority exposure correlates to 
preexisting research indicating that poor minority children in central cities ... are more 
susceptible to lead poisoning."). lllerefore, the expansive discovery practices discussed 
throughout this Article should be considered in light of the potential racist implications 
given the racial composition of the litigants. 
As lead exposure is a problem that particularly affects racial minorities who are pre­
dominantly poor, it is interrelated with concerns of the environmental justice movement. 
See Denno , supra note 10, at 389-91 (discussing "environmental racism"); Michael 
Fisher, Environmenlal Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 
ENVTL. L. 285, 299 (1995) ("[R]ace exerts an independent effect on the distribution of 
environmental hazards."); Charles Lee, Developing the Vision ofEnvironmenlal Justice: A 
Paradigm for Achieving Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 571, 
573 (1995) ("Environmental justice covers a wide spectrum of serious social concerns. 
Communities that suffer from environmental inequities also tend to suffer from social in­
equities."); Lively, supra note 10, at 319-26 (discussing environmental rights and their 
relation to minorities and lead exposure). 
21 See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text (noting the widespread practice of only 
requiring the plaintiff's personal records). 
22 See infra notes 158-60, 239-49 and accompanying text (discussing lead exposure 
cases that have ordered testing and examination and production of non-plaintiff's records). 
23 See infra notes 41-43, 84-89, 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing bases for 
defense arguments in support of access to records of relatives of lead-exposed children). 
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tions of genetic essentialism, the persistence of notions of maternal deter­
minism, and current and anticipated scientific developments. 24 Pan V also 
provides reasons to resist this expansion, reviews current discovery protec­
tions, and concludes with several preliminary proposals to address the vari­
ous interests involved. 
I. EFFECTS OF LEAD EXPOSURE 
This Pan reviews the scientific background concerning the effects of lead 
on humans, particularly children. Lead has been known to be harmful since 
antiquity.2S Lead, a toxin ,26 particularly affects the central nervous systems 
of children.27 In high enough doses, it can cause severe brain injury and 
death.28 
Scientific studies of the effects on children of lead exposure, at levels 
lower than those causing obvious brain injury and death, have attempted to 
measure the effects of lead exposure on IQ. 29 Studies of children exposed to 
lead during the preschool period generally have found an inverse association 
between the level of lead in the blood and IQ.30 Such studies have compared 
24 See infra Part IV.A (asserting that tests and other inquiries regarding non-parties are 
likely to expand given the directions taken in scientific research and other factors). 
25 See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Envtl. Health, Lead Poisoning: 
From Screening to Primary Prevention, PEDIATRICS, July 1993, at 176. 
26 See id. at 177 ("Lead toxicity affects almost every organ system, most importantly, 
the central and peripheral nervous systems, kidneys, and blood."). 
27 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 2, at 9 (documenting that decreases 
in children's cognition are evident even at low blood levels, and further decreases in IQ 
scores among children with greater exposure to lead); COMMmEE ON MEASURING LEAD IN 
CRITICAL POPULATIONS ET AL., MEASURING LEAD ExPOSURE IN INFANTS , CHILDREN, AND 
OTHER SENSmVE PoPULATIONS 32 0993) [hereinafter MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE] 
(stating that "[c]hildren are much more sensitive than adults to the neuropathic effects of 
lead"). Studies of lead have resulted in various public health measures, other than banning 
lead paint, that have also reduced lead exposure, such as decreasing lead in gasoline and 
lead-soldered cans for food and beverages. See id. at 107. 
28 See MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 32-33 (discussing the nature of 
central nervous system injuries, including lead encephalopathy. that carries a high mortal­
ity rate, cerebral edema, structural derangement in capillaries, neuronal necrosis, retarda­
tion, and severe behavioral disorders). Lead also has a variety of other deleterious health 
effects. See id. at 33 (describing the renal and hematological effects of lead exposure). 
29 See id. at 46 (describing studies assessing the correlation between IQ scores of chil­
dren and lead exposure). 
30 See id. at 45-46, 55. Effects from lead have been found at levels as low as 10 micro­
grams per deciliter of blood, and no threshold has been found. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, supra note 2. at 9 ("Although researchers have not yet completely defined the 
impact of blood lead levels < 10 pg/dL on central nervous system function, it may be that 
even these levels are associated with adverse affects that will be clearer with more refined 
research."); MEASURING LEAD ExPOSURE, supra note 27, at 59 (noting that most studies 
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lead-exposed children•s IQs with the IQs of otherwise similar children who 
have not been so exposed.3 1 Harms from lead. however. are not limited to 
brain injury. death. and lowered IQ; lead exposure has also been associated 
with poor perfonnance on tests designed to assess children•s attention 
skills.32 Some studies have also found that lead-exposed children are more 
likely to have learning disabilities and make slower progress in school than 
are other children. 33 Another imponant recent study found links between 
find a 2- to 4-point IQ decrease for every 10-15 microgram increase of lead per deciliter of 
blood within the range of 5 to 35 micrograms per deciliter); see also id. at 94 
(summarizing data that blood lead levels of Jess than 10- to IS-micrograms per deciliter 
correlated to neurobehavioral development deficits and lower IQ). Recent studies have 
focused on effects of lead at relatively low levels, such as 10 and 20 micrograms per deci­
liter of blood, and have not focused on higher levels, such as 30 micrograms per deciliter 
and above, which researchers assume are harmful. Set CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
supra note 2, at 2-3 (noting that at 20 to 44 micrograms per deciliter, a child "should" be 
evaluated and that the child "may" need medical intervention, including chelation ther­
apy). Litigation most commonly involves levels of 30 micrograms per deciliter and above. 
See, e.g., 4 MEALEY'S LmG. REP., LEAD 4 (Sept. 20, 1995) (noting that plaintiff had 
blood lead level of 46 micrograms per deciliter); 3 MEALEY'S LmG. REP., LEAD 6 (Sept. 
21, 1994) (discussing lead exposure settlement in which plaintiff had blood lead level as 
high as 58 micrograms per deciliter). 
31 See MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 40-72 (describing epidemiologi­
cal studies that include both longitudinal, prospective, and cross-sectional cohort studies). 
For an excellent introduction to epidemiological studies, see Michael D. Green, Expert 
Witnesses and Sufficiency ofEvidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy ofAgent 
Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 646-53 (1992) (discussing the 
types of epidemiologic studies and the sources of error). For an instructive exchange 
about the use of epidemiological studies in litigation, see Michael Dore, A Commentary on 
the Use ofEpidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENvrL. L. 
REv. 429, 433-40 (1983) (arguing that although epidemiological evidence can be an im­
portant element of proof, courts must exercise stringent and consistent control over its use 
in litigation); Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Re­
sponse to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv. 441, 441-48 (1983) (arguing for broad use 
of epidemiological studies and that such studies can assist both plaintiffs and defendants). 
Bur see Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Rekwuion of Cause~in-Fact Rules for Indeter­
minate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REv. 881, 899-902 (1982) (arguing for adapting cause-in­
fact rules for indeterminate plaintiffs). 
3l &e MEASURING LEAD ExPOSURE, supra note 27, at 62-63 (discussing tests that assess 
children's attention skills that find children with larger exposure to lead are less attentive 
in the classroom). 
33 &e id . at 63 (noting that children with greater lead burdens make slower progress 
through school, have increased referral rates for remedial academic help, have higher rates 
of reading disability, and are more likely to fail to graduate from high school); see also 
Robert G. Feldman & Roberta F. White, Lead Neurotoxicity and Disorders ofLearning, 7 
J. CHILD NEUROLOGY 354, 354-55 (1993) (arguing that low levels of lead result in learning 
disorders). 
Other measures, such as nerve conduction velocity, have been shown to be associated 
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childhood lead exposure and delinquent behavior. 34 
Although the effects of lead exposure are significantly documented, the 
biological mechanisms of lead poisoning are not yet fully understood.Js The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has lowered its recommended 
levels of acceptable exposure due to the developing research, which has 
found harmful effects at increasingly low levels of exposure.36 In sum, sci­
entific evidence reveals that lead is a neurotoxin that has particularly harmful 
effects on the cognitive development of children. 
with lead and may measure central nervous system disturbances, but their exact clinical 
significance is not yet known. See MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 71 
(describing the effects of lead on peripheral nerve function, including impairment of nerve 
conduction velocity, and the limits of such data). A groundbreaking survey on the long 
term effects of lead, see Herbert L. Needleman et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Class­
room Performance ofChildren with Elevated Dentine Lead Levels, 300 NEW ENG. I. MED. 
689 (1979), was attacked by Drs. Claire Emhart and Sandra Scarr in 1990, leading to a 
misconduct investigation, litigation, and a reanalysis of the data that supported Dr. Nee­
dleman's original conclusions. See MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 64 
(commenting on the criticism of Needleman's analysis and the reanalysis by Needleman 
and J. Schwartz responding to such criticism). See generally Ellen R. Silbergeld, Annota­
tion, Protection of the Public Interest, Allegations of Scientific Misconduct, and the Nee­
dkman Co.se, 85 AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 165 (1995) (arguing that the attacks and the inves­
tigation of Needleman's conclusions were a product of the lead industry's manipulation of 
the National Institute of Health Office of Scientific Integrity process). 
l4 See Herbert L. Needleman et at., Bone Lead Levels and Delinquent Behavior, 215 
JAMA 363, 365-66 (1996) (reporting results of a study revealing a correlation between 
elevated levels of lead burdens in the body and aggressive, delinquent behavior). Fur­
thermore, animal studies have demonstrated harmful effects from lead exposure. See, 
e.g., S.G. Gilbert & D.C. Rice, Low-level lifetime lead exposure produces behavioral 
toxicity (spatial discrimination reversal) in adJdt monkeys, TOXIC. APPL. PHARMACOL. 484 
(1987), cited in Herbert L. Needleman et at., The Long Term Effects of Exposure to Low 
Doses ofLead in Childhood: An 11-Year Follow-up Report, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83, 87 
(1990) (finding that rhesus monkeys that were administered lead had learning impair­
ments). 
3S See MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 77-87 (discussing the toxicity 
mechanisms and noting the difficulty of finding an explanation given the diversity of lead's 
toxic effects). 
36 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the 1985 level of 
25 micrograms per deciliter was being adjusted to a level of concern of 10 micrograms per 
deciliter of blood). 
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ll. GENETIC ESSENTIAUSM AND MATERNAL DETERMINISM 
A. Genetic Research, Genetic Essentialism, and their Implications 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, genetic research has been expanding rapidly .37 The ulti­
mate scientific, legal, and societal implications of this research cannot yet be 
calculated or anticipated . 38 This Pan describes how concepts from genetic 
research have already entered societal and legal discourse. The extent of this 
37 See Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by 
Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 
879-84 (1996) (describing the expansion and advances made in gene research and technol­
ogy in the 1980s and 1990s). 
38 See id. at 883-84 (warning against placing too much emphasis on genetic testing or its 
implications and stating that, "[t]he only true test is the test of time") . For analysis criti· 
cal of genetic research and concerned about future implications, see Ruth Hubbard, Pre­
dictive Genetics and the Construction ofthe Healthy Ill, in PROmABLE PROMISES: EssAYS 
ON WOMEN, SciENCE, AND HEALTH 31, 31-53 (1995) (assessing the problems resulting 
from genetic technology, notably using genetics and genes as predictors of heaJth and dis­
ease and the societal implications). See also RUTH HUBBARD & ELUAH WALD, ExPLODING 
THE GENE MYTH 117-57 (1993) (arguing that the importance of genes as determinative is 
exaggerated, and noting the dangerous effects that genetic research may have on education, 
employment, and insurance); DANIEL 1. KELVES, IN THE NAME OF GENETICS: GENETICS 
AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 114-28 (1985) (discussing the eugenics movement and 
criticizing its foundations, arguments, and implications, focusing on the critics of the 
movement at the time); Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 343-48 (warning against 
conflating "the certainty of scientific findings with the legal relevance of research results" 
and arguing that science should not necessarily be used to solve real world problems) . 
Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald, among others , have documented how minor and/or un­
substantiated claims of genetic causes for human behavior are broadly trumpeted, while 
refutations of such claims get much less attention. See HUBBARD & WALD, supra, at 4-6 
(noting that news stories about genetic links to particular traits are reported without docu­
menting the weaknesses of such claims and the alternative explanations). For a recent ex­
ample, compare Natalie Angier, Variant Gene Tied to a Love ofNew Thrills, N. Y. TIMES, 
Ja.n. 2, 1996, at Al (reporting, on the firSt page, that researchers had located a "novelty 
seeking" gene), with Natalie Angier, Maybe It's Not a Gene Behind a Person's Thrill· 
Seeking Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at A22 (reporting, on the twenty-second page, 
that studies questioned the earlier report regarding the discovery of the "thrill-seeking" 
gene). 
For law review articles Jess critical of genetic research, and trying to consider some im· 
plications of genetic research , see Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post­
Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.I . 727, 738-39 (1993) (arguing that genetic medicine bolsters the 
arguments against the idea of individual autonomy in the medical law and ethics context); 
Robert Wachbroit, Biotechnology and the Law: Making the Grade: Testing for Human Ge­
netic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 583, 583 (1988) (asserting that human gene therapy 
is an important medical advance). 
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is such that some commentators have gone so far as to define "genetic essen­
tialism" as a concept that purports to explain human traits and behavior 
through immutable genetic properties. 39 The publicity and cultural impor­
tance accorded to "genetics," however, frequently far outweigh its actual 
significance. 40 
As research continues, genetic explanations will be offered with increasing 
frequency in a variety of contexts, including litigation. For example, we can 
anticipate increased genetic testing of tort plaintiffs by defendants either 
challenging assertions that defendants' actions caused harm to plaintiffs, or 
arguing that plaintiffs' damages are less than plaintiffs claim.'u In addition, 
we may anticipate increased pressure in tort cases to expand and obtain vari­
ous types of testing or personal records of non-parties. This would occur in 
order to make ar guments that a plaintiff's problems were caused by genetic 
inheritance rather than the defendant's actions, or that a plaintiff's damages 
are less than they would otherwise be, due to the plaintiff's genetic inheri­
tance. The recent efforts in lead exposure cases to perform IQ and psycho­
logical tests of parents and siblings of the lead-exposed cbild42 are partly 
based on the justification of "genetics," and reflect the recent heightened 
emphasis on genetic explanations . 43 
39 See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 320-21 (discussing genetic essential­
ism that posits, "personality traits are predictable and permanent"). 
<40 See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 6 (questioning the scientific basis of the 
claimed importance of the "all-powerful gene"); DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, 
THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON 2 (1995) (noting that the scientific 
reality of the gene differs from its cultural meaning); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON , WHEN 
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN PooR at xv-xvi (1996) (asserting that 
genetic research often downplays the role of environment); Dreyfuss & NeiJcin, supra note 
15, at 339-48 (arguing that the appeal of science and genetic research extends beyond ac­
tual findings and their actual relevance); see also Louis Menand, The Gods are Anxious: 
The Delightful Rise of Genetic Polytheism, NEW YORKER, Dec. 16, 1996, at 5, 6 (noting 
the prevalence of genetic explanations for human behavior). 
41 See Rothstein, supra note 37, at 884-87 (discussing types of evidence defendants may 
submit to dispute plaintiffs' claims). 
42 The efforts to obtain school, employment, and medical records of non-panics are also 
based on the same j ustifications. See Vasquez v. Hezekiah, No. 91-CV-0057, at 1 (Mass. 
Housing Ct. Apr. 18, 1995) (order denying defendants' motion to discover the educational 
records of plaintiff); Coren v. Cardoza, No. 90-CV-29101, at 1-2 (Mass. Housing Ct . 
Oct. 30, 1993) (granting the motion to compel the production of the medical records of 
parents of lead-exposed child, limited to the time period each learned of the lead poisoning 
of the minor plaintiff to time of discovery); see also infra note 169 (discussing additional 
cases). 
43 Defendants have not sought to test the actual DNA of relatives, presumably because 
genes for IQ and other brain functions affected by lead have not been specifically identi­
fied. See Manfred Velden, The Heritability of Intelligence: Neither Known nor Unknown, 
52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 72, 72 (1997) (noting that the molecular basis of intelligence is not 
yet known). For an explanation of the inaccuracy of the term "gene," see HUBBARD & 
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2. Genetic Narratives and Genetic Essentialism 
In the popular media, genes and DNA are often used as explanations for a 
wide range of human behaviors, often with 'limited or no scientific basis. 44 
Professor Ruth Hubbard has described the inaccuracy of many popular 
"genetic narratives, "45 arguing persuasively that genetic explanations for 
human situations are frequently misleading , and in some cases completely 
invalid.46 Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin have identified 
the idea of "genetic essentialism" in order to account for the cultural treat­
ment of genetics and acceptance of genetic explanations: 
Genetic essentialism posits that personal traits are predictable and per­
manent, determined at conception, "hard-wired" into the human con­
stitution. If comprehensively known and understood these inherent 
qualities would largely explain past performance and could predict fu­
ture behavior. Standing in sharp contrast with the relational definitions 
of personhood observed in some societies, this ideology minimizes the 
importance of social context . By stressing the importance of immutable 
biological qualities, genetic essentialism also differs from traditions 
centered on the importance of life experiences in determining behav­
ior.47 
Dreyfuss and Nelkin have compiled examples in which courts have accepted 
generally unreliable genetic evidence48 and argue that this trend toward see-
WALD, supra note 38, at 11-12, 43 (explaining that the word "gene" is "only a simplifica­
tion ofa complex reality"). 
44 See, e.g. , HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 4-6 (discussing several newspaper 
articles regarding genetics and suggesting that the media exaggerates genetic findings); 
Dreyfuss & Nelldn, supra note 15, at 319-20 (noting the media's role in extending the 
limits of science beyond established knowledge) . 
•s See Hubbard, supra note 38, at 17-29 (describing the limits of genetic science and 
warning against viewing human experience "through the lens of genetics"); see also 
HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 117-57 (arguing that the importance of genes as de­
tenninative is exaggerated, and noting the dangerous effects that genetic research may 
have on education, employment, and insurance) . 
46 See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 63-71 (arguing that medicine and science 
tend to make sweeping generalizations to account for human conditions and that often such 
generalizations are of no such use to individuals) . 
4
' Dreyfuss & Nellcin, supra note 15, at 320-21. 
48 See id. at 327-33 (discussing cases in which courts accepted evidence on the defen­
dants' genetic predisposition) . Dreyfuss and Nelkin point out that in tort cases , genetic 
predisposition arguments often favor defendants because they make biological attributes of 
the victim determine whether the defendant is blameworthy, and thus narrow defendant's 
liability. See id. at 327-28. On the other hand, they note that such arguments can at times 
favor plaintiffs. See id.; see also Starling v. Ski Rouodtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 
(M.D. Pa. 1980) (allowing use of evidence of genetic predisposition to arthritis to prove 
injury proximately caused by accident); Mose v. Brewer, 428 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (La. Ct. 
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ing human beings in largely biological and genetic terms must be closely ex­
amined.•9 
3 . 	 Research in Genetics and the Pressure to Expand Testing and Other 
Inquiries 
Although genetic research is at a relatively early stage, we are rapidly 
learning more about the genetic connections linking people. Gene identifica­
tion is one major area of research . so For example, scientists have identified 
some of the genes linked with Alzheimer'sS 1 and Tay-Sachs diseases.sz The 
Human Genome Project is in the process of identifying all of the human 
genes.S3 Additionally, scientists have prepared a complete genetic blueprint 
of a living organism-a bacterium. s. A second area of research centers on 
identifying correlations of particular traits between genetically similar or 
identical individuals. An example of this research is the study of identical 
twins separated at birth.ss From such research, scientists hope to determine 
the respective effects of genes and environment on individual development, 
including IQ.S6 A third category of research concerns manipulating DNA.S7 
App . 1983) (upholding trial judge' s finding that automobile accident aggravated plaintiff's 
predisposition to diabetes). 
49 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 315-16. 
so Set, t .g., HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 54-57 {discussing the Human 
Genome Project and other genetic research) . 
.SI Set Third Gene Tied to FArly Onstt Al.t.Mirners, N.Y. nMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at A12 
{reporting that scientists identified a gene as causing the early onset of Alzheimer's dis­
ease) . 
.52 See HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 33 (noting that the development of a test to 
detect Tay-Sachs carriers allows at-risk couples to determine whether a fetus might de­
velop the disease) . 
.Sl See id. at 54 ("'The Human Genome Project is intended to produce first a map of 
DNA 'markers' associated with specific traits and eventually a complete sequence of nu­
cleotide bases for a 'human prototype.'"). But see id. at 158-59 (arguing that even if sci­
entists mapped the entire human genome, it is unclear what value such a map would have) . 
.54 Set Nicholas Wade, First Sequencing of Cell's DNA D~nes Basis of Lift, · N.Y. 
nMES, Aug. 1, 1995, at C1 (describing the first sequencing of a living organism and pro­
viding a brief overview of the DNA of Hemophilus inftuenzae, a bacterium). 
n See, e.g., Thomas Bouchard, Jr. et al. , Sources ofHuman Psychological Differences: 
The Minnesota Study ofTwins Reared Apart, SCIENCE, Oct . 12, 1990, at 223, 223-28 . 
.56 Set id. (concluding that genetic factors influence behavior and that rearing in the 
home bas little effect on psychological traits); Lawrence Wright, Double Mystery, NEW 
YORKER, Aug. 7, 1995, at 45, 48-51 (discussing the study of twins and noting that the 
principal source of information about human heritability is from such twin studies) . But 
set Adolph Reed Jr., Looking Backward, NATION, Nov. 2&, 1994, at 654, 657-59 
(critiquing studies using twins and calling into question the validity of their findings) . 
,., See, e.g., HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38 , at 109-16 (discussing the process of 
genetic manipulation using the manipulation of human reproductive cells as an illustra­
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For instance, in early 1997 researchers in Scotland announced that they had 
cloned a sheep. sa There appears to be no reason why scientists could not use 
this technique to clone humans.59 Although the potential for medical ad­
vances is thrilling, the potential for ethical nightmares and eugenic proposals 
is terrifying.60 Moreover, simplistic, popularized notions of genetics give 
rise to the possibility of using genetic information in coun and other aspects 
of society before thorough research has been done.6 1 
tion). 
sa See, e.g., Gina Kolata, With Cloning of a Sheep, the Ethical Ground Shifts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Peb. 24, 1997, at A1; Roben Langreth, Cloning Has FasciflllJing, Disturbing Po­
tential, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at Bl. 
S9 See Kolata, supra note 58, at A1 (discussing the potential for cloning humans); Lan­
greth, supra note 58, at B1 (same). 
60 See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics ofBiology: A Critique ofthe 
Argument from lrnrnuJabiUty, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 524-26 (1994) (noting the danger of 
anti-gay eugenics in connection with arguments that homosexuality is genetically caused); 
Beverly Horsburgh, SchrOdinger's Cal, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Steriliwion of 
Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive 
Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 531, 538-55 
(1996) (noting links between current practices regarding limiting poor women's reproduc­
tive freedom and eugenics practices); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Generic ne, U. CHI. L. 
REv. 209, 234-35 (1995) (discussing the biological justification for white supremacy 
through social programs and societal devaluation of African-American "traits"); Note, 
Eugenic Arrifidal/nsemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1850, 1862­
63 (1981) (noting the advantages of eutelegenesis, such as producing "superior individu­
als"-including intellectually superior individuals-and noting that such is consistent with 
the "American tradition of individual choice"). These concerns remain very much alive. 
See, e.g., Richard Saltus, Jewish Women's Group Warns ofRisks ofCancer-Gene Testing, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 1997, at B2 (reponing that Jewish Women's Coalition on Breast 
Cancer warned meeting attendees to beware of genetic discrimination resulting from blood 
test that determines if a woman carries mutated genes that increases the risk of breast and 
ovarian cancers). 
The authors of The Bell Curve note that, "(t]o [some). we will have made a case for 
steps to manipulate the fenility of people with high and low IQs." HERRNSTEIN & 
MURRAY, supra note 19, at 547. Several reviewers have pointed out that while The Bell 
Curve authors claim to eschew eugenics, the implications of their analysis and recommen­
dations could lead to eugenics. See, e.g., HOWARD GARDNER, SCHOLARLY BRINKMANSHIP 
(1994), reprinted in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE 61, 64 (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauber­
man eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE BELL CURVE DEBATE) (noting that the authors "never 
quite say that ... childbearing or immigration by those with low IQs should be curbed; 
yet they signal their sympathy for these options and intimate that readers ought to consider 
these possibilities"); LEON J. KAMIN, LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND STATISTICS (1995), ex­
panded version reprinted in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra, at 81, 105 (criticizing The 
Bell Curve's implications that those with high intelligence should breed more, but those 
with low IQs should breed less). 
61 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note. 15, at 314-15 (discussing the inclusion of genetic 
concepts into substantive legal doctrine); see also infra note 313 and accompanying text 
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In the future, people who are not parties to a legal action may be sought in 
litigation for genetic and other testing. Such tests, as in the lead context, 
would not necessarily involve simply getting a sample of a non-party's DNA; 
rather, they may involve both physiological and psychological tests aimed at 
gathering evidence supposedly useful in drawing genetic links between fam­
ily members. 62 In addition, medical and other records of non-parties may be 
sought on similar grounds. 63 
Several examples can be imagined. In one possible scenario, a person 
with a genetic mutation claims it was caused by exposure to neighboring 
power plant lines. The power plant owners seek DNA samples of her par­
ents to show that she inherited the genetic defect. In response, the plaintiff 
wants DNA samples taken of uncooperative neighbors, to show a high inci­
dence of the defect in the neighborhood. In another example, the victim of 
an automobile accident claims it caused a back injury. The defendant claims 
that the injury was caused not by the accident, but by a genetic defect that 
doctors could detect by x-rays and blood tests of the victim's parents, sib­
lings, and children. In a third example, a person suffering from depression 
claims it is the result of pain from an accident. The defendant claims that the 
person is unhappy largely due to genetic influences. Because geneticists 
have not yet identified the genes for depression, the defendant seeks psy­
chological examinations of the parents and siblings of the person claiming 
injury, as well as medical and personal records of these individuals .64 As 
genetic research expands and pressure builds to use genetic findings in the 
courtroom, judges will have to decide whether to allow such examinations 
and require the production of such records. 
4 . 	 Testing Non-Parties and Seeking Non-Parties ' Personal Records 

Based on Genetic Arguments 

Compelled testing and production of personal records of non-parties in­
volves a balancing of the interests of such parties, litigants, and public pol­
icy.65 Even if science reaches the point where such tests may have probative 
value, courts should exercise caution before embracing such an approach be­
(noting that because of the complexity of gene research, there may never be a straightfor­
ward relationship between genes and traits). 
62 See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving compelling 
IQ tests and psychological tests). 
63 See infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving compelling the 
release of personal records). 
64 See id. In this Article, "personal records" refers to medical, educational, and em­
ployment records of an individual. 
6S In addition to genetic-related reasons, public policy reasons such as privacy of non­
parties, expansion of litigation, and underlying goals of the tort system all should give rise 
to reluctance in allowing this type of discovery. See infra notes 162-68 (discussing the 
implications of broadening the scope of litigation beyond the parties). 
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cause there is a danger that both judges and juries would give such evidence 
excessive weight in relation to its certainty. Genetic science frequently uses 
terms such as "at risk" and "predisposed" to refer to vulnerabilities rather 
than certain causes. 66 Popular notions of genetics, on the other hand, are far 
more simplistic and deterministic. 67 Nevertheless, simplistic genetic essen­
tialism increasingly serves as an actual explanation for human traits and be­
havior, and such vulnerabilities may be given more weight than they de­
serve.68 
Additionally, there is danger in making policy and normative decisions 
about critical issues in the legal arena, or society in general, based solely on 
scientific research. Science is not always neutral, predictable, or certain, 
and its findings should not be uncritically transferred to the legal domain. 69 
Scientific studies and legal matters require that very divergent factors be 
taken into consideration.'O Ideas such as personhood, privacy, and autonomy 
66 See Dreyfuss & Nellcin, supra note 15, at 342 (noting that the law considers the tenns 
"predisposed" and "at risk" as definitions of an individual's status, while science consid­
ers them tenns of probability). 
67 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (arguing that the popular media often exag­
gerate the implications ofgenetic research and findings). 
61 As Dreyfuss and Nelkin note, "[t]he recent reemergence of a genetic perspective 
should be seen then, as stemming not only from dramatic advances in biomedical research. 
but also from a desire 10 utilize scientific explanations to justify a reorientation of social 
policy." Dreyfuss & Nellcin, supra note lS, at 340; see also Wright, supra note 56, at 48 
(discussing the different political views and their implications on society that stem from 
environmental determinism and behavioral genetics). 
69 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-23 (1981) (arguing that sci­
ence is imperfect and influenced by social phenomenon); WJLUAM H. TuCKER, THE 
SciENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL REsEARCH 274 (1994) (distinguishing "aspirational" and 
"justiciable" entitlements and arguing that the former does not depend on a recipient's ge­
netic merit); Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 338 (arguing that science gives defini­
tions to "certainty" and "predictability" that do not readily transfer into the legal arena); 
David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is it 
'Scientific,' 'Technical,' or 'Other' Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 960, 961 
(1995) (aclcnowledging that the methodology of psychology is "uncertain" and 
"tentative"); see also Barbara Underwood. Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior 
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1447-48 (1979) 
(concluding that the use of scientific methods of predicting human behavior are acceptable 
in some contexts but not in others). 
70 For example, it is one thing for a parent to consent to an IQ test as part of a study on 
the effects of lead, and it is another for a parent to be compelled to submit to an IQ test in 
the context of litigation. Some, such as William Tucker, author of 1"he Science and Poli­
tics ofRacial Research, argue that scientists should disclose to potential research subjects 
the potential uses of the research before obtaining consent. See TuCKER, supra note 69, at 
280-89 (arguing from an ethical perspective that human research subjects have a right to 
informed consent regarding a researcher's cause or purpose}. Others , such as Sandra 
Scarr, argue to the contrary. See id. at 289-91 ("[A) scientist's only ethical obligation is 
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are not based on scientific discoveries, but are essentially cultural con­
structs.71 Science should not have the last and only word on the continued 
validity of such long-accepted moral principles . 72 
Third, given the history of ideas and practices concerning genetics and 
race,73 there are special grounds for concern that genetic science will be used 
to make particularly deterministic arguments about racial minorities in 
court.74 Dreyfuss and Nelkin note that , "[i]f it is accepted that genetic en­
dowment determines the propensity to commit bad acts , then hereditary 
traits, which often reduce to ethnic group membership, may one day be con­
sidered evidence of the commission of a crime. "75 In the civil context, 
similar arguments also may be made. 
B. Maternal Determinism and its Implications 
"Maternal determinism" is a cultural concept suggesting that a child's 
characteristics are determined by the mothering she receives. 76 As Professor 
Shari Tburer bas explained, the dominant ideology of the last forty years 
holds mothers almost entirely responsible for the ultimate well-being of their 
children77 and ignores the effects of economic and other factors on mothers 
to protect subjects from harm; as long as there is no danger to their individual health and 
safety, the nature of the research is none of their business, even if its purpose violates their 
deepest values and beliefs.") . 
71 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 316 (noting that various cultures define 
personhood differently); Rayna Rapp, Moral Pioneers: Women, Men, and Fetuses on a 
Fron1ier of Reproductive Technology, in GENDER AT THE CROSSROADS OF KNOWLEDGE: 
FEMINIST ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE PoSTMODERN AREA 384 (Micaela di Leonardo ed ., 1991) 
(maintaining that medical and scientific definitions of personhood are functions of cultural 
definitions); see also JOHN STEWART Mt.LL, ON UBERTY 80 (Currin V. Shields ed., 2d ed. 
1956) (noting that conceptions of the power of the individual have changed since the Mid· 
die Ages); JOHN STEWART MILL, THE SUBJEcrtON OF WOMEN (1869), reprinled in 11 
EssAYS ON EQUALITY, l.AW, AND EDUCATION 336-37 (John M. Robson ed., 1984) 
(claiming that personal autonomy is a basic human desire that leads to happiness). 
12 See Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 343-44 (arguing that because science oper­
ates under controlled conditions, it should not override established principles). 
"[R}ecognizing differences in human potential does not resolve the central debate over 
Great Society programs. Science may be able to quantify the resources necessary to create 
an envirorunent that compensates for biological differences, but it caMOt resolve questions 
about whether and where these resources should be expended." ld. at 345 . 
73 See infra Part ill. 
74 See infra notes 94-111, 115-26 and accompanying text (discussing the racist history 
of IQ research and claims of current bias in testing). 
7S Dreyfuss & Nelkin, supra note 15, at 331. 
76 See SHARI L . THURER , THE MYTHS OF MOTHERHOOD at xxi-xxii (1994) (noting the 
general acceptance of the idea that mothering determines a child's characteristics). 
77 See id. at 267-301 (noting that since World War ll, mothers have been viewed as 
"the primary agent in her child's development"). 
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and mothering.78 African-American women's mothering is particularly de­
valued by the dominant culture, and African-American mothers-and implic­
itly their mothering-have been blamed for the economic and social condi­
tions of the African-American community as a whole. 79 Often, mothering is 
misnamed "parenting. "80 For example, in The Bell Curve , the statistical 
analyses in the chapter titled ..Parenting" exclusively discuss mothering.81 
Regardless of how one phrases it, the message from many sources is that 
mothering is almost solely responsible for a child's characteristics. 
Maternal determinism bolsters genetic essentialism. For example, the de­
fendants in Campbell v. Bonner,ffl a lead exposure case in which a judge or­
dered that non-party relatives of a lead-exposed child had to submit to IQ 
tests and clinical interviews, 83 made a two-pronged argument. First, they 
argued that IQ is genetically inherited. 84 Second, they argued that children' s 
IQs tend to correlate with their mother's IQ through child rearing practices 
that are IQ-related . ss Defendant'.s expert Claire Ernhart stated in her affida­
78 See id. at xxii (discussing current views of the effects of motherhood that ignore class 
and adversity); see also BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD 
190-210 (1978) (describing the rise in the recognition of mothers and mothering on chil­
dren and thus on the future of society); Nancy Chodorow & Susan Contratto, The Fantasy 
of the Perfect Mother, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SoME FEMINIST QUESTIONS 191, 192­
96 (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds ., 1992) (discussing feminist theory that assumes 
that mothering is totally responsible for bow children tum out); Martha L . Fineman, Im­
ages of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J . 274, 279-81 (discussing politi­
cians' simplistic view that mothers are responsible for children's social problems); Janet 
C. Jacobs, Reassessing Mother Blame in Incest, 15 SIGNS 500, 506 (1990) (asserting that 
mothers hold the dominant role in primary child care). 
79 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies , 104 HARV. L . 
REv. 1419, 1436-44 (1991) (discussing the historic systematic devaluation of African­
American motherhood, from slavery to current removal of custody from African­
American mothers, and noting that they are scapegoated for the problems of the African­
American community). 
80 See THURER, supra note 76, at 293 (noting that parental usually means maternal). 
St See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 203-33 (questioning whether parental 
competence is affected by intelligence and finding, through statistics on mothers' IQs, that 
in homes where mothers are at the low end of the intelligence distribution, the worst 
"parenting" takes place). 
n No. 92-7771 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1994). 
83 See id. at 3-4 (order granting defendant's motions for leave to conduct clinical inter­
view and intelligence testing on mother and sibling of minor plaintiff). For a more de­
tailed discussion, see infra notes 243-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Campbell 
decision and rationale) . 
14 An affidavit from one of defendant's experts in Campbell , Dr. Lawrence Charnas, 
stated that "there is a strong heritability [of intelligence) from multiple genes that have not 
been well characterized . These multiple genes contribute 50-70% of the predicted intelli­
gence of a child ." Affidavit of Lawrence Charnas at 2, Campbell (No. 92-7771). 
as See id. ("There is a good correlation between the mother's intelligence and her chil­
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vit: 
[T]he relative contribution of genetic and child-rearing factors to IQ is 
not material .... What matters is that parent IQ is a major determinant 
of child IQ whether for genetic or child-rearing reasons. Information 
about parent IQ is thus necessary to make a meaningful judgment about 
the purported causation of observed deficits in child IQ.86 
Similarly, in The Bell Curve, the authors state that intelligence is substan­
tially immutable whether it is genetically inherited or environmentally deter­
mined.87 
The idea that IQ is passed down in individual situations, either genetically 
or environmentally through child rearing practices reinforces the implicit 
idea of genetic determinism-that IQ is inevitable.88 The defendants' success 
in Campbell would have been unlikely had their experts argued only an envi­
ronmental correlation between mother's and child's IQ without claiming that 
a significant portion of such was genetically determined, especially given the 
distinct social meanings of "genetics" versus "environmental influences" and 
the power of genetic narratives. 89 At the same time, however, a genetic ar­
gument would call for testing the father and not the siblings, yet only the 
dren's intelligence."). 
86 Affidavit of Claire B. Emhart at 4, Campbell (No. 92-7771) (emphasis added). In­
terestingly, while Dr. Emhart claims that "parent IQ" significantly determines child IQ, 
the IQ tests sought were of the mother and siblings. See Campbell, No. 92-7771 , at 3-4. 
81 See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 314-15 (noting that there is a statisti­
cal correlation between parents and children, and arguing that this is true whether due to 
genes or environment). Stephen Jay Gould writes: 
[l)f Herrnstein and Murray are wrong, and IQ represents not an immutable thing in 
the head, grading human beings on a single scale of general capacity with large num­
bers of custodial incompetents at the bottom, then the model that generates their 
gloomy vision collapses, and the wonderful variousness of human abilities, properly 
nurtured •. reemerges. 
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, MISMEASURE BY ANY MEASURE (1994), reprinJed in THE BELL 
CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 3, 13; see also CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL. , INEQUALITY 
BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH 195-96 (1996) (discussing issues about re­
lationship between home environment and IQ); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, LIVlNG WITH 
INEQUALITY (1994), reprinted in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 331, 333-34 
(arguing that Herrnstein and Murray's warnings in The Bell Curve against discriminating 
against individual African-Americans on the basis of their collective IQ ratings are inade­
quate). 
88 Plaintiffs' expert in Campbell, Dr. John Rosen, stated that: 
[T]here is no medical or scientific support for the notion that intellectual function or 
capability passes in measurable form from generation to generation. Nor is there any 
medical or scientific basis for an assertion that neuropsychological impairment may 
be caused by a history of family success or failure rather than lead poisoning. 
Affidavit of John F. Rosen at 4-5, Campbell (No. 92-7771). 
89 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing genetic narratives and the possible deficiencies of 
such). 
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mother and siblings were ordered to be tested in Campbell. This result re­
flects the power of maternal determinist notions. The synergistic combina- o 
tion of the primary genetic argument and the subsidiary aspect of maternal 
determinism were convincing.90 Of course, mothers have very significant 
effects on their children, but the idea that mothers determine or cause all of 
their children • s characteristics is false. 91 The idea that genetic inheritance 
causes all children's characteristics is similarly incorrect.92 In any event, 
subjecting mothers to unwanted testing is unjustifiable, regardless of the 
amount of influence mothers may have. 93 
Ill. IQ REsEARCH: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT 
MANIFESTATIONS 
Any discussion of issues pertaining to cognitive ability takes place against 
a powerful historical backdrop-the backdrop of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, 
classist intelligence research. 94 Accompanying this history, there has been 
90 Judge Graae concluded: 
Defendant has demonstrated good cause for the examinations requested as, according 
to the facts alleged by Defendant, the requested tests directly relate to the extent of 
injuries that Plaintiffs allege they have suffered. Defendant has meticulously de­
scribed the role that environmental and genetic factors may play in mental and devel­
opmental deficiencies . . . . Since the tests would be probative on the issues of causa­
tion and damages, while the extent of the inuusion to {the mother and sister] would 
be relatively minor, the equities favor the Defendant. 
CampMll, No. 92-m1, at 3-4. 
9! See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the cuiNral acceptance of 
the notion that mothering determines the characteristics of children, thus ignoring other 
possible causes). 
92 See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (arguing that genetics carmot be used to 
explain all human traits and behavior). 
93 See infra notes 203-13 and accompanying text (arguing that adequate basis for testing 
the mother and siblings of a lead-exposed child is not established). 
94 This history includes central assumptions of African-American genetic intellecrual 
inferiority and has strong connections to eugenics movements and legislation. See infra 
notes 99-111 and accompanying text (discussing the racist history of intelligence research 
and its social and political implications); see also GoULD, supra note 69, at 22 (noting that 
the history of the "scientific" study of intelligence mirrors social movements with result­
ing racist attiNdes, using the eugenics movement as an example); JOHN S. HALLER, JR., 
OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SciENTIFIC AlTITUDES OF RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900, 
at 19-34 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that the Civil War was a catalyst in the anthropemetry 
movement that had far reaching effects on institutionalized racism, giving it "scientific" 
support); LEON J. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND Pourrcs OF IQ 6 (1974) (discussing the 
"Stanford-Binet" test that was accompanied by claims that it would result in "curtailing 
the reproduction of feeble-mindedness"); WILLIAM STANTON, THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS: 
SCIENTIFIC AlTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA 1815-59, at 24-44 (1960) (discussing 
the craniology movement of the nineteenth century and its "findings" that Caucasians were 
intellectually superior because of a larger interior cranial capacity); TUCKER, supra note 
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wide-ranging questioning of IQ testiog.9S In the 1920s , for example , Walter 
Lippman attacked the idea of measuring IQ.96 Moreover, some courts have 
held IQ tests unconstitutional when used to classify African-American chil­
dren in schools.97 At the same time, however, research into the harmful ef­
fects of lead exposure on children often focuses on IQ loss.98 This Pan ar­
gues that it is possible, and necessary, to recognize the racist history, the 
current legacy of intelligence testing, and the limits of traditional intelligence 
testing, while acknowledging that loss of IQ can be indicative of some nega­
tive effect. 
A. Historical Background 
A backdrop to present day discussions of IQ is the historical use of 
"science" to argue that African-Americans are genetically intellectually infe­
rior99 and that intelligence is genetically inherited . 100 Many early twentieth 
69, at 61-71 (describing the eugenics movement as being bolstered by the study of genetics 
and the quest to breed "better humans"); Richard Delgado et at. , Can Science Be lnop­
poiTIUie? Constitutional Validity of Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 
UCLA L. REv. 128, 131-34 (1983) (noting that IQ research that attributes intellectual dif­
fe~nces to group status, especially race, has a long history); Horsburgh, supra note 60, at 
546-55 (discussing the influence of IQ testing on eugenics practices) . See generally Larry 
P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 935-59 (N.D . Cal . 1979) (recounting discriminatory history 
of development and use of IQ tests in California). 
" See infra notes 115-40 a.nd accompanying text (discussing criticism of IQ testing). 
96 See WALTER LIPPMANN, A FUTURE FOR THE TEsTS (1922), rtprinled in THE BELL 
CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 566, 569 (arguing that no test can measu~ hereditary 
intelligence). 
1ft See, e.g., Larry P. v . Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that 
the administration of IQ tests to determine which students were "educable retarded" vio­
lated the Fourteenth Amendment); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (holding that track system based on IQ scores discriminates against disadvantaged 
students) . 
98 It should also be emphasized that the problem of lead exposure disproportionately 
affects African-American and poor children. See supra note 20 and accompanying text 
(discussing scientific surveys that find that lead exposure affects African-Americans in 
numbers disproportionate to their numbers in the population). 
99 Arguments for the inherent intellectual inferiority of African-Americans have been a 
cornerstone of white supremacy. See, e.g., GoULD, supra note 69, at 77-82 (discussing 
the 1906 craniometric study by Robert Bennett Bean that concluded that because the front 
of whites' brains are larger than those of African-Americans'. the latter a~ intellectually 
inferior); HAllER, supra note 94, at 82 (discussing scientist Josiah Notts's theory that 
mulattos a~ intellectually inferior to whites and intellectually superior to African­
Americans); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK at xii (discussing Thomas Jeffer­
son's belief that African-Americans are intellectually inferior to whites); id. at 187-89 
(discussing eighteenth century conceptions of intelligence and the related belief that Afri­
can-Americans we~ unintelligent); STANTON, supra note 94, at 35-37 (discussing phre­
nologist George Combe's study and comparison of African-Americans, Native American, 
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century mental testing advocates were also active in the eugenics move­
ment.lOJ This movement was instrumental in passing anti-immigration legis­
lation,102 miscegenation legislation, 103 and sterilization legislation. 104 The 
and Anglo-Saxons); TUCKER, supra note 69, at 169 (discussing works by racist leader 
Henry E. Garrett, including a pamphlet entitled IQ and Racial Differences); see also 
KAMIN, supra note 94, at 176-77 (arguing that early IQ tests were inherently biased; citing 
a World War I Army Alpha test that asked questions about names of baseball teams and 
manufacturers of American fireanns). 
For a recent detailed review of the role of intelligence research in furthering ideas of 
racism.and eugenic practices, see Horsburgh, supra note 60, at 538-55 (describing studies 
in the nineteenth century that llWntained the intellectual inferiority of African-Americans, 
and noting that such gave support to the eugenics movement and social policy such as seg­
regation and miscegenation laws and immigration policy). For a thorough historical sum­
mary, see Delgado et al., supra note 94, at 131-44 (recounting the history of controversy 
surrounding theories of race and IQ from the late 1800s through the early 1980s); Randall 
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745, 1751-54 (1989) 
(summarizing history of ideas and practices assuming African-American intellectual inferi­
ority). As Professor Randall KeMedy has noted, "of all the many racially derogatory 
comments about people of color, particularly Negroes, none has been more hurtful, corro­
sive, and influential than the charge that they are intellectually inferior to whites." /d. at 
1751. 
Deterministic white assumptions of black intellectual inferiority were part of the justifi­
cation for exclusion of blacks from participation in all aspects of academia throughout the 
century following slavery's abolition. See id. (noting that the denial of education to Afri­
can-Americans was facilitated by the acceptance of the idea of African-American intellec­
tual inferiority). For an example of the widespread academic acceptance of the inferiority 
of African Americans, see WALTER FRANCIS WILLCOX, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, THE 
NEGRO {1911), reprinted in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 438, 438-39 
(under the entry for "negro," asserting that "mentally the negro is inferior to the white" 
and that mostly "the mental constitution of the negro is very similar to that of a child"). 
100 See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (discussing how notions of racial 
categorization and inheritance of "racial" characteristics were used to bolster white su­
premacy). 
101 See Horsburgh, supra note 60, at 547 (discussing IQ testing advocates and their re­
lated contribution to eugenics). For additional historical background, see generally Gar­
land E. Allen, Eugenics Comes to America, in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, 
at 441 (recounting the historical development of the American eugenics movement in the 
early 1900s); LEON J. KAMIN, THE PIONEERS OF IQ TEsTING (1994), excerpted in THE 
BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 476, 476-507 (recounting the history of IQ testing 
and its impact on American society from 1900-1930s). For statements made by eugenics 
advocates, see generally FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY TALENT AND CHARACTER (1865), 
reprinted in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 393 (outlining fundamental 
eugenic theory); KARL PEARSON, ON BREEDING GOOD STOCK (1903), reprinted in THE 
BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 410 (analogizing humans to breeding animals and 
arguing that to preserve "good stock" in humans, humans must breed accordingly). 
102 The immigration law was the Immigration Act of 1924. §§ 31-32, 153-164, 43 Stat. 
190, which limited immigration of southern and eastern Europeans, especially Jews and 
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most famous legal monument to the eugenics movement was Buck v. Bel1, 1os 
in which Justice Holmes, upholding a 1924 Virginia statute allowing invol­
untary sterilization of "mental defectives, " 106 wrote that "[t]hree generations 
of imbeciles are enough. " 107 
Italians. See Paul A. Lombardo, MiscegeTIIJlion, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Foot­
notes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 421, 423 (1988) (observing that the 
eugenics movement was instrumental in passing the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924). 
I03 See, e.g., An Act to Preserve Raciallruegrity, 1924 Va. Acts ch. 371. This Act, 
which decreed that in Virginia no white person could marry anyone other than another 
white person, remained law until the Supreme Court struck it down in Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967). See Lombardo, supra note 102, at 423. Thirty U.S. states had laws 
forbidding racial miscegenation as of 1940. See Horsburgh, supra note 60, at 545 (citing 
Robert N. Proctor, Genetics and Eugenics: How Fair is the Comparison, in GENE 
MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 57, 61 (George J. Ames & Shennan Elias 
eds., 1992)). 
104 For example, the 1924 Virginia law calling for sterilization of epileptics and the fee­
ble minded was passed in large part through the efforts of members of the eugenics 
movement. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Lighl on Buck 
v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 30, 32-33 (1985) (discussing the role of Strode, Whitehead, 
and Priddy, who were active in the eugenics movement, and arguing that they were critical 
to the passage of the Virginia sterilization law). This was one of thirty statutes passed be­
fore 1931 that authorized some fonn of involuntary sterilization. See Horsburgh, supra 
note 60, at 554 {citing HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 25). 
105 274 u.s. 200 (1927). 
106 The plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was a "feeble minded white woman" committed to the 
State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, and was "the daughter of a feeble minded 
mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble minded child." /d. 
at 205. According to Professor Gould, Buck would not be considered mentally deficient 
by today's standards. See Gouw, supra note 69, at 335-36. 
107 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. Regarding Justice Holmes's views pertaining to race and 
eugenics, see Kastely, supra note 11, at 301-02 (discussing Justice Holmes's views in fa­
vor of eugenics). 
The Bell Curve brings this history to the fore, making arguments similar in structure and 
form to those made by early twentieth century mental testing advocates. See Derrick Z. 
Jackson, 141 Years lAter. Bigotry Still Sells, .BoSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 1995, at A1S 
(comparing quotes from Josiah Nott and George Glidden in 1854 to quotes from The Bell 
Curve, and concluding that The Bell Curve is essentially non-distinct from Nott and Glid­
den's "niggerology"). For example, ideas in The Bell Curve that are similar to those of 
early mental testing and eugenics advocates include the following: those who rise to the 
top do so because they are the most competent. see HERRNSTEIN & MURRAv, supra note 
19, at 25-115 (using statistical analysis to argue that those with "elite" intelligence attend 
elite universities, bold elite occupations, and increasingly mate with others of elite intelli­
gence, and concluding that this is the result of cognitive ability); things are getting worse 
because the poor/ not sman are having more children than the rich/smart, set id. at 341-68 
("Mounting evidence indicates that demographic trends are exerting downward pressure on 
the distribution of cognitive ability in the United States and that the pressures are strong 
enough to have social consequences."); and society is being threatened by unintelligent 
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Society's emphasis on certain genetic ties and heritability of race has also 
played a part in the establishment of white supremacy. 108 Professor Dorothy 
Roberts and others have shown, for example, that while children of white 
male slaveowners and their white wives enjoyed the inheritance rights and 
social status of their fathers, the biological links between slaveowners and 
their children borne by African-American slave women were ignored.109 
Laws excluding anyone with "any trace of Negro blood" from membership 
in the white race reflect this focus on defining race as tied to genetics. 110 
Miscegenation laws were also aimed at keeping the "blood" of the white race 
pure and uncontaminated by "black blood," which was thought to transmit 
inferior intellect and other inferior traits . 111 
The racist and otherwise bigoted history of intelligence research and the 
use of genetic ties to further racism form a powerful combination in debates 
on race, intelligence, and genetics. 
B. 	 Heritability 
Central to much of the debate regarding IQ and intelligence is the issue of 
whether and to what extent IQ. is genetically inherited. The Bell Curve 
authors claim that intelligence is forty to eighty percent "heritable. " 112 The 
concept of "heritability" is group-based, and does not apply to an individ­
ual's IQ : 
Heritability . . . is a ratio that ranges between 0 and 1 and measures the 
relative contribution of genes to the variation observed in a trait .. .. 
[H]eritability describes something about a population of people, not an 
immigrants, see id. at 356-69 (asserting that America has increasing social problems and 
implying that it is a result of low IQ among immigrants). 
108 See Roberts, supra note 60, at 223-30 ("The genetic tie's prominence in defining 
personal identity arose in the context of a racial caste system that preserved white suprem­
acy through a rule of racial purity . "); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 
106 HARV. L . REV. 1707, 1738 (1993) (arguing that white supremacy was influenced by 
ideas of the inheritability of race and the invention of "race" itself). 
109 See Roberts, supra note 60, at 225-30 (discussing several reasons why slave status 
passed through the mother, including increasing the capital assets of the master/father); see 
also MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY 
OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (1994) (discussing the historic practice of 
basing a child's status on the father's status unless the mother was African-American); 
Harris, supra note 108, at 1738-39 (noting that under common law, a child 's status was 
determined by her father's status, but during the slave era, status passed through the 
mother) . 
110 Roberts, supra note 60, at 228-29 (citation omitted) (discussing common law and 
statutes defining the ancestry of different races, noting that the "black genetic tie, no mat­
ter how minuscule, both contaminat[ed] and subordinat[ed]"). 
111 See id. at 229 ("Racist ideology dictated that Black bodies, intellect, character, and 
culture were all inherently vulgar ."). 
Ill See H ERRNSTElN & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 105. 
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individual. It makes no more sense to talk about the heritability of an 
individual's IQ than it does to talk about his birthrate. A given individ­
ual's IQ may have been greatly affected by his special circumstances 
even though IQ is substantially heritable in the population as a 
whole . . . . [I]he heritability of a trait may change when the conditions 
producing variation change.tl3 
As the quotation notes, heritability does not mean that environmental influ­
ences will have no affect on the heritable trait. 11" Arguably, if the heritabil­
ity varies depending on environmental conditions, then a heritability estimate 
of forty to eighty percent seems to mean little or nothing. 
C. 	 Bias 
One of the central issues of the intelligence debate, since the inception of 
mental ability testing, has been whether test results reflect test takers' genu­
ine innate ability, opportunities, neither, or both.ll5 The issue of whether 
m /d. at 106; see also TUCKER, supra note 69, at 221-24 ("Since heritability is the pro­
portion of differences between persons that is genetic, it is applicable only to groups, not 
to individuals ."); Marcus W. Feldman, Heritability: Some Theoretical Ambiguities, in 
KEYWORDS IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 151, 151 (Evelyn Fox Keller & Elisabeth Lloyd 
eds., 1992) ("[H]eritability is a number between zero and one which is intended to indi­
cate ... the variance among genotypic means in the population."); PAT SHIPMAN, LEGACY 
OF RACISM (1994}, reprinred in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 325 , 327 
(noting that heritability is "always time- and population-specific" and that "[s]ome popu­
lations have a genuinely higher heritability for intelligence than others, which renders 
cross-population comparisons of IQ and its correlates problematic"). 
114 	 Cf. Halley, supra note 60, at 522-23 (discussing differences in identical twins). 
liS For examples of the early debate, see WALTER LIPPMAN, A FUTURE FOR THE TEsTs 
(1922), reprinred in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 566, 569 (arguing that 
attempts to design tests to "discount training and knowledge" have made them less useful); 
LEWIS H. TERMAN, THE MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE (1916), reprinted in THE BELL 
CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 542, 543 (noting early recognition of errors in assump­
tions of the first tests). For examples of the current debate, see HERRNSTEIN & MURRAy, 
supra note 19, at 23 ("Properly administered IQ tests are not demonstrably biased against 
social, economic, ethnic, or racial groups."); GoULD, supra note 87, at 3, 9-10 
(discussing the absence of statistical bias and the inability to scientifically control for cul­
tural bias); ARTHUR R. JENSEN, PAROXYSMS OF DENIAL (1994), reprinred in THE BELL 
CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 335, 335-36 ("The IQ distribution in two population 
groups socially recognized as 'black' and 'white' is represented by two largely overlapping 
bell curves with the means separated by about 15 points, a difference not due to test 
bias."); KAMIN , supra note 60, at 81, 91 (criticizing Herrnstein and Murray for 
"dismiss(ing socioeconomic status] as a major factor •.. on the self-reports of young­
sters"). For an approach that examines IQ and mental ability internationally, see THOMAS 
SoWELL, RAcE AND CULTURE 157-58 (1994) (describing international differences in intelli­
gence test performance), and historically, see id. at 224-58 (arguing that any discussion of 
IQ and mental ability must consider history). 
1050 BOSI'ON UNJVERSrrY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1025 
and how IQ tests are biased has provoked much controversy over the last 
three decades.ll6 The authors of The Bell Curve claim that the tests used in 
their analysis were not biased against African-Americans or other groups.m 
Professor Stephen Jay Gould approaches the issue by stating: 
As for . . . cultural bias, the presentation of it in The Bell Curve 
matches Arthur Jensen's and that of other hereditarians, in confusing a 
technical (and proper) meaning of 'bias' (I call it S-bias, for 'statistical') 
with the entirely different vernacular concept (I call it V-bias) that pro­
vokes popular debate. All these authors swear up and down (and I 
agree with them completely) that the tests are not biased-in the statisti­
cian's definition. Lack of S-bias means that the same score, when it is 
achieved by members of different groups, predicts the same thing; that 
is, a black person and a white person with identical scores will have the 
same probabilities of doing anything that IQ is supposed to predict. 
But V-bias , the source of public concern, embodies an entirely dif­
ferent issue, which, unfortunately, uses the same word. The public 
wants to know whether blacks average 85 and whites 100 because soci­
ety treats blacks unfairly-that is, whether lower black scores record bi­
ases in the social sense. And this crucial question (to which we do not 
know the answer) cannot be addressed by a demonstration that S-bias 
doesn't exist, which is the only issue analyzed. however correctly, in 
The Bell Curve. 118 
In essence, Gould argues that IQ scores are equally predictive for African­
116 See, e.g., HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 280-86 (arguing that there is 
no evidence of external or internal bias); THEOOOSIUS DoBZHAMSKY, DIFFERENCES ARE 
NOT DEFICITS, reprinJed in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE, supra note 60, at 630, 632 (noting 
that there is "always the danger that IQ tests are biased in favor of the race, social class, 
or culture of those who devised the tests"). 
117 See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 22-23 (claiming that IQ tests were 
not biased toward any ethnicities): The Bell Curve discussed correlations between the 
Armed Forces Qualifying Test (" AFQT") and educational level, income, ethnic back­
ground, and other measures. The correlations were based on a multiple regression analy­
sis of a large data set, the Ni!tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which began in 1979, 
and has followed more than 12,000 Americans aged 14-22, all of whom had taken the 
AFQT. See id. at 118-20. Herrnstein and Murray characterize the AFQT as an IQ test. 
See id. at 580 (noting that the AFQT qualifies as one of the "beuer" IQ tests) . The weak­
ness of the correlations and the errors made in The Bell Curve are discussed at length 
throughout Inequality by Design. See generally FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87 (criticizing 
the data on which The Bell Curve authors rely); GoULD, supra note 87, at 9-10 (discussing 
the weakness of the correlations used in The Bell Curve). Professor Stephen Jay Gould 
wrote that the authors used "the most appropriate technique and the best source of infor­
mation[,)" but argued that their conclusions could not be "either supported or denied-by 
such a restrict ive approach." /d. at 7-8. 
118 GoULD, supra note 87, at 9-10. 
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Americans and whites, but that the issue remains open as to whether or not 
the lower average African-American score is due to societal discrimina­
tion.119 
The authors of Inequality lJy Design go further, concluding that "[g]roups 
"
120score unequally on tests because they are unequal in society. They pro­
pose that the socioeconomic deprivation, segregation, and stigmatized iden­
tity121 of those in subordinate groups lead to lower IQ scores. 122 They sup­
port their argument with cross-culrural and historical materials indicating that 
the IQ scores of subordinate groups increase as the groups move toward par­
ity with dominant groups.l23 In the last twenty years, the advantage whites 
have had over African-Americans in standardized testing has "narrowed by 
the equivalent of several IQ points." 124 The authors also assert that the pre­
dictive value of IQ tests has been exaggerated. 125 Thus, Inequality lJy Design 
119 An American Psychological Association Task Force report takes a similar position. 
See American Psychol. Ass'n Task Force, Intelligence: Known.s and Unknowns, 51 AM. 
PsYCHOLOGIST 7, 93-94 (1996) [hereinafter Task Force) (noting that the difference in IQ 
scores between African-Americans and whites may be due to socioeconomic factors and 
discrimination). The report also asserts that IQ tests predict school performance reasona­
bly well, and that they predict school performance for African-Americans as accurately as 
for whites, so that as predictors of school performance, they do not seem to be biased 
against African-Americans in a statistical sense. See id. at 93. 
120 FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 72. 
121 For example, researchers studying test performance of African-Americans have 
found that they do worse when told a test is of cognitive ability than when told the same 
test is not of cognitive ability. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat 
and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PsYCHOL. 797, 808 ( 1995) (finding that mere knowledge that a test measures cognitive 
ability is enough to lower African-American participants' performance); see also Claude 
M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, 269 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 68, 68 
(1992) (asserting that the stigma connected to academic achievement among African­
Americans is underappreciated). 
122 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 194-202 (discussing Jonathan Crane's study, 
which found six specific social factors that together could account for the difference in test 
pe_rformance). . 
tn See id. at 190-93 (discussing the increasing parity of IQ scores as the status changed 
of groups such as Eastern Europeans in the U.S. and Afrilcaaners in South Africa). 
124 /d. at 188. Also, IQs generally have been rising worldwide ever since testing began, 
an unexplained phenomenon lmown as the Flynn Effect. See Task Force, supra note 119, 
at 89-90 (describing the "Flynn Effect, " which maintains that intelligence test performance 
has steadily increased, about 3 IQ points per decade, since testing began) . 
125 See Fred E. Fiedler & Thomas G. Link, Leader lnteUigence, Interpersonal Stress, 
and Task Performance, in MIND IN CONTEXT: INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN 
INTELLIGENCE 152, 152 (Robert J. Sternberg & Richard K. Wagner eds. , 1994) 
[hereinafter MIND IN CONTEXT] (noting that cognitive ability tests are poor predictors of 
performance); Richard K. Wagner, Content C<Junts: The Case ofCognitive-Ability Testing 
for Job Selection, in MIND IN CONTEXT, supra, at 133, 148-49 (concluding that the validity 
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provides a powerful argument that the relatively poor performance by some 
groups on such tests is due to social and political factors rather than race or 
genetics. 126 
D. 	 The Uses ofIQ 
The proper uses of IQ tests have been a critical issue since their develop­
ment. 127 Although their developer, Alfred Binet, 128 believed that they had 
limited purposes, 129 others, such as Hermstein and Murray, believe that they 
should be broadly utilized. 13° Hermstein and Murray believe that IQ scores 
and usefulness of cognitive ability tests is exaggerated). 
126 The poor quality of schools in many inner city areas might be such a factor. See 
JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 83 (1991) (arguing that the poor quality of inner 
city schools results in the denial of "the means of competition"). William Julius Wilson 
discusses research about cognitive gains made by inner city children in early educational 
programs, which tend to dissipate as children get older. See WILSON, supra note 40, at xv 
(discussing the Head Start "fade-out," which is the long term decline of any benefits that 
children derive from such programs). Wilson claims that given the harshness of the urban 
environment faced by such children, it should be expected that cognitive gains disappear as 
the children get older. See id. at xv-xvi. By contrast, The Bell Curve authors claim that 
quality of schools is a relatively unimportant contributor to IQ, see HERRNSTEJN & 
MURRAY, supra note 19, at 398 (concluding that "the amount or objective quality of 
schooling in America caiUlOt be counted on to equalize cognitive ability much"), and that 
the dissipation of cognitive gains after preschool programs end is evidence of the limited 
mutability of IQ scores, see id. at 403-10 (discussing the Head Start program and others 
that do not appear to have long term effects on IQ, although they show short term gains). 
These conclusions form part of the basis of their conclusion that cognitive ability is 
"substantially heritable." See id. at 23. 
127 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 27 (noting that tests have been used for both 
good and ill, from promoting eugenics to identifying gifted children to provide them with 
opportunities). Other countries, such as Japan and China, use IQ tests sparingly compared 
with the United States. See HAROLD STEVENSON & JAMES W. STIGLER, THE LEARNING 
GAP: WHY OUR SCHOOLS ARE FAIUNG AND WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM JAPANESE AND 
CHINESE EDUCATION 97 (1992) (noting that Asian societies make more restrictive use of 
intelligence than the U.S., in part ~use of the Asian emphasis on effort, which differs 
from the American emphasis on innate ability). 
128 See GoULD, supra note 69, at 149 (discussing Alfred Binet's approaches to measur­
ing intelligence, noting that his "1908 version established the criterion used in measuring 
the so-called IQ ever since"). 
129 See id. at 155 (noting that Binet believed that the tests do not define innate or per­
manent qualities, that the tests should be used only as a rough guide to identify children in 
need of special help, and that "[I]ow scores shall not be used to mark children as innately 
incapable"). These limitations have aJI been ignored, to society's detriment, according to 
Gould. See id. 
130 In The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray lament that the use of IQ tests in society, 
particularly in employment, has been limited by court decisions finding them discrimina­
tory. See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 19, at 63-89 (arguing that legislation and 
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have tremendous significance and should be used as a basis for generating 
social policy . 131 Their work disregards other research suggesting that human 
ability cannot be measured by a single score, and that IQ scores as tradition­
ally measured are less significant ·and more malleable than the authors be­
lieve.l32 To base a whole set of judgments and policy decisions on statistical 
correlations with a test that may or may not be a valid test of intelligence is 
to unjustifiably reify the importance of IQ scores. Moreover, such reliance 
has dangerous implications.m 
Critics of The Bell Curve tend not to discuss any appropriate uses of IQ 
scores. Nevertheless, many critics . might agree with various state criminal 
statutes that forbid the execution of persons deemed to have very limited 
mental ability or include limited mental ability as a mitigating factor in sen­
tencing.134 In the context of criminal defense, critics might be likely to agree 
court decisions that limit the use of IQ in hiring have significant negative effects on the 
economy). 
131 See id. at 106. 
132 Compare i d. at 120, 579 (noting that the Armed Forces Qualification Test 
('"AFQT") is a good measure of cognitive ability), with FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 
12, 40-43, 59-69 (characterizing the AFQT as a test of learned knowledge), and WILSON, 
supra note 40, at xvi (arguing that the AFQT is an achievement test, the results of which 
can be affected by additional schooling). 
133 Possibilities of a revival of eugenics are presented by the arguments in The Bell 
Curve, as the authors acknowledge. See supra note 60 (acknowledging that some may 
view The Bell Curve as support for eugenics and other manipulation of reproduction) . The 
former editor-in-chief of Science magazine. Daniel Koshland wrote: 
If a child destined to have a permanently low IQ could be cured by replacing a gene. 
would anyone really argue against that? .•• It is a short step from that decision to 
improving a normal IQ. Is there an argument against making superior individuals? 
Not superior morally, and not superior philosophically, just superior in certain skills: 
better at computers, better as musicians, better physically. As society gets more 
complex, perhaps it must select for individuals more capable of coping with its com­
plex problems .. .. 
HuBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 115-16 (quoting Daniel E. Koshland, Jr. , The Fu­
ture ofBiological Research: What is Possible and What Is Ethical?, 3 MBL SCIENCE 10­
15 (1988-89)) ; see also Horsburgh. supra note 60, at 561-66 (exploring potential links 
between ideas in The Bell Curve and eugenics). 
134 See, e.g . • 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5·5-3 . 1( 13) (West 1992) (defendant 's 
mental retardation is mitigating factor in criminal sentencing); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
532.130, 532. 140 (Michie 1990) ("[s]eriously mentally retarded defendant" is not subject 
to execution; one of the requirements for being a "seriously mentally retarded defendant" 
is IQ of70 or below): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A.1340.169(e) (1995) (limited m~ntal capac­
ity of defendant is mitigating factor in criminal sentencing); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13­
203 (1991) ("mentally retarded defendant" not subject to execution: one of necessary fac­
tors is IQ of 70 or below). Some of these stawtes specify certain IQ levels as one of the 
factors in determining whether the defendant meets the standard. See, e.g., KY. R EV . 
STAT. ANN. §§ 532 . 130, 532. 140 (using IQ of 70 as cutoff for eligibility for execut ion) ; 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (same). In addition, the mental condition of a victim can 
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with the arguments that a person's IQ is so low that a confession or strategy 
decision was not voluntary. 135 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the use of IQ tests to place children in classes for 
mentally retarded students, or to track students of supposedly different ability 
levels, was successfully challenged on federal constitutional and statutory 
grounds.I36 The authors of Inequality by Design, however, recognize that 
extremely low IQ scores are indicative of mental retardation and/or mental 
handicap, and thus acknowledge that scores have meaning in some con­
texts.137 
Professors Herbert Needleman and David Bellinger, two prominent lead 
researchers, have noted the limitations of standardized IQ tests in lead re­
search, stating that, "[a] global measure, such as an intelligence test, may 
not be the most valid or sensitive measure of the quality, efficiency, or flexi­
bility of a child's cognition or of any effects lead may have on it. "138 This is 
because, as cognitive psychology has shown, "cognitive function is not 
monolithic but the result of complex, context-dependent interplay among 
numerous aspects of information processing. " 139 Nevertheless, using stan­
dardized IQ tests has been a practical way to proceed with research. Profes­
be an aggravating factor in sentencing. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A.1340.16(d)(ll) 
(aggravating factors include the victim being mentally handicapped); State v. Turner, 406 
S.E.2d 147, 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding judge's finding that victim was espe­
cially vulnerable as aggravating factor in sentence because, among other reasons, she had 
an IQ in the mildly handicapped range-45-60). 
m These defenses, however, are often unsuccessful. See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 368 
N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (rejecting claim that guilty plea was involuntary be­
cause of defendant's low IQ-71-and mental condition); In re J.W.K., 724 P.2d 164, 164 
(Mont. 1986) (rejecting the claim that confession was involuntary because of defendant's 
diminished mental capacity-IQ of 86-and evidence of mental illness); People v. Chafee, 
42 A.D.2d 172, 173-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (holding that low IQ did not render confes­
sion involuntary). 
136 See, e .g., Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 985 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (invalidating 
use of IQ tests in placing children in special classes for the educable retarded because there 
was no showing of compelling state interest in the use of IQ where the program had an 
overwhelming effect on African-American enrollment); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 
401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that track system based on IQ scores discriminates 
against disadvantaged students). 
13'7 See FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 65-66 (criticizing The Bell Curve for including 
test results for mentally retarded and mentally handicapped people in the sample used for 
analysis). The authors of Inequality by Design also state that the SAT "can be useful when 
applied properly." /d. at 45. 
138 David Bellinger & Herbert L. Needleman, Neurodevelopmental Effects ofLow-Level 
Lead Exposure in Children, in HUMAN LEAD EXPOSURE 195 (Herbert L. Needleman ed.• 
1992). 
139 /d. Indeed, the most effective way to get a comprehensive picture of a child's cog­
nitive function is through a thorough neuropsychological examination. See MURIEL 
DEUTSCH L EZAK, NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 75-85 (3d ed. 1995). 
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sors Needleman and Bellinger state that: 
[I]ntelligence tests ... have played an important role in neurotoxi­
cological assessment. Their administration and scoring are standardized 
and familiar, facilitating comparison of results from different studies. 
One should bear in mind that small changes in integrative indices such 
as IQ scores may be markers of substantial changes in more basic cog­
nitive competences.t40 
In sum, despite the limitations of IQ tests, they can provide useful informa­
tion in some circumstances and an IQ loss can be indicative of a negative ef­
fect.141 
IV. THE DISCOVERY SHIFT FROM THE PLAINTIFF TO THE MOTHER AND 

FAMILY 

A. 	 The Plaintiff-Centered Discovery Framework 
Traditionally. the tort system focused on individuals.l42 Consistent with 
this focus is the basic principle that a personal injury claim brought by an in­
dividual places that person's physical and, in some cases, mental condition at 
issue, thereby waiving whatever confidentiality protections she otherwise has 
over her medical records. 143 Very little attention is paid to questions of the 
defense's right to seek other persons' medical or personal records, 144 or of 
140 	 Bellinger & Needleman, supra note 138, at 195. 
141 Plaintiffs bringing claims for lead-caused injuries argue that reduced IQ and other 
functioning result in reduced earning capacity and lost earnings. See Benjamin Hiller & 
Jeffrey M. Feuer, Expert Testimony in Childhood Lead-Poisoning Cases, TRIAL, Mar. 
1991, at 46 (noting that damages sought by lead-exposed plaintiffs include lost earnings 
and reduced earning capacity). This context might be an interesting one in which to con­
sider Professor Martha Chamallas's argument that data used to estimate lost earnings ca­
pacity should be based on average figures rather than gender- or race-specific figures. See 
Chamallas, supra note 11, at 75-76 . (arguing that using race- and gender-specific future 
earnings data unjustifiably reduces the tort awards of women and minorities, while unjusti­
fiably raising the recoveries of white men).
142 See, e.g. , Judith Resnick et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, 
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 298 (1996) ("Individualism pervades 
the traditional conception of civil litigation within the United States ... . ") . 
143 See Rothstein, supra note 37, at 887-89 (noting that discovery requests for plaintiffs' 
records are rarely challenged and usually granted). 
144 See supra note 64 (defining "personal records" as used in this Article). In personal 
injury cases it is generally the condition of the plaintiff that is at issue, but occasionally 
issues arise concerning the physical condition of persons other than the plaintiff. See, 
e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964) (considering whether to order an 
examination of a bus driver involved in an accident and concluding that an eye exam could 
be ordered). To my knowledge, however, no defendant in a car accident case has sought 
access to the medical records of the plaintiffs relatives to argue that the plaintiff's injuries 
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the court's ability to order mental or physical examinations of non-parties. 145 
There is a widespread, but largely implicit, understanding that such records 
either are not relevant or are privileged, and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure indicate that examinations of non-parties are not allowed . t46 Tradi­
tional tort discovery has recognized and endorsed these personal boundaries. 
In a departure from this implicit understanding, defendants in eight hun­
dred consolidated DES cases in the early 1990s sought the medical records 
of mothers of DES plaintiffs, arguing that such records were necessary to 
determine whether the plaintiffs' injuries were caused by genetic factors or 
exposure to defendants' products. 147 The court held that the plaintiffs' 
waiver of their own doctor-patient privileges did not constitute a waiver of 
relatives' equivalent privileges; therefore, the records were not discover­
able.t4s The court noted the dangers of th.is type of discovery and the neces­
sity for privacy protections in the face of increasing intrusions. 149 Thus, the 
plaintiff-centered discovery framework persisted, despite the challenge posed 
by the DES cases . 
Aside from the DES cases and recent developments in the lead arena, 
medical records of non-parties have also been sought to a limited degree in 
some cases in which plaintiffs claim that injuries to a child occurred in utero 
or during delivery . tso In such instances , some defendants have sought rec-
had been exaggerated or had other causes. 
14
' See infra notes 214-49 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Pro­
cedure 35 and its state law correlates). 
146 1be Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in pertinent part: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant 
to the subj ect matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other 
party .... The infonnation sought need not be admissible at the trial if the informa­
tion sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi­
dence. 
FED. R. Ctv . P. 26(b)(l). Rule 35(a) allows examinations only of parties or persons in 
control or custody of parties. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 35(a). 
147 See In reNew York County D.E.S. Litig., 570 N. Y.S.2d 804, 804-05 (App . Div. 
1991) (holding that approximately 800 plaintiffs who brought suit against various drug 
companies for birth defects allegedly caused by ingestion of defendants' products were not 
required to release medical information of non-party family members). 
148 See id. at 806. The lower court held that because some of the plaintiffs' medical 
records contained medical history of the plaintiffs' family members, the plaintiffs' family 
members had waived their own doctor-patient privilege by telling the plaintiffs of their 
medical condition, and thus those relatives' records were not protected. See Cerisse An­
derson, Discovery Limited in DES Suits- Privacy Considerations Bar Access to Re/4Jives' 
Medical Records, N .Y. L.J., May 29, 1991, at 1 (reporting on plaintiffs' successful appeal 
of discovery issue); Cerisse Anderson, DES Plointif!s Lose Bid to Curve Discovery, N .Y . 
L.J., Aug. 31, 1990, at 1 (reporting on lower court opinion). 
149 See D.E.S. Litig., S10 N.Y.S.2d at 806. 
150 See, e.g. , Vincent v. Connaught Labs , Inc., 131 F .R .D . 1S6, 159 (E.D . Mo. 1990) 
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ords of a mother's other pregnancies and deliveries to challenge causation. 
Despite the exception of pregnancy and delivery-related injuries, medical and 
personal records of non-parties are generally not obtainable in litigation. 
Currently. childhood lead exposure litigation is the major area of tort liti­
gation in which the defense seeks personal records and physical and mental 
examinations of non-parties. Damages are sought for injuries such as cogni­
tive deficits, speech problems, learning disabilities, and lowered IQ. 151 Al­
though these types of claims are not unique to lead exposure , 132 the practice 
of defel)dants seeking testing , examination, or records of non-party relatives 
is not conventional in other types of cases . m Rather, through thorough ex­
(granting motion compelling mother to permit discovery of her pregnancy and birth rec­
ords for other children born before the brain-damaged infant); Palay v. Superior Court , 22 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 849 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that prenatal medical records of non-party 
mother were discoverable and not subject to claim of physician-patient privilege or a right 
to privacy); Williams v . Roosevelt Hosp., 488 N.E .2d 94, 97 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that in 
a medical malpractice case where father and child sued for child's alleged brain damage 
from negligent obstetrical care, non-party mother must answer general questions as to 
health history and physical condition of minor child, but can invoke doctor-patient privi­
lege to avoid telling of confidential communications); Kaplowitz v. Borden, Inc., 594 
N.Y.S .2d 744, 746 (App. Div. 199.3) (holding that mother waived her physician-patient 
privilege by alleging that defendant's actions affected mother' s and child's health); Schar­
lack v. Rictunond Mem'l Hosp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that 
non-party mother is deemed to have waived physician-patient privilege with respect to rec· 
ords relating to the period when the child was in urero, but can invoke physician-patient 
privilege regarding records of other pregnancies). 
tsl See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text (noting that scientific studies have 
found causal links between lead exposure and such effects as speech problems, learning 
disabilities, and other cognitive defects) . Non-parties in this discussion refers to individu­
als other than the lead-exposed child. They may in fact be parties to the litigation as next 
friends or other appropriate designation or because of their own claims of emotional dis­
tress. See infra notes 302.05 and accompanying text (regarding legal status of parents in 
childhood lead exposure litigation). 
sn See, e.g., Mercado v. Atuned, 974 F.2d 863, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1992) (claiming 
damages for six-year-old's head injury, including impairments processing visual and audi­
tory information, and reading, writing, and arithmetic); Coastal States Gas Producing Co. 
v. Locker, 436 S.W.2d 592, 596-97 (Tex. 1968) (claiming four-year-old child's head in­
jury from an automobile accident to be the cause of mental impairment and subsequent be· 
havioral changes). 
See David R. Price & Paul R. Lees-Haley, Defending Claims of Postconcussion 
Syndrome, 62 DEF. COUNS. J . 589, 592-93 (1995) (proposing numerous avenues for cau­
sation defenses to head injury claims without suggesting the examination of records of 
non-parties); Judith F. Tartaglia & Kevin F. Amatuzio, Using Substantial Factor Analysis 
in Closed Head Injury Cases, FoR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 1991, at 19, 23 (stressing defense 
strategies that "focus upon the pre-accident plaintiff" as key to handling causation con­
cerns in head injury claims). Bur see Sellers v. Hendriclcson, 360 N.E.2d 1235, 1240-41 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (allowing defendant to use expen testimony that disabilities claimed to 
be limited to a car accident were in fact linked to "environmental, heredity, [and] socio­
153 
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amination of plaintiffs' own records and other routine discovery, defendants 
have challenged plaintiffs' assertions where appropriate in such cases, as in 
ton cases generally . IS4 
B. 	 Depanures from the Plaintiff-Centered Discovery Framework 
The assumption of personal boundaries of plaintiffs is central to the con­
cept of relevance in tort discovery . 155 Ordering the production of relatives' 
medical, school, or employment records, or ordering non-parties to submit to 
mental or physical tests in order to dispute causation or to limit damages is a 
significant departure from plaintiff-centered discovery. Nonetheless, pro­
duction of school, employment, and medical records, as well as IQ and psy­
chological tests of persons other than the lead-exposed child, have been or­
dered in some cases. For example, while New Jersey156 and MassachusettsiS7 
courts have denied defendants' requests seeking examinations of plaintiffs' 
mothers, a District of Columbia court allowed the IQ testing and psychologi­
cal examination of a plaintiff's mother and sibling,158 New York courts or-
logical associations" as manifested by the school conduct and performance of plaintiff's 
sisters and brothers) . 
,,. Set infra note 310 and accompanying text (noting that defendants challenge plain­
tiffs' assertions of injury by examining medical records) . For a discussion of discovery 
relating to medical issues, see Rothstein, supra note 37, at 887-91 (noting that discovery 
requests for plaintiffs' records are usually liberally granted). 
us Set supra notes 142-43 aoo accompanying text (noting the traditional focus on the 
plaintiff in tort discovery). 
t S6 Set Little v. Mcintyre, 672 A.2d 1271, 1272-73 (N.J. Super. Ct . App. Div. 1996) 
(refusing to order plaintifrs mother to submit to a physical or mental examination because 
the mother was not a "party" and her condition was not " in controversy" within the 
meaning of New Jersey Rule 4 : 19). 
m Stt Brickley v. Sullivan, No. 89-CV-107 (Mass. Housing Ct. Mar. 18, 1992) (order 
denying defendant's motion for an independent neuropsychological examination of plain­
tiffs parents). There are also various decisions not allowing blood tests of mothers. Set, 
t.g. , Caminero v. Baker, No. 88-2226 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov . 17, 1990) (order denying 
defendant's motion to compel mother of leacJ.exposed child to submit to a blood test); Pi­
erre v. Dixon, No. 92-CV-00835 (Mass. Housing Ct. Mar. 19, 1993) (order denying de­
fendant's motion for physical and mental examination of minor plaintifrs mother because 
mother had not placed her physical or mental condition in controversy) ; Maguire v . 
Restuccia, No. 22364 (Mass. Housing Ct. Nov. 30, 1990) (order rescinding prior order 
compelling discovery and holding that plaintiff, the child's mother, need not submit to a 
blood test) . 
tsa See Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7771 , at 3-4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 4 , 1994) (order 
granting defendant's motions for leave to conduct clinical interview and intelligence testing 
on mother and sibling). The decision in Campbtll allowing IQ tests and psychological 
tests of non-parties has been followed consistently by other judges in the District of Co­
lumbia, who typically issue handwritten endorsements of motions for such test ing, citing 
Campbell. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Jester, plaintiffs' attorney, Campbell (July 
1, 1996). 
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dered IQ testing of a plaintiffs mother in two cases,159 and a Louisiana court 
ordered the neuropsychological testing of a plaintiffs siblings. 160 Efforts by 
defendants to obtain this information are likely to continue, given the expan­
sion in scientific research, the ascension of genetic essentialist notions, and 
the persistence of maternal determinist ideas. t6t 
If the assumption of personal boundaries on which traditional plaintiff­
centered discovery is based is to be rejected, then consideration must be 
made of all implications of such a decision. For example, if defendants are 
able to test non-parties and obtain their personal records in order to challenge 
causation, then plaintiffs should be able to obtain non-parties' records and 
tests in order to prove causation. Similarly, if defendants are able to obtain 
non-parties' records and tests in order to argue that plaintiffs' damages are 
less than plaintiffs claim, then plaintiffs should be able to do the same to 
prove damages. If litigants may compel non-parties to submit to mental or 
other tests and to supply personal records , this would imply a judgment in 
the interests of the litigants, but will essentially disregard those of non-party 
individuals' autonomy and privacy. Expansion of this nature requires careful 
consideration before embarking upon it. Some of the consequences of re­
jecting plaintiff-centered discovery are considered below. 
IS9 See Salkey v. Mott, 656 N.Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 1997) (order affinning lower 
coun's decision allowing IQ test of plaintiff's mother as within lower coun's discretion); 
Atkins v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 12460195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct . 29, 1996) 
(order granting defendant's motion to compel IQ testing of minor plaintiff's mother and 
ordering release of academic records of mother and siblings of plaintiff). 
160 See Stewan v. Nassau Corp., No. 89-8214 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Orleans Par. Jan. 19, 
1996) (order granting defendants' motion compelling a neuropsychological exam of a non­
pany sibling). 
161 Much feminist scholarship has criticized the emphasis in law on individual bounda­
ries and autonomy. It would seem that effons to depan from plaintiff-centered discovery 
and to discount boundaries between people and emphasize connections linking people, 
would therefore be in line with such scholarship. Yet the consequences of this depanure 
from individual boundaries both reflect and reinforce ideas of genetic essentialism and 
maternal detenn inism and may funher racism. These consequences thus cast doubt on the 
broad application of boundary critiques. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: 
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
848, 870-71 ("[T)he law must begin from the premises that human beings are interrelated 
in their Jives .• . . ");Bender, supra note 11, at 579-80, 583 (applying the feminist theory 
of interconnectedness and responsibility to challenge the individualistic "no duty to res· 
cue" doctrine); Handsley, supra note 11, at 472 (arguing that restrictive liability rules re­
lating co mental injury caused by hann to another person neglect the connectedness experi­
ence and values of women); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 
1, 13 (1988) (explaining the "connection thesis" that women, unlike men, are "actually or 
potentially materially connected co other human life"). Bur see Robens, supra note 79, at 
1470-71 (arguing that broad feminist critiques of privacy do not recognize that privacy 
ideas can have useful functions for women of color). 
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1. Broadening Scope of Litigation 
Broadening the causation and damages inquiry beyond the plaintiff, by 
either party, is likely to dramatically broaden the scope of the litigation. 162 
Such an expansion is contrary to current trends in litigation, which aim to 
streamline and limit discovery procedures. 163 As Justice Blackmon stated, 
"[l]aw .. . must resolve disputes finally and quickly .... [The] Rules of 
Evidence [are] designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic under­
standing but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes. " 164 For ex­
ample, if the educational records of a plaintiffs sibling reveal a learning dis­
ability, the parties will need to consider the possible causes of that learning 
disability. I6S If only one of two siblings of the plaintiff has a learning dis­
ability, the inquiry becomes more complicated.166 Similarly, knowing a 
mother's IQ creates more questions than it answers. A low-IQ mother might 
162 See, e. g., In reNew York County D.E.S . Litig., 570 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805-06 (App. 
Div. 1991) (noting concern about expansion of litigation to distant relatives in rejecting 
defendants' demand for nonparties' records). 
163 As the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure states, "[t)he information explosion of recent decades has greatly in­
creased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to 
be used as an instrument for delay or oppression. Amendments to Rule 30, 31, and 33 
place presumptive limits on the number of depositions and interrogatories ...." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note. 
164 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
165 Such a learning disability could have been caused by a head injury, lead exposure, 
prenatal or perinatal events, or a host of other factors. For example, an anoxic event at 
birth can cause injury to the brain. See Bo K. Siesjo & Fred Plum, Pmhophysiology of 
Anoxic Brain Damage, in BIOLOGY OF BRAIN DYSFUNCTION 319, 319 (Gerald E. Gaul! ed., 
1973) (noting that the stresses of birth can cause anoxia, which is one of the most common 
causes of brain injury). If anoxia causes the death of brain cells in a child, "the child can 
suffer some degree of mental deficiency" and the child may "exhibit impulsive hyperac­
tivity ...." VERNON H. MARK & FRANK R. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN 56 
(1970). Attention deficit disorder can be caused by a genetic thyroid problem. See Peter 
Hauser et al., Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in People with Generalized Resis­
tance to Thyroid Hormone, 328 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 997, 1001 (1993) ("[S]ubjects with 
generalized resistance to thyroid hormone have a markedly increased frequency of atten­
tion-deficit hyperactivity disorder as compared with their unaffected family members."); 
Dorothy Nelkin, After Daubert: The Relevance and Reliability ofGenetic Information, IS 
CARDOZO L . REv. 2119, 2123 (1994) (noting that "only one behavioral disorder, attention 
deficit hyperactivity," had been traced to a specific genetic defect); see also Natalie Ang­
ier, Hormone Imbalance Linked to Behavior, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1993, at C3 
(discussing studies of a rare familial disease linking a defect in the gene that produces the 
thyroid hormone receptor to attention-deficit disorder). 
166 Both siblings' medical and school records would be considered, delivery records for 
all siblings would be considered, issues of what type of learning disabilities the children 
had and whether the learning disabilities were or were not properly diagnosed, all would 
become issues. 
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have been deprived of oxygen at birth, exposed to lead, or a myriad of other 
factors.t67 Should she be x-rayed for an early lead exposure? 168 Should her 
birth records be obtained? Are the father's IQ, prenatal, perinatal, head in­
jury, and lead exposure histories relevant? Should the grandparents' histo­
ries be examined, as well? There is no logical end to the litigation inquiry 
once individual boundaries are crossed. 
2. Intrusion 
Discovery of the educational, medical, and employment records of persons 
other than the plaintiff can be intimidating and extraordinarily intrusive. 169 
The subjects of the discovered records may find the nonconsensual release of 
their records to be extremely embarrassing and invasive. In addition, disclo­
sure may cause tangible harm to the subjects of the records. For example, 
medical or educational information could become public and possibly lead to 
extreme embarrassment for some children, and negative employment or in­
surance consequences for adults. The topic of, and arguments based on, that 
information also make this type of discovery particularly sensitive. Defen­
dants essentially argue that the plaintiff has learning problems, not because 
of lead exposure, but due to either her genetic or environmental heritage. t?o 
167 For example, in one case where a mother's IQ was ordered to be tested, the mother 
may have had a difficult birth that may have affected her in some way, but her birth rec­
ords were unavailable because they had been destroyed in a hospital fire many years prior. 
Telephone InterView with Elizabeth Jester, plaintiffs' attorney , Campbell v. Bonner, No. 
92-7771 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1994) (July 1, 1996). 
168 A recent article on lead exposure used bone x-rays to estimate lead burden to study 
lead exposure. See Needleman et at., supra note 34, at 364-65 (finding an association 
between high bone lead levels and attention problems, aggression, and delinquency). 
169 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Ford, No. C7-93-8771 (D . Minn. Nov. 29, 1993) (order 
granting motion in part and denying in part to compel release of names of parents' health 
care providers and denying motion to compel execution of medical authorization); Vasquez 
v. Hezekiah, No. 91-0057 (Mass. Housing Ct. Apr. 18, 1995) (order denying defendant's 
motion to discover the educational records of plaintiff, mother of lead-exposed child); 
Coren v . Cardoza, No. 90-CV-29101 (Mass . Housing Ct. Oct. 30, 1993) (order granting 
the motion to compel the production of the medical records of parents of lead-exposed 
child, limited to the time period each learned of the lead poisoning of the minor plaintiff to 
time of discovery); Salkey v . Mott, 656 N.Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 1997) (order affirming 
lower court's decision ordering the plaintiffs mother to execute authorizations for her em­
ployment and academic records as within the lower court's discretion); Rodriguez v. New 
York City Hous . Auth., No. 09340192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 1996) (order granting de­
fendant's motion to discover educational records of minor plaintiff's siblings); Brunner v. 
American Cyanamid Co., No. 12596/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 1995) (order denying 
defendant's motion to compel release of family's medical and social services records). 
170 See. e.g.• Defendants' Opposition to Supervisory Writ Application at 5, Stewart v. 
Nassau Corp., No. 96-C-0475 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1996) (arguing that the minor 
plaintiff's condition is "more likely the result of [plaintift]'s genetic makeup and/or the 
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Even the prospect of an argument concerning a sibling's or parent's learning 
ability status can be extremely unpleasant and insulting. Similarly, defen­
dants may seek work records of a child's parents, based on the argument that 
if the parents did not maintain a steady job, it is because they had attention 
problems, low IQ, or both. For parents who have not been successful in the 
employment market-for whatever reasons 171-discovery of this nature could 
be extremely painful. 
Even more intrUsive are involuntary IQ and psychological tests. The 
stated argument for seeking IQ tests of mothers is that some portion of the 
child's intelligence is passed down maternally , either genetically or environ­
mentally; therefore, if the mother bas a low IQ, the plausibility of maternal 
responsibility increases. 172 Although District of Columbia Judge Graae 
wrote in CampbeU v. Bonner that an IQ test and clinical interview's degree 
of intrusion for the non-party mother and siblings was "relatively minor, " 173 
this conclusion is highly debatable. At the outset, Campbell's reliance on the 
intrusiveness analysis of Schmerber v. Califomia11• is questionable in the 
civil setting, given that Schmerber involves the reasonableness of govern­
ment searches under the Fourth Amendment175 and generally is applied in the 
criminal context. 176 
envirorunent in which she lives" than the result of lead poisoning). 
171 See generaJly WILSON, supra note 40 (discussing structural changes in the labor 
market). 
172 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing defendants' arguments that 
IQ is inherited and that a child's IQ correlates to her mother's IQ). 
173 Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7771, at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1994) (order 
granting defendant's motions for leave to conduct clinical interview and intelligence testing 
on mother and sibling). 
174 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Sclvnerber , the defendant had been arrested at a hospital 
while receiving treatment for injuries suffered in an accident involving the automobile that 
he had apparently been driving. See id. at 758. At the direction of a police officer, a phy­
sician took a blood sample from the defendant despite the defendant's refusal on advice of 
counsel to consent to the test. See id. at 758-59. A report of the chemical analysis of the 
blood, which indicated intoxication, was admitted into evidence over the defendant's ob­
jection. See id. at 759. The Court held that states may be permitted to make minor intru­
sions into an individual's body under only stringent limited circumstances. See id. at 772. 
The Court found that in view of the time required to bring the defendant to a hospital, the 
consequences of delay in making a blood test for alcohol, and the time needed to investi­
gate the accident scene, there was no time to secure a warrant and the search was an ap­
propriate incident of the defendant's arrest. See id. at 770-71. The Court also found that 
the test chosen to measure the defendant's blood-alcohol level was a reasonable one be­
cause it was an effective means of determining intoxication, imposed vinually no risk, 
trauma, or pain, and was performed in a reasonable marmer by a physician in a hospital. 
See id. at 771 . 
17
' See id. at 758. 
176 See, e.g., Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 428, 431-32 (D. 
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Assuming Schmerber's analysis of the intrusiveness issue is appropriate, 
consideration of several factors can lead to a different conclusion from that 
of Campbell. First, one way to measure the intrusiveness of an examination 
would be the involvement of physical intrusion, like the blood test in 
Schmerber.117 The use of this simplistic method to measure degrees of intru­
sion is inadequate, however, because it unjustifiably assumes that mental in­
trusions are fundamentally less intrusive than physical ones. Would a psy­
chological examination inquiring about one's dreams and sexual fantasies be 
less intrusive than a blood test for alcohol after a car accident? Intrusion into 
one's mental processes, in some circumstances, can be more intrusive than, 
or equally intrusive as, intrusion into one's body .11s 
Another way to approach the question might be to look at the ubiquity of 
the particular intrusion. The Supreme Court, in deciding that the blood test 
in Schmerber was a reasonable intrusion, considered the ubiquity of the in­
trusion, stating that "[s]uch tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic 
physical examinations, and experience with them teaches that the quantity of 
blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves 
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. "179 Nonetheless. mere commonness alone 
does not provide satisfactory answers . For example, although IQ tests are 
Mass. 1993) (rejecting defendant's request for blood test of plaintiff in an attempt to prove 
reduced life expectancy due to HIV status, thus refusing to apply Schmerber). But see 
Beckwith v. Beckwith, 355 A.2d 537, 545 (D.C. 1976) (applying Schmerber's intrusive­
ness analysis in granting a blood test of a child in a divorce case to detennine whether 
adultery took place). Other cases that have applied Schmerber in the civil context have in­
volved searches of government employees, and so have had an element of government ac­
tion that is less pronounced in ton litigation. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F .2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding. that customs service em­
ployee drug testing program was reasonable and therefore not unconstitutional); Shoe­
maker v. Handel, 619 F . Supp. 1089, 1107 (D. N.J. 1985) (holding that state racing com­
mission regulations for alcohol and drug testing of jockeys were reasonable under Founh 
Amendment). 
177 See Schmerber, 384 U.S . at 758 (noting that the blood test was taken by a physician 
at the direction of a police officer). In determining that the intrusiveness of the clinical 
interview and intelligence testing would be relatively minor, the judge in Campbell applied 
the intrusiveness test of Schmerber and Beckwith. See Cmnpbell, No. 92-7771 , at 3-4. 
178 See Jansen v. Packing Corp. of Am. , 158 F .R.D. 409, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting 
that mental examinations are usually more sensitive then physical examinations). The 
United States Supreme Coun recently recognized the importance of the privacy of a pa­
tient' s conununications with a therapist and the significance of intrusions into mental proc­
esses. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931·32 (1996) (protecting from disclo­
sure under federal psychotherapist privilege, statements that defendant made during course 
of counseling sess ion). 
179 Schmerber, 384 U .S. at 771 (finding that admission of defendant's blood samples in 
defendant's trial for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, taken over his ob­
jection, was const itutional). 
1064 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1025 
commonly used in schools, 180 employers no longer use such tests to choose 
employees. lSI More importantly, commonness in one context, such as medi­
cal examinations, does not mean that the test is not intrusive in another con­
text, for instance when a person is observed intoxicated following her in­
volvement in a car crash. Similarly, the commonness of IQ testing in 
schools does not render them non-intrusive when applied to unrepresented182 
non-parties in civil litigation. In any event, regardless of context, some may 
consider very common practices to be extremely intrusive. 183 Thus, proof of 
the ubiquity of a practice should not be proof of its degree of intrusiveness. 
A better approach is to look at the type and nature of information that is 
sought, to determine whether the degree of intrusion is minor or not. The 
blood test in Schmerber gave information about whether the defendant had 
been drinking, 184 a fact already known by the defendant. An IQ test result, 
on the other hand, conveys a score that statistically correlates with academic 
achievement and income, 185 but predicts little about what an individual is 
likely to achieve.t86 Nonetheless, the information obtained through an IQ 
test can profoundly affect a person's self-image and her public perception. A 
person may have a strong interest in not knowing, or keeping private, her IQ 
score.l87 A person may also reasonably fear the consequences of disclosure 
•so See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 87 (1997) (allowing IQ tests of school chil­
dren, but ordering that scores be kept separate from the confidential school records); see 
also FISCHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 93 (noting that IQ tests function well as predictors 
in American schools). 
181 See Griggs v. Dulce Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (prohibiting, under Title 
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, defendants' requiremem of a high school diploma or 
passing of an intelligence test as a condition of employment). 
182 See infra note 243 (noting that the mother and siblings in Campbell were unrepre­
sented). 
183 A commonplace example is telemarketing. See OSCAR H . GANDY, JR., THE 
PANOPTIC SORT 102-03 (1993) (discussing the telemarketing industry and the arguments by 
citizens and legislative representatives that the use of the telephone intrudes upon a per­
son's privacy when it penetrates the house). Similarly, in a 1995 advertising campaign, 
AT&T distinguished itself from its competitors, not by mentioning price, but by empha­
sizing privacy. The text of an ad read: "Not all phone companies respect your pri­
vacy .... Privacy. That's Your True Choice." N.Y. nMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at A20. 
1114 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (discussing the blood test and noting that such is "a 
highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence 
of alcohol"). 
185 See Task Force, supra note 119, at 82 (stating that IQ test scores predict years of 
education and, to a lesser extent, income). 
186 See id. ("[I]ndividuals who have the same test scores may differ widely in occupa­
tional status and even more widely in income."). 
187 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 121, at 808 (argwing, in the context of African­
American students, that the threat of stereotype can actually impair intelligence test per­
formance). As Howard Gardner notes: 
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of her score to others, such as employers .1" It is therefore arguable that al­
though the test method itself is less physically intrusive than drawing blood, 
the nature of the information obtained through the test is such that the intru­
sion is not minor. 189 
Another way to consider the issue of the degree of intrusion would be to 
look at the context more broadly, considering the societal interests at issue, 
the potential value , and the historical context. In Schmerber, the Court held 
that the blood sample, taken from the defendant while under arrest for driv­
ing under the influence of alcohol, was non-testimonial, and therefore the 
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply .190 Although not explicitly 
discussed, at stake in Schmerber were the societal interests in stopping drunk 
driving and providing constitutional protections for criminal defendants . The 
fact that the test was "a highly effective means of determining the degree to 
which a person is under the influence of alcohol," was key to the Court' s de­
cision.191 In the setting of civil lead exposure litigation, the societal interest 
in testing non-parties is much less clear. Moreover, the heritability of IQ test 
results, as well as what IQ tests purport to measure, are the subject of intense 
scientific debate. l92 Even those who argue for heritability of IQ posit heri-
How one thinks about oneself, one's prospects in this world and beyond, and whether 
one regards intelligence as inborn or acquired-all these shape patterns of activity, 
attention, and personal investments in learning and self-improvement. Particularly 
for stigmatized minorities, these signals can wreck any potential for cognitive growth 
and achievement. 
GARDNER , supra note 60, at 68. The information can be analogized to unwanted medical 
information obtained through genetic tests ordered in litigation. Professor Rothstein has 
noted the problems in compelling testing and individuals' des1re not to know . See Roth­
stein, supra note 37, at 895-900 (arguing that ordering genetic testing not only violates 
one's "informational" privacy, but also one's "decisiona.l" privacy). He has proposed that 
compelled genetic testing of anyone in civil litigation should not be allowed for challenging 
damages. See id. at 907. 
188 Regardless of the implications of Griggs, see supra note 181, a person may still fear 
the consequences of such disclosure. For example, an employer may give increased scru­
tiny to a lower-IQ employee, which may have negative employment consequences. 
189 In Campbell, the court did not discuss what the contents· of the clinical interview 
would be, and one of the defendant' s experts had already interviewed the mother under an 
agreement of the plaintiff. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Jester, plaintiffs • attorney, 
Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7TI1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1994) (July 1, 1996). Such 
interviews by defendant's expert are beyond the usual expert discovery described in Rule 
26(b)(4). 
190 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U .S. 757, 764-65 (1966) ("Not even a shadow of 
testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was involved in 
the extraction or in the chemical analysis."). Justice Black dissented, noting the strained 
reasoning of the Court in concluding that the blood test was not testimonial or communi­
cative. See id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting). 
191 /d. at 771 (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 n.3 (1957)). 
192 See supra Part m .C (discussing the scientific debate regarding whether IQ testing 
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tability as a range of between forty to eighty percent, t93 acknowledging that 
this concept applies to groups, not to inheritance between actual individu­
als.l94 
The justification for invading the privacy interests of a non-party to a civil 
action by ordering IQ and other tests is not equivalent to the justification for 
infringing on the privacy rights of a criminal defendant by ordering blood 
tests. The purpose of testing the non-party is to show that the plaintiffs IQ 
is low because the family has low IQs . However. this is far removed from 
the actual controversy. As such, the intrusiveness of the test is correspond­
ingly greater. t9S Further, given that plaintiff children in lead paint cases are 
generally from poor, African-American or Hispanic families, there may be 
an unconscious sub-text regarding this type of discovery, which implies that 
such people are less deserving of privacy rights than others.t96 
accurately re flects the test takers' innate ability). 
t93 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
19' See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
1~ This is why an IQ test of a plaintiff is less intrusive than an IQ test of a non-party. 
196 In all four cases that I have found wbere a non-party has been ordered to have her 
IQ tested, the plaintiffs and their families have been African-American. Telephone Inter­
view with Tracy Abatemarco's office, defense attorney , Atkins v. New York City Hous. 
Auth. , No. 12460195 (N.Y . Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 1996) (Jan. 27, 1998) ; Telephone Interview 
with Erin Hurley, plaintiffs' attorney , Salkey v. Mon. 656 N.Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 
1997) (Jan. 26, 1998); Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Jester, plaintiffs' attorney, 
Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7nl (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1994) (July 1, 1996); Tele­
phone Interview with Terrence Lestelle, plaintiffs' attorney. Stewart v. Nassau Corp., No. 
89-8214 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Orleans Par. Jan. 19, 1996) (Dec . 13, 1996); see also Horsburgh, 
supra note 60, at 579 (arguing that where rights are considered in economic terms, women 
on welfare are not included in the "institutional structure of the discourse on privacy"); 
Roberts, supra note 79, at 1441 (noting the prevalence of state intrusions on African­
American women's autonomy). The history of claims that African-Americans have ge­
netically lower intelligence than whites exacerbates the offense associated with compelling 
non-party African-American family members to take IQ tests. In addition, the particular 
focus on seeking intelligence tests of mothers of children exposed to lead ties in with ideas 
of maternal determinism. See supra'Part II.B (discussing maternal determinism and noting 
the devaluation of African-American mothering) . Moreover, admission of testimony re­
garding African-American family members' IQs may have harmful implications with pre­
dominately white juries, given the historical legacy. See supra notes 99-104, 108-11 and 
accompanying text (discussing the history of race-based IQ testing that has generally 
maintained that African-Americans test lower than whites); see also E va S. Nilsen, The 
Crimifllll Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudict!, 8 GEO. I. LEGAL ETHICS l , 1­
5 (1994) (discussing criminal defense lawyers' use of hannful stereotypes in order to win 
cases). These efforts bring to mind the statement by Herman Melville that, " [o]f all the 
preposterous assumptions of humanity over humanity, nothing exceeds most of the criti­
cisms made on the habits of the poor by the well-housed. well-warmed, and well-fed. " 
Herman Mel ville, Poor Man 's Pudding and Rich Man's Crumbs, in THE WRITINGS OF 
HERMAN MELVILLE 289, 296 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., Northwestern Univ. Press 
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In addition, acceptance of this type of discovery demands that whenever a 
plaintiff brings a personal injury case, she must consider that her relatives 
may be required to produce complete medical, educational, and employment 
histories,197 and submit to IQ or other testing. 198 This may serve as a signifi­
cant deterrent to participation in the tort system, two of the goals of which 
are compensation for injuries and removal of unreasonably dangerous prod­
ucts from the marketplace. 199 For all of these reasons. the IQ or psychologi­
cal test of a parent or sibling should not be ordered over an individual's ob­
jection unless the participant bas put his IQ at issue, even if such testing may 
have probative value. 
In sum, gross distinctions between mental and physical tests are insuffi­
cient to determine a test's degree of intrusiveness. Nor is the relative ubiq­
uity, or lack thereof, of a test particularly useful in determining intrusive­
ness. Rather, examination of the type and nature of information that might 
be obtained, and the context in which the test is sought, are factors that are 
more instructive. Although the content of IQ test results are not personal in 
the same way that answers to questions about sex are personal, the test 
nonetheless involves access to one's mind, information about oneself, and 
purports to quantify that information, all of which is intensely personal. This 
presents a clear case for privacy and autonomy under various definitions. 200 
The intrusiveness of the IQ test and clinical examination is major, not minor, 
under any definition. 
3. 	 The Scientific Basis for Departures from Plaintiff-Centered Discovery 
is not Clearly Established 
Science is a socially grounded human activity, subject to people's assump­
tions, preconceptions, and biases.201 Nonetheless, some scientific discover­
1987) (1854). 
197 See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which defendants 
have requested discovery of non-plaintitrs personal records). 
198 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (describing the cases in which non­
parties have been required to submit to intelligence testing, clinical interviews, or to re· 
lease other infonnation). 
199 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25-26 {5th ed. 1984) 
(noting that compensation for injuries and removal of dangerous products are goals of the 
tort system). Some writers believe the tort system has "gone too far" and might welcome 
this additional deterrent to plaintiffs. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY 153-61 
(1988) (arguing that the tort system slows the pace of iiUlOvation and thereby sets back 
safety rather than advancing it}. 
200 For example, Charles Fried defines privacy as "control we have over infonnation 
about ourselves." CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140 {1970}. Allen Westin 
defines privacy as "the claim of individual, groups or institutions to detennine for them­
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." 
ALLEN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
201 See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (arguing that scientific findings should 
1068 BOSTON UNJVERSIIT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1025 
ies are indisputably real, and scientific developments may reach a point 
where it is necessary to test or examine non-parties or to obtain their per­
sonal records to determine if the plaintiff has been harmed by the defendant's 
actions.202 This point , however, has not been reached in the lead exposure 
context. 
Various epidemiological studies of the effects of relatively low levels of 
lead exposure on children take into account parents' education, socioeco­
nomic status, and mother' s IQ as "confounding variables . "203 A confound­
ing variable "is an extraneous factor that independently associates with a 
higher or lower disease rate, but which is differentially present in the ex­
posed [group). "204 For example, if longhaired children have a higher per­
centage of learning disabilities than shorthaired children, regardless of prior 
lead exposure, a study must consider this . Multiple regression analysis 
would isolate the role of lead, thereby eliminating the supposed effect of 
having long hair on learning disabilities . If the srudy does not weed out the 
effect of the longhaired factor, and focuses primarily on longhaired children, 
the longhaired variable would mistakenly magnify lead's effects. 
Although the mother's IQ is often used as a confounding variable in stud­
ies determining the effect of lead on children, not all studies utilize it. 20S 
not be uncri tically applied to the legal arena) . 
202 The conflueoce of numerous studies over decades , and mounting biological evi­
dence, puts scientific testimony about the banns caused by lead on a surer footing than 
teStimony about other substances wbere the evideoce might be more recem and less cer­
tain. Thus, I believe the Court's decision in DOlJbert v. MerriU Dow PlulrmDCeuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 {1993), will have limited, if any, effect on testimony concerning the 
effects of lead on children in lead exposure litigation. To the extent that DOlJbert focuses 
on the need for resolving disputes, as opposed to endlessly revising scientific evidence, set 
id. at 596-97 , it may have an influence in efforts to limit the increased expansion of litiga­
tion inquiries that testing IQs of nonparties represents. However, the ultimate impact of 
DOlJbert is not yet clear and commentators have differing views about its impact. See, 
e.g., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for 
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 786-87 (1994) (arguing that DOlJbert will not 
significantly change admissibility of evidence); Faigman, supra note 69, at 962-68 
(contending that DmdJert may make psychological testimony more difficult to admit); Lau­
rens Walker & John Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Mtl/IUlll: An Essay on the Fu­
ture of Science in lAw, 82 VA. L. REv. 837, 848-57 (1996) (predicting that DOlJbert will 
result in judicial acceptance of random sampling, inferential statistics, and s imulation re­
search, and in diminished insistence on individualized adjudication). 
203 Set MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 52-54 (noting the various con­
founding variables that selected epidemiological studies have considered , including history 
of head trauma, birth order, mother's IQ, social class , binhweight, length of gestation, 
mother's age at child's birth, length of hospital stay after birth, divorce, mother's alco­
holism, and bilingualism). 
21M Green, supra note 31, at 651. 
20S Set MEASURING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27, at 52-54 (noting Studies of low­
dose lead-exposure that did not take maternal IQ into account as a confounding variable) . 
--········· ···-- -... .. .. . ..... 
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Moreover, it is inappropriate to test mothers' and siblings' IQs in lead expo­
sure litigation. First, the argument for testing the IQs of the mother and sib­
lings of a lead-poisoned child rests partly on the idea that there is a measur­
able genetic correlation between IQs of family members .206 Many factors , 
however, can contribute to the low IQ of a lead-exposed child or her mother, 
such that testing the mother's IQ would not shed light on the cause of a 
child's low IQ. '1m For example, a mother might have had the potential for a 
very high IQ , but might have received a head injury that resulted in a low 
IQ. In such a situation , a genetic argument that her child's IQ was low be­
cause hers was low would obviously be false.208 
Second, the studies that control for mothers' IQs continue to find harmful 
effects from lead. 209 Third, the degree to which IQ is heritable is highly de­
batable, and heritability itself is a concept that applies to group, not individ­
ual, IQ.21o Thus, any general statistical correlation between mothers' IQs 
and children's IQs does not imply anything about either the individual 
mother's or individual child's IQ. Fourth, the claimed harm from lead is not 
always IQ damage, but includes harms such as learning disabilities and at­
tention disorders . 211 Fifth, none of the epidemiological lead studies consid­
ers the siblings' IQs,212 thus presenting no basis for testing siblings. 
In addition, existing correlations between birth order and IQ indicate that firstborn chil­
dren generally have higher IQs than other children; thus , some researchers have consid­
ered this when drawing conclusions about lead's effect on IQ . See id. at 54 (noting a 
study that considered birth order as potential confounding variable) . 
106 See supra notes 84-87, 170 and accompanying text (discussing defendants' argu­
ments that IQ is inherited). 
w See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (discussing various possible causes of 
a learning disability and low IQ). In addition, as with many toxic tort claims, it is difficult 
to isolate harms as attributable solely to lead, because various other sources can also po­
tentially cause such harms. Of course, a plaintiff in a negligence case need not show that 
lead exposure is the only cause of the harm claimed, but need only show that it was a sub­
stantial factor in bringing about the harm. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 
(1979). 
208 Such an argument also would put the mother's entire medical history and records at 
issue , expanding the scope of the litigation even further . &e supra notes 162-68 and ac­
companying text (arguing that expanding the scope of litigation is against current trends 
toward streamlining discovery procedures). 
209 See MEAS URING LEAD EXPOSURE, supra note 27 , at 52-58 (noting studies, which 
controlled for maternal IQ, that found higher lead levels correlated to lower intelligence 
test scores) . 
1 10 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of the con­
cept of heritability as applied to individuals) . 
111 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing other neurological effects 
of lead exposure). 
1 12 See MEASURING LEAD ExPosURE, supra note 27, at 52-54 (describing the confound­
ing variables considered in various studies, none of which included sibling IQ). 
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Finally, the purported basis for testing siblings' IQs, as opposed to testing 
the father's IQ, is unclear. The siblings do not contribute genetically to the 
child, while arguably the father contributes half of the child's genetic mate­
rial. If parental IQ contributes genetically to the child's IQ, then one would 
assume that a father's IQ would be equally as important as the mother's. 
Yet, the studies do not generally consider this.213 Thus, even if epidemiol­
ogical studies include mother's IQ as a confounding variable, this does not 
imply that an individual mother's or sibling's IQ would be of probative value 
in an individual case. 
4. 	 Rule 35 and Judges' Power to Compel Non-Parties in Civil Cases to 
Submit to Examination and Testing 
The most intrusive efforts departing from plaintiff-centered discovery are 
those aimed at performing tests on persons other than the lead-exposed child. 
Such efforts necessarily implicate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 ("Rule 
35") or one of its state law correlates, because these are the only civil rules 
allowing physical or mental examinations.114 Under Rule 35, a party can be 
compelled to submit to mental and physical examination if a party's condi­
tion is at issue and in controversy and the requisite good cause is shown. liS 
In 1970, Rule 35 was amended to provide that an examination can be or­
dered of anyone who is in custody or under the legal control of a party, if 
that person's condition is in controversy and good cause is shown.216 The 
1970 amendment was made in order to clarify that if a parent or guardian 
was suing for injuries to a minor, the parent or guardian could be ordered to 
produce the minor for examination.117 This Part briefly reviews pertinent 
authority concerning Rule 35, and then reviews the legal foundations of the 
decisions regarding IQ and psychological testing of persons other than the 
lead-exposed child. 
21 3 See id. at 52 (noting that only the Needleman study considered "parental IQ" as a 
confounding variable). The actual Needleman study refers to "parental IQ," but specifies 
that most of the parents whose IQs were tested were mothers. See Needleman et al., su­
pra note 34, at 690 (noting that usually the mothers were brought to the testing location). 
Thus, the study did not test and average both parents' IQ. 
214 See FED. R. C1v. P. 35(a) (describing the requirements and limitations for physical 
and mental examinations); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2231 n.l6 (1994) (commenting that Rule 35 has correlates in 
almost every state). 
m See FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a) (stating that upon a showing of good cause, an examina­
tion can be ordered of the parties or those in custody or control of the panies); see also 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 214, § 2231 (same). 
2l6 See FED. R. CJV. P. 35 advisory committee's noce (pronouncing that an order to 
produce a person in the custody or control of a party imposes a good faith effon to pro­
duce the person). 
217 See id. 
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a. Past Challenges to Rule 35 
Although Rule 35 is now taken for granted as an element of civil practice, 
the idea of forcing parties to submit to mental or physical tests did not gain 
immediate acceptance with the passage of the Rule. 218 In fact, at common 
law such examinations were not allowed in federal court. 219 In Sibbach v. 
Wilson,:w in which a court-ordered examination of the plaintiff was chal­
lenged, the Supreme Court considered the validity of Rule 35.221 The Court 
concluded that Rule 35 did not modify the substantive rights of litigants, and 
therefore it was within the authority granted by the Rules Enabling Act. 222 
Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, and Black dissented, emphasizing 
the common law tradition of personal privacy. 223 Justice Frankfurter wrote 
that the Rule authorized "invasion[s] of the person" and "intrusion[s] into an 
historic immunity of the privacy of the person," which were so significant, 
that authority to invade those interests should not be inferred from the gen­
eral language of the Rules Enabling Act. 224 Moreover, in Union Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Botsford,225 the Supreme Court held that a federal court did 
not have power to order a personal injury plaintiff to submit to a physical ex­
amination.226 
In Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 221 the Supreme Court considered whether Rule 
35 permitted mental and physical examinations of a defendant driver who 
had not put his own condition at issue. 228 In holding that such examinations 
were allowable in certain situations, the Court emphasized that the driver 
218 See. e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1941) (5-4 decision) 
(Frankfuner, J., dissenting) (arguing that "inviolability of a person" should only be cur­
tailed if the law is clear and unquestionable, and that Rule 35, in ordering physical exami­
nations, could not withstand such a standard). 
219 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-53 (1891) (holding that the 
coun may not order the plaintiff to submit to physical examination to determine the extent 
of injuries, and remarking that "no order to respect the body of a pany in a personal ac­
tion appears to have been made, or even moved for, in any of the English couns of com­
mon law, at any period of their history"). 
220 312 u.s. 1 (1941). 
221 See id. at 6. 
m See id. at 14-16. 
223 See id. at 17 (Frankfuner, J .• dissenting) (arguing that privacy has historic roots in 
Anglo-American law). 
224 Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
225 141 u.s. 250 (1891). 
226 See id. at 252 (assening that "the inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a 
compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow" and that to "compel any one, and espe­
cially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without law­
ful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass"). 
227 379 u.s. 104 (1964). 
228 See id. at 114-15. 
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was subject to the examination requirement because be was a party. 229 The 
Court stated that, "it is clear that the person sought to be examined must be a 
party to the case[,} .. . not that be be an opposing party vis-a-vis the mov­
ant. "230 In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that it is fair that the plaintiff 
must "choose between his privacy and his purse," but that a defendant bas 
no such choice and thus should not be required to "surrender his right to 
keep his person inviolate" by the mere fact that someone has sued him. 231 
In both Sibbach and Schlagenhauf, the idea of ordering parties to submit 
to mental or physical examinations was highly contested. 232 These decisions 
considered the privacy interests of the parties, and there was no suggestion 
that a court would have authority to order examinations of non-parties.233 
The limitations of Rule 35234 recognize and endorse individual privacy and 
229 ~e id. at 115. 

230 /d. (emphasis added). 

231 /d . at 126 (Douglas, J ., dissenting) (noting that Sibbach rests on the idea that the 

plaintiff waives privacy interests by bringing a lawsuit). The Schlagenhauf majority 
viewed the case as resting on an interpretation of the language of the rules , and not as 
resting on a waiver theory. See id. at 114 (noting that there might be constitutional prob­
lems with a waiver theory). The reading by the SchlagenhDuf majority seems more con­
s istent with the language of the opinion in Sibbach than does Justice Douglas' s interpreta­
tion. 
m ~e id. at 122 (5-4 decision); Sibbach, 312 U.S . at 16 (5-4 decision). 
133 Indeed , considering that these were 5-4 decisions for ordering parties to submit to 
examinations, it seems very unlikely that the Court would have ordered non-parties to 
submit to such examinations. Cf. Schlagtnhouf, 379 U .S. at 114-15 (considering whether 
Rule 35 pennits examination of defendant who had llOl put own condition at issue); Sib­
bach, 312 U .S. at 6 (considering whether Rule 35 is valid and would allow examination of 
parties). 
234 The limitations of Rule 35 are that it only applies to parties or those in custody or 
control of parties, that a showing of good cause is necessary before an examination can be 
ordered, and that it is necessary that the condition of a party be in controversy before an 
examination can be ordered. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 35(a). Courts have repeatedly held that 
Rule 35 does not allow mental examinations of plaintiffs bringing emotional distress 
. 	claims. See, e.g., Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F .R.D. 89, 97.-98 (S. D. Cal. 1995) 
(holding that emotional distress cJaim did not put plaintiff's condition in controversy for 
purposes of Rule 35); O'Quinn v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 F .R.D. 226, 228 
(S.D .N.Y. 1995) (holding that defendant not entitled to mental examination of sex dis­
crimination plaintiff because plaintiff did not bring tort claim for emotional distress); 
Smith v. J.l. Case Corp., 163 F .R .D . 229, 230 (E.D . Pa. 1995) (holding that products 
liability plaintiff's claim for mental damages based on embarrassment does not put condi­
tion in controversy, so defendant not entitled to mental examination or counseling rec­
ords); Curtis v. Express, Inc., 868 F . Supp. 467, 469 (N. D .N .Y. 1994) (holding that 
mental examination of plaintiff in race discrimination case not allowed); Cody v. Marriott 
Corp., 103 F .R.D. 421, 422 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that plaintiff in employment dis­
criminat.ion case making emotional distress claim does not put her mental condition "in 
controversy" to justify requiring ber to submit to psychiatric examination under Rule 35). 
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the separateness of individuals. 
b. 	 Testing ofPersons other than the Lead-Exposed Child Despite Rule 
35 
In the lead litigation context, courts have taken varying positions con­
cerning examinations of persons other than the lead-exposed child. 235 In Lit­
tle v. Mclmyre,236 the New Jersey Appellate Division held that such tests 
were not allowed because they were beyond the scope of Rule 35.237 Massa­
chusetts's courts have taken the same position.238 Courts in three states, on 
the other hand, have allowed such tests. In Stewart v. Nassau,239 a Louisi­
ana court held that the mental state of the plaintiff's sister was relevant, and 
therefore tests would be allowed.2AO In Atkins ·v. New York City Housing 
But see Eckman v. University of Rhode Island, 160 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.R.I. 1995) 
(allowing mental examination of plaintiff claiming physical and mental injuries); Jansen v. 
Packaging Corp., 158 F.R.D. 409, 411 (N.D. Dl. 1994) (same). One court held that an 
mv blood test of a personal injury plaintiff who claimed long term damages could not be 
ordered under Rule 35, despite defendant's argument that plaintiff may have been lllV 
positive and thus had a reduced life expectancy because he shared needles and engaged in 
unprotected sex with men. See Sacramona v. BridgestonelFirestone, Inc., 152 F.R.D . 
428, 431-32 (D . Mass. 1993) (holding that HIV test would not be ordered under Rule 35 
because argument that plaintiff could be infected was too attenuated). 
m Courts have generally viewed the limitations of Rule 35 as limiting the ability to or­
der physical or mental examinations of non-parties. See, e.g., Caminero v. Baker, No. 
88-2226 (Mass . Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1990) (order denying defendant's motion to compel 
mother of lead-exposed child to submit to a blood test because requirements of Rule 35 
were not satisfied); Pierre v. Dixon, No. 92-CV-00835 (Mass. Housing Ct. Mar. 19, 
1993) (order denying defendant's motion for physical and mental examination of minor 
plaintiffs mother because mother had not placed her physical or mental condition in con­
troversy, as required under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a)); Maguire v. 
Restuccia, No. 22364 (Mass. Housing Ct. Nov. 30, 1990) (order denying motion for blood 
test of minor plaintiffs mother because requirements of Massachusetts Rule of Civil Pro­
cedure 35(a) had not been met). 
236 672 A.2d 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
231 See id. at 1272-73 (holding that New Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure 4: 19 is subject 
to clear limits and that because the mother made no claim for personal injuries, ordering 
her to submit to a physical or mental examination was beyond the reach of the rule) . 
238 See Pierre v. Dixon, No. 92-CV-00835 (Mass. Housing Ct. Mar. 19, 1993) (order 
denying defendant's motion for physical and mental examination of minor plaintiffs 
mother because she had not placed her physical or mental condition in controversy); 
Brickley v. Sullivan, No. 89-CV-107 (Mass. Housing Ct. Mar. 18, 1992) (order denying 
defendant's motion for an independent neuropsychological examination of lead-exposed 
child's parents). 
239 No. 89-8214 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Orleans Par. Jan. 19, 1996). 
240 See id. (order granting defendants' motion compelling a neuropsychological exam of 
a nonparty sibling). 
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Aurhority24' and Salkey v. Mott,141 the courts ordered the minor plaintiff's 
mother to submit to an IQ test. In Campbell v. Bonner, a District of Colum­
bia court acknowledged that it did not have power under Rule 35 to order 
non-parties to submit to IQ and psychological testing, but ordered the tests 
anyway under its "inherent powers. "243 
The Campbell opinion, written by Judge Graae, merits further discussion 
because it is the only decision that articulates a basis for the court's power to 
order non-party testing. 144 Judge Graae concluded that be was "not pre­
cluded from ordering such tests, "245 and that "[s]ome courts have resorted to 
their 'inherent powers' to order examinations of non-parties where they 
could not compel such examinations pursuant to Rule 35. "246 He further 
stated that "due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every 
available defense"247 and that "[b]ased upon this principle, courts have in­
creasingly been willing to find circumstances in which an individual's right 
of privacy must yield to a defendant's right to discover evidence bearing 
upon his liability. "248 Judge Graae's reasoning concerning the authority to 
order tests and examinations of non-parties is based on two main aspects­
inherent powers and due process. 249 As discussed below, neither of these 
aspects grants to the court the authority to order these tests. 
i. The Inherent Powers Argument 
In Campbell, Judge Graae claimed that courts have inherent power to or­
141 No. 12460195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 1996) (order granting defendant's motion to 
compel IQ testing of minor plaintiffs mother and ordering release of academic records of 
mother and siblings of plaintiff). 
242 656 N .Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 1997) (order affirming lower court's decision order­
ing mother of lead-exposed child to submit to IQ test as within trial court's discretion). 
143 See Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7771, at 3-4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 7. 1994) (order 
granting defendant's motions for leave to conduct clinical interview and intelligence testing 
on mother and sibling of lead-exposed child). The mother and sister were not represented; 
the lawyer for the lead-poisoned children presented arguments against the testing and 
asked that the court appoint a guardian ad litem for them, which the court declined to do. 
See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Bonner's Motion for Leave to Conduct Clinical 
Interview and Intelligence Testing at 1-2, Campbell (No. 92-7771). 
244 In SaJkey v. Moll, the appellate court simply noted that discovery decisions were 
within the trial court's discretion and that IQ tests were not privileged medical informa­
tion. See Salk.ey, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 886. 
lAS Campbell, No. 92-7771, at 2. 
146 /d. at 3. 
247 /d. at 2 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)). 
241 /d. at 2-3 (citing Department of Soc. Servs. v. Stein, 612 A.2d 880, 891 (Md. 1992) 
(al lowing defendants in a lead poisoning case to examine social services records of the mi­
nor plaintiff's family)). 
249 See id. 
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der these testslSO in the face of a clear rule that denies this power. As Pro­
fessors Wright and Miller have noted regarding federal law, "[c]laims of in­
herent power in the face of a rule with specific limitations are always dubi­
ous and especially when it is clear that the federal courts bad no power, 
inherent or otherwise , to order a physical or mental examination prior to the 
adoption of the rule. "251 To support its assertion of inherent powers, the 
court cited only a 1972 Arizona Supreme Court case that is clearly inappo­
site.2S2 
In Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.,2S3 the most recent Supreme Court decision 
that discussed in detail inherent powers in civil litigation, inherent power was 
limited to the authority of the federal court to maintain order and sanction 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial process.254 The Su­
preme Court gave a broad interpretation to the inherent power of federal trial 
~ See id. at 3 (noting that some courts have resorted to their inherent powers to order 
such tests). 
2.5! WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 214, § 2233 n.8. The limits on the inherent power 
of federal courts would not necessarily be the same as for state courts. See Developmmts 
in the Law-Discovery, 14 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1024-25 (1961) (noting that the ..general 
rule in the states is that courts do possess the inherent authority to order a physical exami­
nation of a party .. and that "a state court might well eJltend its inherent power to order 
medical examinations to include third persons as well as parties") . 
m See CtunpbeU, No. rn-7771, at 3 (citing Lewin v. Jackson, 4rn. P.2d 406 (Ariz . 
1972)). In Uwin v. Jaclcson, a mental and physical eumination of a non-party elderly 
man was ordered over his guardian daughter' s objection, solely in order to determine 
whether he was competent to test.ify at a deposition. See Lewin, 4rn P.2d at 409. The 
lawsuit at issue was a slander case brought by the guardian/daughter in which she claimed 
that the defendants, by defaming her, bad induced her wealthy father to disinherit her. See 
id. at 407. The defendants wanted to take her father's deposition, and she claimed that be 
was not fit to be deposed. See id. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that the eumination 
was not for discovery purposes and that Rule 35 did not apply to the eltaJllination, but that 
the court had inherent power to "take all steps necessary to assure itself not only that a 
witness' testimony will be accurate but also that the act of testifying will not endanger the 
health of the proposed witness." /d. at 409. The court funher argued that under the cir­
cumstances, because its purpose was to make sure the father was competent to be deposed, 
the examination was acceptable. See id. at 408-o9. The court analogized the situation to 
the ..well-establi shed power of a trial judge to personally examine a child witness in order 
to detennine the child's mental capacity." /d. at 410. In T.H. v. Department of Health &: 
Rehabilitation Service , the court held that it lacked the authority to order the mother of a 
cocaine dependent child to undergo bimonthly drug testing to prevent the birth of any more 
drug-exposed children. See 661 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. Dist . Ct. App. 1995). But see Din­
sell v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. , 144 F. Supp. 880, 882 (W.D . Pa. 1956) (holding that the 
coun has the power to appoim a specialist to conduct eye exams of non-pany co-worker of 
plaimiff who threw stones that hit the plaintiff, where the plaintiff claimed that the em­
ployer was negligent in allowing the employee to work near him). 
2.53 501 u.s. 32 (1991) . 

2.S4 See id. at 43-46 . 
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courts to sanction fraudulent and oppressive litigation related behavior. 25' In 
Chambers, the defendant bad engaged in sustained and extraordinary bad 
faith litigation tactics, and after a trial and frivolous appeal, the district court, 
under its inherent power, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs entire 
attorney fees, though under the circumstances the judge did not have specific 
statutory or rule based authority to do so. 2S6 
The Supreme Court noted that the inherent power includes the power to 
maintain silence in court,2S7 to punish for contempt,258 to vacate its judgment 
when a fraud is committed, 259 and to "fashion an appropriate sanction for 
conduct which abuses the judicial process, "260 including awarding attorney 
fees when outrageous bad faith conduct has occurred in litigation. 26l Despite 
the lack of specificity in the majority opinion as to the precise scope of in­
herent power to sanction, there is no basis in that opinion for the suggestion 
that a court can create new rules in situations other than where a party has 
engaged in extraordinarily egregious conduct. Chambers presents no 
authority for applying the idea of "inherent power" to the completely differ­
ent context of non-party discovery. 
Some state courts have held that they had inherent power under common 
law to order an examination of a pany in discovery, 262 while others have 
held that they lack such power. 263 The inherent power to order an examina­
tion of a non-pany is wholly different, because the common law power to 
order examinations, where it existed, was limited to parties. 264 Discovery is 
regulated by carefully constructed rules that allow for a great deal of judicial 
lU See id. 
256 See id. at 40 (noting that the district court tJad ordered the defendant to pay attorney 
fees for improper conduct). 
m See id. at 43. 
251 See id. at 44. 
259 See id. 

~ /d. at 44-45. 

261 See id. at 45-46. 
262 See, e.g., Greenhow v. Whitehead's, Inc., 175 P.2d 1007, 1015 (Idaho 1946) 
(holding that the court has inherent power to order physical examination of plaintiff in per­
sonal injury litigation); People ex rei Noren v. Dempsey, 139 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Dl. 1957) 
(same); Drake v. Bowles, 92 A.2d 161, 163 (N.H. 1952) (same); SS . Kresge Co. v. 
Trester, 175 N.E. 611, 613 (Ohio 1931) (same); Cohen v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co . • 
95 A. 315, 316 (Pa. 1915) (same). 
263 See, e.g., McGuigan v. Delaware L. & W. Ry. Co., 29 N.E. 235 , 236 (N.Y. 1891) 
(holding that court has no power to order plaintiff in personal injury case to submit to 
physical examination). 
264 See, e.g. , Greenhaw, 175 P.2d at lOIS (ordering physical examination of plairu.iff in 
personal injury litigation based on waiver argument); Noren, 139 N.E.2d at 784 (same); 
Dralce, 92 A.2d at 163 (same); SS. Kresge Co.• 175 N.E. at 613 (same); Cohen , 95 A. at 
316 (same). 
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discretion, but not unlimited discretion.265 Rule 35 and the various state 
analogues are unique in their degree of intrusiveness on individuals.266 In­
herent authority to order non-parties to submit to unwanted IQ and psycho­
logical testing and interviews is therefore lacking. 267 
ii. The Due Process Argument 
Judge Graae's citation of the language from the Supreme Court's decision 
in lindsey v. Normet,268 that "due process requires that there be an opportu­
nity to present every available defense, "269 does not establish a firm founda­
tion for compelling the mental or physical examinations of non-parties, even 
if good cause is shown. Lindsey upheld, against a facial due process chal­
lenge, state eviction statutes that limited tenants' rights.270 The Supreme 
Court held that no due process violation had occurred because the tenant 
could challenge the landlord's action in another proceeding.271 Similarly, 
discovery orders not allowing IQ tests or clinical examinations of non-parties 
in lead paint claims do not deprive defendants of the opportunity to challenge 
causation or damages; rather, they may merely force defendants to alter their 
strategy. 
In addition, due process does not grant parties in civil matters the right to 
obtain or introduce every conceivable piece of evidence.272 Numerous tech­
26S &~. t.g., Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1964) (reiterating the pro­
visions of Rule 35); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1941) (describing the limitations 
of Rule 35); se~ also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 214, § 2233 n.8 (explaining the 
questionable use of the inherent powers doctrine). 
266 &t supra notes 218-34 (discussing the resistance to Rule 35 given its intrusiveness 
and the requirements imposed upon those trying to seek examinations under it). 
267 Set supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (noting the focus in litigation on dis­
covery penaining to parties); cf. Ex parte Anniston Personal Loans, 96 So. 2d 627, 630 
(Ala. 1957) (holding that court lacked inherent power to order non-party to produce, with­
out notice, books and documents in advance of trial for inspection by a party). The Mis­
souri Supreme Court has held that in a loss of consortium case involving the damages a 
husband suffered as a result of his wife's injuries in a car accident, it had inherent power 
to direct the .wife to be examined by a doctor chosen by the COUrt. s~e Missouri v. 
McMullen, 297 S.W.2d 431, 437 (Mo. 1956). In McMullen, the wife's injuries were at 
issue; the existence of the husband's claim turned on them. &t id. at 433-34. By con­
trast, in the lead context, the plaintiffs case does not tum on the extent of injury to a non­
party. 
l6l 40.5 u.s. 56 (1972). 
269 Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7771, at 2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 1994) (citing lind­
sey, 405 U.S. at 66). 
no &~lindsey, 405 U.S. at 69 (holding that the eviction statute at issue was valid un­
der the Due Process Clause). 
271 &~ id. at 66 (noting that there are other available procedures for litigation claims 
against landlords). 
2n &e Haaf v. Grams, 355 F. Supp. 542, S46 (D. Minn. 1973) (denying defendant's 
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nical limitations, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403,213 therapist-patient 
privilege,214 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4),275 physician-patient 
privilege,276 husband-wife privilege,277 and statutes of limitation,278 restrict 
parties' "rights" to present defenses or claims . Such technical matters may 
also obstruct the trial's purpose to "search for truth . "279 However, there are 
compelling reasons for each of these "technical" barriers .280 In sum, there is 
no due process right for civil parties to compel non-parties to submit to 
request to compel voice exemplar tests of the plaintiff's female children). The defendants, 
including the city police chief, were accused of civil rights violations in connection with 
arresting plaintiffs for allegedly making obscene telephone calls. See id. at 544. The de­
fendants sought to compel voice exemplar tests of the plaintiffs' female children under 
twelve, so that they could show that obscene phone calls had been made from plaintiffs' 
phone and thereby establish defendants' good faith . See id. at 546 (noting that "[t]here is 
no provision in the rules requiring non-panics to produce evidence of the type requested"). 
The decision to deny voice exemplar tests might have limited the options of the defendants 
and forced them to change strategy, but that is different from violating their due process 
rights. This is not to say that no due process considerations arise in civil litigation. For 
example, punitive damage awards may violate defendants' due process rights. See, e.g., 
BMW of N. Am ., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996) (holding that "grossly ex­
cessive" punitive awards violate defendam's due process rights). 
273 See FED. R. Evm. 403 (excluding evidence, although relevant, that would be out­
weighed by chances of unfair prejudice). 
274 Su, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (protecting patient's 
communications with her psychotherapist from involuntary disclosure). 
275 See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(bX4) (providing limitations upon expen discovery). 
276 See, e.g., 6 CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West 1995) (physician-patient privi­
lege); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN . § 5929 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996) (noting that 
patient's consent is necessary before physician may disclose any information except in civil 
matters brought by the patient in claims for damages for personal injury) . 
211 See, e.g., 5 CAL. Evro. CODE§§ 980-987 (marital communications privilege). 
271 See, e.g., Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803, 807 (Me. 1994) (holding that a three 
year statute of limitations for medical malpractice is constitutional); St. Paul Fire & Ma­
rine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil, 782 P.2d 915, 923 (Okla. 1989) (finding that builders and ar­
chitects statute of repose limiting a cause of action to a ten year period is constitutional).· 
279 Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-m1, at 3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan . 7, 1994) (quoting 
Beckwith v. Beckwith, 355 A.2d 537, 545 (D .C. 1976)). 
280 Numerous mechanisms, in addition to those mentioned in the accompanying text, 
reflect consideratiom other than "truth," such as the importance of legitimacy and consen­
sus. But, truth is a highly contested concept on many levels. For example, eyewitness 
testimony is often unreliable, and there is debate about whether expen testimony about the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony should be allowed . See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 
U.S. 341, 350 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing the unreliable nature of eyewitness 
testimony~ its powerful impact on juries); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967) 
(holding that eyewitness testimony is unreliable because of prosecutor's power of sugges­
tion); Faigman, supra oote 69, at 967 (arguing that expen testimony on factors associated 
with inaccurate identification eyewitness testimony should be admissible). 
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mental or physical examinations. 
c. A Thought Experiment 
To clarify this argument further, an analogy may be drawn between lead 
poisoning and an allegedly poisonous chemical. This hypothetical situation 
presents the case of a middle level manager who is the son of a corporate ex­
ecutive . He suffers a mental disability that he ascribes to the long term ex­
posure to a chemical that is universally recognized as poisonous that was 
present in the workplace. Consequently, he makes a workers' compensation 
claim against his employer for the mental disability, accompanied by a 
claimed loss of IQ. Studies have found that lowered IQ was associated with 
the chemical to which he was exposed, but these studies also recognized a 
genetic or environmental component. 
The workers' compensation carrier concedes that the workplace exposed 
the manager to the poisonous chemical, and further, that the manager has a 
mental disability as well as a low IQ. The carrier, however, claims that the 
manager inherited such traits from his family and not from exposure to the 
chemical. The carrier supports its contention with epidemiological studies of 
the chemical and IQ that find that many people exposed to the chemical have 
mental disabilities and lowered IQ, but not finding a one-to-one correspon­
dence. The studies take into account many factors, such as socioeconomic 
status, the presence of other major stresses, and father's IQ . The studies 
find a very strong pattern that the chemical causes lowered IQ. There is a 
correlation, not fully understood , between exposure to this chemical, low IQ, 
and high socioeconomic status. 
Although the manager's siblings are a prominent law professor and a sur­
geon, they both possess embarrassing employment and medical histories. 
Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that a coun would order the man­
ager's family to submit to IQ or psychological tests or release records, al­
though this information could help the carrier's defense. Releasing such in­
formation would greatly intrude on this family's right to privacy . It is also 
difficult to imagine the well-heeled relatives of the manager, who would 
surely be represented in coun, tolerating the coercion involved. 
V. FUTURE DIRECOONS 
A . Introduction and the Happiness Set Point 
Increased pressure from current scientific research and its broader cultural 
implications encourages both expansion of non-pany testing and disclosure 
of information previously considered privileged, irrelevant, or otherwise un­
discoverable. Defendants argue that such information may reveal that envi­
ronment, genetic condition, or genetic disposition caused the plaintiff's con­
dition or made plaintiff's damages less. Plaintiffs may provide similar 
arguments that such measures would help prove their cases as well . Courts 
should resist these arguments for several reasons . First, such discovery ex­
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plorations involve extreme intrusion into the lives of non-parties.281 Second, 
these techniques greatiy expand both the scope and expense of litigation.282 
Third, they may simply reflect the undue power of genetic and maternal de­
terminism narratives. 283 
A 1996 story in The New York Times concerning a genetically determined 
set point for happiness illustrates the aforementioned problems in expanding 
the discovery process.284 Relying on studies of identical twins reared apart 
who nevertheless possess similar happiness levels, psychologists found that 
genes determined a significant part of happiness.28S One researcher claimed 
that, "[a]bout half of your sense of well-being is determined by your set 
point, which is from the genetic lottery, and the other half from the sorrows 
and pleasures of the last hours, days or weeks. "286 Under this happiness set 
point theory, a person injured in an accident who suffers residual pain may 
claim damages for pain and suffering as well as for mental distress. 287 Ad­
ditionally, in some states she may assen a right to hedonic damages. 288 
Based on this happiness research, a defendant could try to obtain evidence 
about the general happiness level of the plaintiff's family members, given 
their life circumstances. The defendant may use this information to argue 
that the plaintiff's unhappiness and pain were due to whatever unhappiness 
runs in the family, rather than the pain and distress that followed from the 
281 Set supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the intrusiveness of various discovery techniques). 
212 Set supra Part IV.B.l (discussing negative implications of broadening the scope of 
litigation and increasing its costs). 
283 Set supra notes 40-91 and accompanying text (critiquing genetic and matema1 de­
terminism) . 
114 Set Daniel Goleman, Forget Money; Nothing Om Buy Happiness, So~ Researchers 
Say , N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1996, at Cl (reporting that some research findings propose that 
genes, not outside sources, largely determine happiness). 
l8.S Set id. 
286 /d. at C9 (quoting Dr. David T. Lykken, a behavioral geneticist at the University of 
Minnesota who published results from a study of 1500 pairs of twins in the May issue of 
Psychological Science). This research seems to fail to take into account data about depres­
sion levels among African-Americans compared with whites. Cf. C.W. Henderson, Social 
Issues Study: High Levels ofDepressive Distress Among Gay Blacks, AIDS WKLY., June 
13, 1994, at 1, avaUDble in 1994 WL 2564409 (finding that homosexually active African­
American men and women suffer significantly higher levels of depression and stress than 
other individuals) . 
287 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 90S (1977) ("Compensatory damages that 
may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss include compensation (a) for bodily harm, 
and (b) for emotional distress.") . 
241 Set Gretchen L. Valentine, Comment, Hedonic Damages: E~rging Issue in Per­
soMl Injury and Wrongful Death C/Qims, 10 N. ILL. U. L . REv. 543, S46 (1990) 
(suggesting that hedonic damages may be awarded in personal injury cases to compensate 
for loss of enjoyment, pleasure, and value of life, but noting that no clear consensus has 
emerged for their use as a tort remedy) . 
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accident. Defendants could request that the plaintiff and her family submit to 
various happiness tests and allow defendants to examine the medical, educa­
tional, and employment records of family members, so that experts could 
fully evaluate the plaintiff and her family's genetically determined set 
point.2B9 The current happiness research appears so vague that courts would 
likely regard such inquiries as beyond the scope of discovery. 
Nevertheless, beyond the current preliminary nature of the science , there 
are additional reasons to be reluctant to depart on the path outlined above. 
First, the family members possess powerful privacy interests, and society as 
a whole also has an interest in protecting individuals' confidentiality inter­
ests.290 Second, administering the tests, obtaining the records, and having 
experts review them would add to the expense of litigation. Third, such in­
quiries would broaden the scope of litigation with no necessary or logical 
stopping point. The plaintiff may want to bring up some constantly exuber­
ant distant relative and highlight the happiness of an adoptive sibling to un­
dercut the defendant's argument . These types of arguments shift the focus 
from the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injury , to the family and be­
yond, undercutting the broad societal interest in resolving disputes . 291 
Fourth, this type of genetic. inheritance argument may lead to particularly 
racist and damaging connotations and consequences. m 
B. The Current Discovery Framework 's Protection ofIndividuals 
Under the current discovery framework, parties may discover any non­
privileged material that is relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the dis­
covery of admissible evidence. 293 Unfortunately, this system fails to ade­
289 The article cited various ways of studying happiness, such as accepting people's ac­
counts of how happy they were, observing how exuberant they were, and seeing whether 
their left prefrontal brain has greater electrical activity when a person states that she agrees 
with certain statements like, "[w]hen good things happen to me, it strongly affects me." 
Goleman, supra note 284, at C9. All of these or other methods might be proposed. 
190 Set, t.g. , FRIED, supra note 200, at 140 (emphasizing American society's desire to 
protect its privacy, a fundamental value, in the face of surveillance technology); WESTIN, 
supra note 200 , at 7 ("[P]rivacy is not just one possible means among others to insure 
some other value, but . . . it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most funda­
merual sort: respect, love, friendship , and trust.. .. [W]ithout privacy they are simply 
inconceivable."); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Righi to Privacy, 4 HARv. 
L . REv. 193, 195 (1890) (advocating the individual's right "to be let alone" from unau­
thorized invasions by newspapers). 
291 Set Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (asserting 
that unlike scientific conclusions, which are subject to perpetual revision, the law prefers 
quiclc and final dispute resolutiom). 
192 Set supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text (discussing the racist backdrop of 
genetic inheritance arguments and inteUigence research) . 
m Set FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
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quately address the concerns outlined above . 294 One area of consideration is 
that of privilege, which can insulate some material from discovery. A privi­
lege is a societal recognition that some communications or information 
should not be disclosed-that the societal interest in keeping them confiden­
tial outweighs the societal interest in disclosure . 29s Communications to doc­
tors are generally privileged, although the exact scope varies from state to 
state.296 The extent of protections for educational records varies between 
states. 297 Employment records generally are not privileged, although confi­
294 See Rothstein, supra note 37, at 902 (highlighting additional imponant ways in 
which the current discovery framework may not be adequate to protect individuals, such as 
delay, expense, and insufficient protection of litigants' privacy interests). 
:m See, e. g. , Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-32 (1996) (holding that the 
therapist-patient privilege was not subject to a balancing test on a case-by-case basis, but 
that as a society , the privilege had to be recognized as absolute). In Jaffee, the privilege 
protected the therapist from an order to testify and produce her records . See id. at 1932 
(holding that conversations and notes taken during counseling session were protected). 
296 See Rothstein, supra note 37, at 889 (noting approaches that courts use to determine 
whether plaintiff waived his medical record privacy); Wanda Wakefield, Annotation, Phy­
sician-Parient Privilege as Extending to Pariem's Medical or Hospital Records , 10 A.L.R. 
4TH 552, 557 (1981) (listing state-carved exceptions to privilege where the intrusion is 
considered justified or where no statute exists granting the privilege). Protecting the con­
fidentiality of communications to physicians has ancient roots . See Rothstein, supra note 
37, at 896 (" Ever since the Oath of Hippocrates in the fifth century B.C., confidentiality 
has been one of the cardinal obligations of physicians."). Today, the confidentiality of 
medical records is under attack with the impact of technology and insurance. In response, 
various states have passed statutes protecting confidentiality of records held by Health 
Maintenance Organizations. See, e.g. , ME. REV . STAT . ANN. tit . 24-A , § 4224 (West 
1990) (protecting medical records obtained by any health organization from discovery) ; 
see also Lawrence 0. Gostin et at., Privacy and Security ofPersooollnformation in a New 
Health Care System, 270 JAMA 2487, 2488-91 (1993) (attempting to balance a proposed 
electronic health care plan with society's interest in privacy). 
l'P See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994) (limiting access to educational records with­
out written consent to school officials, state and local officials, and parents or guardians 
upon request to inspect educational records of a student); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
10/ 2-8. 1 (West 1993) (limiting third party access written consent to parents , school princi­
pal, qualified professionals, school officials, state and federal officials); MAss. REGs. 
CODE tit. 603 , § 23.07(4)(a)-(h) (1995) (limiting third pany access to educational records 
without written consent); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-288 to -289 (Michie 1996) (limiting fur­
nishing educational information to local law enforcement agency, parents, and guardians); 
see also Vasquez v. Hezekiah, No. 94-J-889 (Mass . App. Ct. Feb. 13, 1995) 
(memorandum and order) (ordering that the Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169 
(1993) , guidelines for discovery of privileged mauer apply to educational records); cf. 
John E. Theuman, Armotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family Educa­
tiotllll Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) (20 U.S.C .A. § 1232(G)), 112 A.L.R. 
FED. I, 1 (1993) (noting that access restriction may be trumped by state freedom of infor­
mation Jaws) . 
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dentiality protections exist in some states. 298 
Tensions exist between the concepts of privilege and privacy, and these 
concepts are likely to become increasingly inconsistent. Legal recognitions 
of privacy have not kept pace with intrusions into privacy made possible by 
science and technology. 299 The continuing shift away from plaintiff-centered 
discovery will pennit litigants to discover employment, educational, and 
medical records about individuals other than the injured party and subject 
these individuals to unwanted tests. 300 Existing privilege law may be too 
narrow to satisfy the concerns raised here. 
The question of when a privilege is waived can be critical in this context. 
As noted above, a person claiming physical injury waives privileges in perti­
nent medical records.301 Many cases are brought by parents as next friends 
or guardians of their children because it is a necessary prerequisite. 302 How­
ever, a next friend is not equivalent to a party.303 Therefore, being next 
298 See Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidentiality ofGenetic /nformtllion in the 
Work:plilce, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75, 83-84 (1991) (citing various state statutes that protect 
the confidentiality of medical and health records obtained during employment); Kurt 
Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the 1990s, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 577 (1988) 
("Whatever confidentiality exists is generally the result of employer voluntary action. 
Only limited statutory controls exist to preserve employment information confidential­
ity."); Mordechia Mironi, The Confidentiality of Personal Records: A Legal and Ethical 
View, 25 LAB. L.J. 270, 275 (1974) (lamenting employee's virtual dependence on em­
ployer's good will not to disclose information because no statutory protections exist); Scott 
Fast, Comment, Breach ofEmployee Confidentiality: Moving Toward a Common-Law Tort 
Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 438-89 (1993) (arguing that states should provide 
greater statutory protection for personal information in the workplace). 
299 See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 200, at 3 (noting "that American society [has) devel­
oped a deep concern over the preservation of privacy under the new pressures from sur­
veillance technology"); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 159 
(1992) (noting that technology permits increasingly greater intrusions into people's private 
domains); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 290, at 195 (recognizing that technological de­
velopments necessitate developments in the law to protect privacy); G. Bruce Knecht, A 
New Casualty in Legal Battles: Your Privacy, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 11, 1995, at Bl 
(lamenting that legal protections do not cover the increased availability of consumer in­
formation). 
300 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of broad­
ening discovery to include non-parties). 
301 See Rothstein, supra note 37, at 887-89 (noting that discovery requests for plaintiffs 
records are rarely challenged and usually granted). 
302 See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 17(e) (requiring that an infant sue through a representa­
tive, next friend, or guardian ad litem). 
303 See, e.g., Hall v. Haque, 34 F.R.D. 449, 449 (D. Md. 1964) (holding that next 
friend, the parent of child, is not party to suit brought on child's behalf); see also Craw­
ford v. Loving, 84 F.R.D. 80, 81 (E.D. Va. 1979) (holding that next friend of incompe­
tent person is only nominal party and that person under disability is real party). 
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friend should not waive any privileges. 304 In addition, it is established that 
simply being next friend or guardian ad litem of a child does not waive 
privileges and does not constitute being a party for Rule 35 purposes. 305 
A related issue is whether a parent who asserts emotional distress or loss 
of consortium claims in connection with a child's injuries waives privileges 
for the parent's own educational or medical records. There is limited discus· 
sian of this issue in the case law. In one case, in which parents claimed 
emotional distress based on their child's exposure to lead, the court held that 
defendants could obtain medical records of the minor plaintiff's parents, but 
only for the time period beginning when the parents learned of their son's 
lead exposure. 306 In another case, however, defendants argued unsuccess· 
fully that a mother had waived her privacy interests in her educational rec· 
ords by asserting emotional distress and loss of consortium claims. 307 On 
appeal of the denial of the defendant's motion to compel, the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court did not discuss or decide the issue, but seemed to imply such 
a waiver, stating that "[i]nitiation of litigation inevitably compromises the 
privacy of the parties and it is particularly reasonable that this be so regard· 
ing the party who instigates the litigation. "308 The appeals court remanded 
the issue to the trial court for reconsideration, and on remand, the trial court 
304 Indeed, no decision I have found allowing discovery of records or testing rests on 
the idea that being next friend or guardian ad litem waives any privileges. 
JOS See. e.g., Scharf v. U.S. Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(holding in an action by Mexican child for citizenship that the court lacked power to order 
parents to submit to blood group testing); Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 81-82 
(9th Cir. 1956) (holding in a suit brought by minor through parent or guardian as next 
friend, the parent or guardian is not a party because her physical and mental condition is 
not directly in controversy); Chin Nee Deu v. Dulles, 18 F.R.D. 350, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955) ("Regardless of the gratuitous inclusion .•. of the father ... as 'next friend' ... 
neither he nor the mother ... is a party within the meaning of F. R. Civ. P. 35(a)."). 
Bur cf. Paula M. Becker, Court-Ordered Mental and Physical Examinations: A Survey of 
Federal Rule 35 and Illinois Rule 215, 11 LoY. U. L.J. 725, 728 (1980) (proposing that 
state and federal rules be broadened to include defendants' employees and witnesses' ca­
pacity); Note, Physical Examination ofNon-Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure, 43 IOWA L. REv. 375, 375 (1958) (arguing that examinations should be authorized 
for three categories of persons: children in paternity suits for maintenance brought by their 
mother; agents of defendants when such agents are actively involved in the controversy; 
and parents and siblings of claimants in derivative citizenship cases). 
306 See Coren v. Cardoza, No. 90-CV-29101 (Mass. Housing Ct. Oct. 30, 1993) 
(holding that parents placed their condition at issue by asserting claims related to their 
son's poisoning). 
3U1 See Vasquez v. Hezekiah, No. 94-J-889, at 7 (Mass. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1995) 
(remanding for reconsideration trial court's order denying access to mother's educational 
records). 
308 !d. 
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found that the defendant had not shown that the records were relevant. 309 
Rather than applying a blanket rule, the courts should determine the issue 
of whether the parents' claims of loss of consortium or emotional distress 
waive their privileges based on the nature of the claims, the accompanying 
requirements of proof for such claims, and the opposing party's claimed rea­
son for needing the records. For example, if a parent claims emotional dis­
tress arising from her child's injuries, and that such has affected her aca­
demic performance, she places her academic history at issue, thereby 
waiving any privilege in pertinent academic records. Conversely, if her 
emotional distress claims are unrelated to academic performance , her privi­
lege remains intact. Additionally, if a parent has an emotional distress 
claim, and the defendants want access to her school and medical records so 
that their experts can use this material to challenge the child's injuries3to 
rather than to evaluate the emotional distress claim, this kind of discovery is 
being used as a smokescreen for departing from plaintiff-centered discovery 
and should not be allowed. To avoid arbitrary and unjust results , courts 
should require a substantive nexus between the nature of the claim at issue 
and the waiver involved. 
Leaving aside the issues of privilege, the rule allowing discovery of all 
material that is relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence should be examined in light of recent and anticipated 
developments . Under existing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and its 
state parallels , the courts may consider the privacy interests of non-parties , 
although this is not specified in the Rule. 311 Rule 26(c) authorizes courts to 
limit discovery to protect any person "from annoyance, embarrassment, op­
309 See Vasquez v. Hezelc:iah, No. 91-CV-0057, at 1 (Mass. Housing Ct. Apr . 18, 1995) 
(order denying defendants' motion to discover the educational records of plaintiff). 
3to In fact, defendants generally seek records and information about parents specifically 
in order to challe nge causation and/or damages of the child's injuries. See, e.g., Affidavit 
of Lawrence Charnas at 2, Campbell v. Bonner, No. 92-7771 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 
1994) (stating that parents' educational and other records are necessary to determine a 
child's intelligence without the injury , to determine whether lead is the cause or if genetic 
factors are responsible); Affidavit of Claire B. Emhart at 4 -5 , Campbell (No. 92-7771) 
(stating that information about a child's parents is necessary to determine whether lead ex­
posure is the cause of plaintiff's claimed harm). 
311 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U .S. 20, 30-31 (1984) (holding that trial 
court has duty and discretion to consider privacy interests of the litigants and third par­
ties). The Court stated: 
The Rules do not differentiate between information that is private or intimate and that 
to which no privacy interests attach. Under the Rules, the only express limitations 
are that the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter 
of the pending action. Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs 
of both litigants and third parties. 
/d. at 30; see also Rothstein, supra note 37, at 902 (noting that discovery may involve liti­
gant's and third party's privacy interests). 
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pression or undue burden or expense. "312 Although some might argue that 
this provides sufficient protection for non-parties, discovery in the lead expo­
sure cases demonstrates the existing framework's insufficient protection of 
non-parties because it presents the possibility of virtually limitless expansion 
of litigation and discovery of peripheral records. Further, it leaves litigants 
the option of constructing wholly deterministic arguments about human be­
havior. 
C. 	 A Preliminary Proposal 
Given the inadequacy of the current framework in dealing with the antici­
pated changes in civil discovery efforts, this Article proposes various steps. 
First, legislatures should systematically review statutory and common law 
privileges protecting individuals' records to determine if existing law pro­
vides sufficient protection for those not directly involved in litigation. If ex­
isting laws fail to provide the requisite protection, lawmakers should pass 
appropriate legislation. Second, lawmakers should closely examine princi­
ples of waiver and make decisions concerning which claims should waive 
what privileges. 
Third, because the Rule 26(c) standard may eventually have effectively no 
limits, a more specific rule for the types of situations discussed and contem­
plated here should be considered. A rule should be formulated so that in 
personal injury cases, discovery of records and materials pertaining to the 
individual parties would be subject to the usual Rule 26 test, but that discov­
ery of records pertaining to others generally would not be allowed. This 
presumption that non-party's personal-but non-privileged-records are non­
discoverable could be outweighed by a showing of compelling need and es­
tablished scientific foundation. This technique would better protect privacy 
interests generally, and non-party records and materials from discovery in 
personal injury cases in particular. 
Fourth, Rule 35 should be left intact, prohibiting examinations of persons 
other than parties or persons in custody of parties, and allowing them only in 
certain circumstances. This Rule has worked well for over fifty years, and 
strikes a practical balance between privacy and discovery of information per­
tinent to litigation. As genetic and other research progresses, however, sci­
ence may eventually create compelling situations when examining non-parties 
proves truly pertinent in strengthening or challenging a claimant's case. 
Such a time has not yet arrived, and it is entirely possible that such a time 
will never arrive in view of the complexities of genetic issues. 313 
312 FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(c). The Rule provides that, "upon motion by a party or by the 
person from whom discovery is sought ... and for good cause shown, the court in which 
the action is pending ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." /d. 
313 Su HUBBARD & WALD, supra note 38, at 36-37 (noting that genetic conditions in­
volve "a largely unpredictable interplay of many factors and processes," thus there may 
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Accordingly , revisions of Rule 35 should be considered only if that time 
occurs. A possible revised framework might require the condition of the 
person whose examination is sought to be "in controversy. " This approach 
would force the claim or defense to tum on the non-pany ' s condition for the 
court to consider even the possibility of a non-party examination. Also, the 
litigant seeking the examination must make a showing of "compelling need." 
In addition , the court would then consider the persuasiveness of the follow­
ing additional factors: (1) the degree of intrusiveness of the test or examina­
tion; (2) the potential mental or physical harm to the test subject; and (3) the 
strength of the science. 314 
The courts generally should deny the testing of non-parties when they con­
sider the test intrusive , potentially harmful , or where the science is weak or 
disputed. Conversely, courts should allow non-intrusive testing supported by 
strong, undisputed scientific bases, with no potential for harm to the subject, 
such as the DNA testing of relatives that definitively establishes an alternate 
cause of disease.31S Additionally, courts should prohibit testing if the science 
is strong , but the intrusion great and potentially harmful to the subject. On 
the other band, if the science is strong and the intrusion great but not harm­
ful, then there could be situations where courts might permit such test.lt6 
never be a straightforward relationship between genes and traits). 
314 Of course, scientific testimony is rarely unanimous, and judgment inevitably enters 
into decisions whether to admit such testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., 
Inc., 509 U .S. 579, 592-98 0993) (proposing flexible standard for admitting scienti fic tes­
timony and evidence). Given the social nature of science and the unfortunate uses to 
which it has been put in our history, however, judges should be vigilant in making deter­
minations about admission of scientific testimony particularly in the context of science re­
lating directly or indirectly to race . See Delgado et al. , supra note 94 , at 131-39 
(discussing the history of attributing group differences in intellect to innate factors); cf. 
Charnallas, supra note 11, at 78 (advocating that the courts should stop the practice of us­
ing race and gender based data in detennining damages). 
m An example of nonintrusive testing is the practice in Maine, where tests of saliva, 
rather than blood, are now commonly used far pnternity testing. Interview with Jessica 
Maurer, Assistant Attorney General, Maine Department of Human Services , Child Sup­
port Enforcement Div. (Feb. 10, 1997); see Gina Kolata, Parents Talce Charge, Putting 
GeM Hunt on Fast Tracie, N.Y . TiMES, July 16, 1996, Cl , at C7 (reporting that in re­
search regarding genes for dysautonomia, hair from a deceased child's hairbrush was 
used). 
316 Such a change in Rule 35 would likely lead to challenges making arguments similar 
to those made in Sibbach--that it was beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act. See 
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting) (arguing that Rule 
35, authorizing a physical examination of plaintiff. was beyond the scope of the Rules 
Enabling Act because it modified the substantive right of the litigant). There would likely 
also be challenges under state laws and constitutional privacy principles. See, e.g. , MAss. 
GEN. LAws ch. 214, § 113 (1996) (forbidding unreasonable invasions of privacy). 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent increased emphasis on genetic and maternal explanations for indi­
viduals • characteristics has renewed emphasis on the genetic determinism of 
intelligence. Acceptance of these ideas has fostered a shift from plaintiff­
centered discovery in lead exposure litigation toward a focus on the relatives 
of the lead-exposed children. This trend manifested itself in efforts by liti­
gants to examine persons other than the party claiming injury from lead and 
to obtain personal records about persons other than the lead-exposed child. 
Not surprisingly, in view of the race, gender. and class characteristics of 
many plaintiffs and their families, lead exposure litigation constitutes the first 
area in which litigants systematically seek this type of discovery. 
Yet, every reason exists to believe that this type of discovery will expand 
far beyond this context to many other types of litigation . 317 For reasons set 
forth in this Article, courts should be extremely dubious of arguments that 
litigants need tests or personal records of persons other than the party 
claiming injury. As human knowledge about genetics expands , the law may 
need to change and concern itself less with human autonomy . Significantly 
affecting society as a whole, we should adopt such changes only after full 
debate and evaluation of all the issues involved, a task only just begun . 
317 As Prosser and Keeton have noted, "[pJerhaps more than any other branch of the 
Jaw, the Jaw of torts is a battleground for social theory ." CHARLES PROSSER & W. PAGE 
KEETON, THELAWOFTORTS 15 (5thed. 1984). 
RAPE, RACISM, AND THE LAW 

JENNIFER WRIGGINS* 
INTRODUCTION t:! 
The history of rape in this country has focused on the rape ofwhite 
women by Black men. From a feminist perspective, two of the most 
damaging consequences of this selectiv~ blindness are the denials that 
Black women are raped and that all women are subject to pervasive 
and harmful sexual coercion of all kinds. 
This Note examines the historical legacy ofthe racist social mean· 
ing of rape and its consequences. Part I describes the history of the 
legal and societal focus on punishing Black men when the rape of 
white women is claimed. Part ll discusses the denial of the rape of 
Black women. Part III argues that the narrow focus on one racial 
combination of rape obscures the significance of the sexual coercion 
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The word -Black" is capitalized in this Note when used to denote someone's race. The reason 
for this has been well stated by Catharine MacKinnon: 
Black is conventionally (I am told) regarded as a color rather than a racial or national 
designation, hence is not usually capitalized. I do not regard Black as merely a color 
of skin pigmentation, but as a heritage. an experience, a cultural and personal identity, 
the meaning of which becomes specifically stigmatic and/or glorious and/or ordinary 
under specific social conditions. It is as much sociaiiy created as, and at least in the 
American context no less specifically meaningful or definitive than, any linguistic, tribal, 
or religious cthnicity, all of which are conventionally recognized by capitalization. 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, ond the SIDle: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 
SIS, 516 (1982). While a parallel argument could support the capitalization of"white," such 
a usage would resonate with a long tradition of dominance by whites and is hence rejected. 
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all women face. Part IV argues that feminists must go beyond tradi­
tional rape reform measures to stop sexual coercion. 
PART I: THE NARROW FOCUS ON 

BLACK OFFENDER/WHITE VICTIM RAPE 

There are many different kinds of rape.1 Its victims2 are of all 
races,3 and its perpetrators are of all races. 4 Yet the kind of rape 
1 By "rape" this Note refers not to the legal defmition of rape or sexual ~Jssault, but rather 
to "any attempted or completed sexual act that is forced on an individual against his or her 
will." Bowker, Rape and Other Sexual A$$0ults, WoMEN AND CJuME IN AMERICA 180, 180 
(L. Bowker ed. 1981). The term thus includes a wide range of situations, from a stranger 
assaulting a woman in a dark alley to a husband forcing sex on his wife, regardless of whether 
penetration is involved or the act is illegal. The term "illegal rape" refers to situations where 
the imposition of sex is prohibited by law. 
This Note addresses only the rape of women by men. Besides being the most prevalent and 
widely-studied kind of rape, it is also an important manifestation of, and means of perpetuating, 
male dominance. This Note argues that the treatment of this kind of rape by the legal system 
also serves as a weapon of white dominance. 
2 Rape statistics are notoriously unreliable. An initial problem with them is that they report 
only activity which the Jaw defines as rape. Illegal rape is not necessarily the only or most 
harmful sex forced on victims. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence 8 SlGNs (forthcoming 1983); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: 
Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 919. 941 (1973). 
A second major problem with rape statistics is that underreporting even of illegal rape renders 
them inaccurate. It is likely that Black women underreport more than white women, espe· 
cially if the woman's assailant is white. See infra note 122. A recent estimate is that only one 
in two illegal rapes is reported. Bowker, Women as Victims: An Examination ofthe Results 
ofL.E.A.A.•s National Crime Survey Program, in WoMEN AND CRIME IN AMERlcA, supra 
note 1, at 158-64. 
A third problem is that police often decide not to pursue rape complaints which may be 
valid, especially if the complainant is Black, so these complaints may not appear in police 
"reported rape" figures. Chappell, Geis, Schafer & Siegel, A Comparative Study ofForcible 
Rape Offenses Known to the Police in Boston and Los Angeles, in FoRCIBLE RAPE 227, 235 
(D. Chappell, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977). 
More accurate figures may be derived from victim surveys which involve interviewing a 
random sample of citizens in a particular area concerning their victimization. It is from such 
surveys that the estimated ratios ofactual to reported rapes are derived. However, this method 
has in some circumstances been found to underestimate the crime committed against Blacks. 
Hood & Sparks, Citizens Attitudes and Police Practice in Reporting Offenses, in VrCTJMOl.OGY 
167 (1. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1974). 
3 This Note focuses on rape between white and Black people in this country. It does not 
deal with rape involving other people of color for several reasons. First, most of what has 
been written about race and rape focuses exclusively on Black/white issues. (Exceptions include 
J. \VII.I.WoiS & K. HoiJdES, TBE SECOND AssAULT (1981) fhereinafter cited as THE SECOND 
AssAULT]; AEGIS, March-Apr. 1979 (special issue entitled Violence Against Women andRace); 
Cbu & Torres, Rape: It Can't Happen to Me!, BluDoE; AN AsiAN AlaruciiN PERSPECTIVE, 
Spring 1979.) Second. crltics of feminist rape literature have primarily addressed its failure 
to combat the myth of the Black rapist and to recognize the differences between the wlnerabllity 
of white and Black women as rape victims. See infra note 183. This Note attempts to begin 
to correct these failures. A remaining failure is commentators• neglect of rape as it affects 
other people of color. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 121-232. 
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that has been treated most seriously throughout this nation's history 
has been the illegal forcible rape of a white woman by a Black 
man.5 The selective acknowledgement of Black accused/white 
victim rape was especially pronounced during slavery and through 
the f1rst half of the twentieth century. 6 Today a powerful legacy 
remains that permeates thought about rape and race. 7 
Slavery 
During the slavery period, statutes in many jurisdictions provided 
the death penalty or castration for rape when the convicted man was 
Black or mulatto and the victim white.8 These extremely harsh 
penalties were frequently imposed.9 In addition, mobs occasionally 
broke into jails and courtrooms and lynched slaves alleged to have 
raped white women, 10 prefiguring Reconstruction mob behavior .11 
In contrast to the harsh penalties imposed on Black offenders, 
courts occasionally released a defendant accused of raping a white 
woman when the evidence was inconclusive as to whether he was 
5 See Mann & Selva. The Sexualiwion ofRacism: The Black as Rapist and White Justice, 
3 W. J. BLACK STUDIES 168 {1979); see also infra text accompanying notes 8-80. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 8-63. 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 64-80. 
8 See, e.g., Alabama Code of 1852 (death penalty for rape of a white woman by a slave 
or free Black); Mississippi 1857 Statute {death penalty for attempted carnal connection with 
or rape of a white female under fourteen by a slave); Tennessee 1858 Law (death by hanging 
for rape of a free white woman by a slave or free Black); Missouri 1825 Statute (castration 
for rape or attempted rape by a Black or mulatto); Arkansas Code of 1838 {death penalty 
for assauh with intent to commit rape by a Black or mulatto). Bienen, Rape III-National 
Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WoMEN's RIGHTS L. REP. 170, 173 n.l4 (1980). 
Although the last two states appear to provide strong sanctions for the rape of a Black woman 
by a Black man, the case law demonstrates that the claims of Black women were ignored. 
See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. Although concentrated in the South, statutes 
distinguishing between the races for sexual crimes were enacted in other states as well. See, 
e.g., Pennsylvania Code of 1700 (death penalty for rape of a white woman bya Black man); 
Kansas Compilation of 1855 (castration at his own expense for rape or attempted rape of 
a white woman by a Black or mulatto). Bienen, supra, at 173-n.14; see also Burns, Race 
Discritrrination-Law and Race in America, in THE PoLITics oF LAw 89 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). 
9 Dennis, a slave, v. State, S Ark. 230 (1843); State v. Joshua, a slave, lS La. Ann. 118 
{1860); State v. Bill, 8 Rob. 527 (La. 1844); Isham v. State, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 111 (1853); 
Ellick v. State, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 325 {1851); Commonwealth v. Watts (4 Leigh) 672 {1833); 
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 652 (1833). 1-3 JUDICIAl. CASES CoNCERNJNG 
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (H. Catterall ed. 1926-1932); see M. HINDUS, PRISON 
AND PLAN'I'AnoN: Ctul&E, JurncE AND AUTHORITY IN MAssACHUSETTS AND SoUTH CAROLINA 
1767-1878, at 150-61 (19SO); K. STAMPP, TBE PEcUUAR INsnnmoN 210-11 (1956). 
1
°K. STAMPP, supra note 9, at 190-91. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 26-40. 
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Black or mulatto.12 The rape of Black women by white or Black 
men, on the other hand, was legal;13 indictments were sometimes 
dismissed for failing to allege that the victim was white. 14 In those 
states where it was illegal for white men to rape white women, statutes 
provided less severe penalties for the convicted white rapist than for 
the convicted Black one. 15 In addition, common-law rules both 
defined rape narrowly16 and made it a difficult crime to prove.17 
During slavery, then, the legal system treated seriously only one 
racial combination of rape-rape involving a Black offender and a 
white victim. This selecti\'e recognition continued long after slavery 
ended. 
The Post-Civil War Period 
After the Civil War, state legislatures made their rape statutes race­
neutral,18 but the legal system treated rape in much the same way 
12 Thunnan v. State, 18 Ala. 276 (1850); Dick, a slave, v. State, 30 Miss. 631 (1856). 
13 S. EaoWNMltl.ER, ACWNST OUR Wn.L)76 (1975); Evans, Rope, Race, and Research, in 
BLACKS AND CluM:INAI. JumCE 75, 79 (C. Owens & J. Bell eds. 1977); see W. BOWERS, 
ExEctmONS IN AMEIUCA 173 (1974); A. L. HJOOINBO'I'HAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 282 (1978); 
Blackwell, Social and LegalDimensions ofJntenocialLiaisons, in THE BLACK MALE IN AAIEIUCA 
219, 225 (D. Wilkinson & R. Taylor eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE BLACK MALE); infra 
notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
1
• State v. Charles, a slave, 1 Fla. 298 (1847); Commonwealth v. Jerry Mann, 4 Va. (Va. 
Cas.) 210 (1820); George, a slave, v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (1859); see infra text accompanying 
notes 93-96. 
uSee. e.g., Vuginia Code of 1819 and 1823 Law (death penalty for rape or attempted rape 
of a white woman by a slave, Black, or mulatto and term of J0-2J years for rape by a white 
man); Kentucky 1802 Code (death penalty for rape of a white woman by a slave and term 
of years for rape by a white man). Bienen, supra note 8, at 173 n.14; Georgia Penal Code 
of 1816 (death penalty for rape or attempted rape of a free white woman by a slave or free 
person of color and term of not more than 20 years for rape or attempted rape by a white 
man) No. 380 §§ 33-34; No. 508 and 509, § 2; Georgia Acts of 1816 § 1, CoMPILATION OF 
THE LAws oF GEOROIA 804 (Lamar ed. 1821), cited in Amicus Brief of Women's Legal Defense 
Fund and Equal Rights Advocates at 17, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
16 For example, rape by one's husband and rape not involving penetration by the penis were 
not defmed as "rape." See H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 154, 163 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as JURoRS}; MAcKINNoN, Violence Against Women: A Perspective, AEms, Jan. 1982 
51, 53; MacKinnon, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 2, at 925-26. 
17 The two most important rules were those allowing admission of evidence of the sexual 
history of the victim and requiring extensive corroborating evidence ofthe rape. Berger, Man's 
Trial, Woman's Tribulation, 77 Cou.JM, L. REv. 1, 15-20 (1977); Note, The Victim in a Forcible 
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AN.. CRnl. L. REv. 335, 336 (1973); Comment, supra note 
2, at 919; see infra text accompanying notes 140-163. Such rules were relaxed when the defendant 
was Black. See infra text accompanying notes 145-151. 
18 A compilation of all post-Civil War state legislation enacted prior to 1917 that mentioned 
race contained no rape statutes. F. JoHNSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION CoN­
CERNING THE FREE NEoRo (1918). Such race-specific legislation included many anti­
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as it bad before the war. Black women raped by white or Black men 
bad no hope of recourse through the legal system.19 White women 
raped by white men faced traditional common-law barriers that pro­
tected most rapists from prosecution.20 
Allegations of rape involving Black offenders and white victims 
were treated with heightened virulence. This was manifested in two 
ways. The frrst response was lynching, which peaked near the end 
of the nineteenth century. 21 The second, from the early twentieth 
century on, was the use ofthe legal system as a functional equivalent 
of lynching, as illustrated by mob coercion of judicial 
proceedings,22 sp'ecial doctrinal rules,23 the language of opinions,2A 
and the markedly disparate numbers of executions for rape between 
white and Black defendants. 25 
Lynching 
Between 1882 and 1946 at least 4715 persons were lynched, about 
three-quarters of whom were Black. 26 Although lynching tapered 
off after the early 1950s, occasional lynch-like killings persist to this 
day.27 The influence of lynching extended far beyond the numbers 
miscegenation statutes.Jd. at 8-10, 62-207. These statutes, providing criminal penalties for 
interracial marriage, were declared unconstitutional only quite recently, in Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
For thorough general discussions of miscegenation see D. BEIJ., RACE, RActSH AND .AlomucAN 
LAw 53-81 {1980): Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Pr()­
blem, S3 GEo. L.J. 49 (1964). Fora more specific historical discussion, see J. JoHNSTON, RACE 
REIJ.nONS IN VIROINIA AND ¥JSCEGENAnON IN TBE SOUTH 1776-186o (1970).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 101-112. 
20 See supra note 16. 
21 A. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 1-2 {1933); C. WOODWA:PJJ, THE STRANGE 
CAlU!ER OF JD4 CRow 43 (1974); Note, Constitutionality ofProposed Federal Anti-Lynching 
Legislation, 34 VA. L. REv. 944 {1948). 
n See infra text accompanying notes 37-SO. 
23 See ill.fra text accompanying notes Sl-SS. 
2A See ill.fra text accompanying notes S6-S8. 
23 See Jll.fra text accompanying notes S9-63. 
26 A. RoSE, THE ~OllO IN AMERICA ISS (1948) (citing a Tuskegee Institutestudy). A study 
by the NAACP found the number oflynchings acknowledged by white officials between 1882 
and 1927 to be 49Sl, with approximately 700!o of the victims being Black. White, A State­
ment o/Facl [on Lynching], inA Docul.tE:NTARY HlsroJtY O'F TBE NEGllO PEoPLEIN THE UNJTEI> 
STATES Igto-1932, at 610 (H. Aptheker ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Docm&ENTARY HistoRY]. 
27 1n March 1981, in Mobile, Alabama, a 19-year-oJd Black man was beaten, strangled to 
death, and left banging from a tree by a rope tied in a noose. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1981, 
at A12, col. 6. There were suggestions bypeople in the community that be was killed for socializ­
ing with white women, or that be was mistaken for a Black co-worker who was married to 
a white woman. !d., Mar. 26, 1981, at A16, col. 6. Three white men were arrested for the 
murder but later released when a grand jury failed to return indictments.Id., July 28, 1981, 
at Al2, col. 6. 
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of Black peoplelB murdered because accounts of massive white 
crowds torturing, burning alive, and dismembering their victims29 
created a widespread sense of terror in the Black community.30 
The most common justification for lynching was the claim that 
a Black man had raped a white woman. 31 The thought of this par­
ticular crime aroused in many white people an extremely high level 
of mania and panic. One white woman, the wife of an 
ex-Congressman, stated in 1898, "If it needs lynching to protect 
woman's dearest possession from human beasts, then I say lynch a 
thousand times a week if necessary. " 32 The quote resonates with 
common stereotypes that Black male sexuality is wanton and 
bestial,33 and that Black men are wild, criminal34 rapists of white 
women.35 
11 Black women were not spared the violence of lynchings. The NAACP study, discussed 
in White, supra n ote 26, found that of the 4951 people lynched, 76 were Black women. /d. 
at 610. Vivid fiJ'St person accounts of the lynchings of Black women document that no gentleness 
was accorded them on aCc:ount of their sex. See G. LERNER, BLACK WoUEN 1N WHITE AMEPJ CA 
161-63 (lm); Katz, The Negro Wonum and the Law, in 2FREEDOMWAYS 289 (1962); I>ocln.ml­
TARY HISTORY, supra note 26, at 142. 
29 See A. RAPER, supra note 21, at 141-44, 420-21; I. WEU.S, Lynching Bee, in A RED 
REco1U>: LYNCBINGS IN mE UNITED STATES 1892-1893·1894 (1895), reprintedin JOSTJCE DENIED: 
TBE BLACK MAN IN WHITE AlmuCA 196 (W. Chace & P . Collier eds. 1970). 
30 A. ROSE, supra note 26, at 186-87; Hall, "The Mind that Bums in Each Body": Women, 
Rape, and Racial Violence, in PoWERS OF DESIRE: TBE PoLITICS OF SEXUALITY (A. Snitow, 
C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. forthcoming 1983); Hemton, The Negro Male, in THE BLACK 
MALE, supra note 13, at 244-46. 
3 1 A. ROSE, supra note-26, at 185; C. WooDWARD, supra note 21, at 43; Hall, supra note 
30; Reynolds, The Remedyfor Lynch Law, 7 YALE L.J . 20, 20 (1897-98) (quoting an article 
that refen to the lynching of a Black man for the alleged rape of a white woman as "the usual 
crime"). 
31 Reynolds, supra note 31, at 20. 
33 Day, The Hidden Fear, in THE BLACK MALE, supra note 13, at 193, 197-98. The assum~ 
tion made by whites that Blacks have bestial sexuality has deep historical roots. See W. JoRDAN, 
WJDTE 0v.ER. BLACK: Al.mucAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEORO ISS0-1812, at 32-40, 151 
(1968). In a culture with a somatopbobic heritage such as ours, the association of any group 
with physicality or sexuality is in itself degrading. For discussions of this phenomenon ns it 
relates to women, seeS. DE BEAuvom, TBE SEcoND SEX 182-84 (1952); S . ORJFFIN, WoMEN 
AND NATURE (1978); Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?, in WoMAN, CULTURE 
AND SOCIETY 67 (M. Rosaldo & L . Lamphere eds. 1974); Spelman, Woman as Body: Ancient 
and Contemporary Views, 8 FEMlNIST STUDIES 109, 119 (1982). 
,. The association of Black men with criminality extends back at least to the nineteenth cen­
tury. A. RoSE, supra note 26, at 303. White criminals often capitalized on and perpetuated 
this stereotype by dying their faces black before committing crimes. I d. at 304; Johnson, The­
Negro and Crime, in TBE SocioLOOY OF CRn.n: AND DEuNQUENCY 419, 422 (M. Wolfgang, 
L. Santz& N. Jobnston eds. 2d ed. 1970). The alleged propensity of Black men to rape white 
women can be seen partly as a manifestation of the criminality stereotype. In 1933 , Arthur 
Raper made this link in trying to explain lynching: "[A)ccording to the popular estimate, all 
Negroes are essentially alike and are inclined to commit certain crimes, chief of which is the 
rape of white women." A . RAPER, supra note 21, at 50; see A . RosE, supra note 26, at 305. 
Note that "all Negroes" refers only to Black men; Black women are left out of this formulation. 
35 In the United States the myth of Black male sexuality includes the .characterization or 
the Black male as rapist of white women. See, e.g•• E . GENOVESE, Rou JoP.DAN Rou: THE 
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Many whites accepted lynching as an appropriate punishment for 
a Black man accused of raping a white woman. The following argu· 
ment made to the jury by defense counsel in a 1907 Louisiana case 
illustrates this acceptance: 
Gentlemen of the jury, this man, a nigger, is charged with 
breaking into the house of a white man in the nighttime and 
assaulting his wife, with the intent to rape her. Now, don't you 
know that, if this nigger had committed such a crime, he never 
would have been brought here and tried; that he would have 
been lynched, and if I were there I would help pull on the 
rope.36 
The Legal System~ Treatment: '~egal Lynchingu 
It is doubtful whether the legal system better protected the rights 
of a Black man accused of raping a white woman than did the 
mob.37 Contemporary legal literature used the term "legal lynching" 
WoRLD mE SLAVES MADE 336 (1976); G. lnNER, supra note 28, at 193; Mann & Selva, supra 
note 5, at 169-70; Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the 
Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday ofJim Crow, 82 Count. L. REv. 3, 444,454 (1982).
36 State v. Petit, 119 La. 1013, 1016, 44 So. 848, 849 (1907) (quoting defense counsel). The 
argument also reveals much about the way the legal system deimed the rape of white women. 
The house where the alleged rape took place belonged not to the victim but to "a white man" 
and she was "his wife." A Black woman would not have received such protection from the 
legal system and a white woman did only because she belonged to a white man. These dynamics 
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 143-166. Also, note that the jury here is accurately 
addressed by the defense counsel as "gentlemen," i.e., it consists entirely of white men, pro­
bably landowners. See, e.g., Day v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 562 (1845); 44 Va. 
(3 Gratt.) 629 (1846) (new trial for free mulatto defendant convicted of rape of white woman 
because of evidence that one juror was not a landowner in the county where the trial was held). 
37 The district attorney responded to the defense's claim in the Petit case, discussed supra 
note 36, by arguing that a legal system controlled by whites made lynching unnecessary because 
it had the same result: 
During the reeonstruction days, when we had negro domination in this state, the Kuklux 
Klans were organized and the best people of the state shouldered their guns for the 
protection of our white people. During those days white people were thrown into jail 
and tried by negro justices ofthe peace and negro juries. Now we have no more negro 
domination, but a government by the white people, ond hence no necessity jor lyn­
ching.. • • [T]he fact that this negro is given a fair trial is no reason why you should 
believe him innocent. 
119 La. at 1016, 44 So. at 849 (quoting the district attorney) (emphasis added). Although the 
defendant claimed the district attorney's argument was prejudicial, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana affumed the conviction, commenting: "While this discussion of matters outside 
of the record was highly improper, and should have been, in its inception, repressed by the 
trial judge, we fal1 to perceive in the remarks of the district attorney any appeal to racial pre­
judice for the purpose of influencing the jury." /d. at 1017, 44 So. at 849. 
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to describe the legal system's treatment of Black men. 38 Well past 
the frrst third of the twentieth century, courts were often coerced 
by violent mobs, which threatened to execute the defendant themselves 
unless the court convicted him.39 Such mobs often did lynch the 
defendant if the judicial proceedings were not acceptable to them.40 
A contemporary authority on lynching commented in 1934 that "the 
local sentiment whic~ would make a lynching possible would insure 
a conviction in the courts. " 41 Even if the mob was not overtly 
pressuring for execution, a Black defendant accused of raping a white 
woman faced a hostile, racist legal system.42 State court submission 
to mob pressure is well illustrated by the most famous series of cases 
about interracial rape, the Scottsboro cases of the 1930s. 43 Eight 
young Black men were convicted of what the Alabama Supreme Court 
called "a most foul and revolting crime, " 44 which was the rape of 
"two defenseless white girls."45 The defendants were summarily 
sentenced to death based on minimal and dubious evidence, having 
been denied effective assistance of counsel.46 The Alabama Supreme 
Court upheld the convictions in opinions demonstrating relentless 
determination to hold the defendants guilty regardless of strong 
evidence that mob pressure had influenced the verdicts and the weak 
evidence presented against the defendants. In one decision, that court 
affrrmed the trial court's denial of a change ofvenue on the grounds 
that the mobs' threats of harm were not imminent enough although 
the National Guard had been called out to protect the defendants 
from mob executions."' The U.S. Supreme Court later recognized 
31 Chadbourn, infra note 39, at 332. 
39 A. RAPER, supra note 21 , at 143; Chadbourn, Plan for Survey ojLynching and the 
Judicial Process, 9 N.C. L. REv. 330, 332-33 (1931); see Thompson v. State, 117 Ala. 67, 
23 So. 676 (1898) (change ofvenue granted for Black defendant accused of rape because threats 
of mob violence threatened defendant's imminent death or would pressure jury into convic­
ting); see also R. \VILXINs, RAPE: A CASE HisTORY OF MURDER, '~'ERRoR AND INrumcs VJStTED 
UPON A NEORO CoMMUNITY (1949). 
~Chadbourn, supra note 39, at 331. 

41 Chadbourn, L y nching and the Law, 20 A .B.A.J. 71 (1934). 

42 Burns, Black People and the Tyranny ofAmerican Law, 407 ANNALS, Spring 1973, at 

156, 159-60. 
0 Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 141 So. 195 (1932); Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 141 
So. 201 (1932); Weems v. State, 224 Ala. 524, 141 So. 215 (1932). 
44 Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 540, 544, 141 So. 201, 204 (1932).
0 /d. at 548, 141 So. at 2fJ7. 
46 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S . 45, 71 (1932).
47 Patterson v. State, 224 Ala . 531, 534, 141 So. 195, 196 (1932); Powell v. State, 224 Ala. 
540, 545-46, 141 So. 201, 205-06 (1932). 
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that the proceedings had in fact taken place in an atmosphere of 
''tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment."48 After a lengthy ap­
pellate process, including three favorable Supreme Court rulings,•9 
all of the Scottsboro defendants were released, having spent a total 
of 104 years in prison.'0 
In addition, courts applied special doctrinal rules to Black defen­
dants accused of the rape or attempted rape of white women.'1 One 
such rule allowed juries to consider the race of the defendant and 
victim in drawing factual conclusions as to the defendant's intent in 
attempted rape cases. If the accused was Black and the victim white, 
the jury was entitled to draw the inference, based on race alone, that 
he intended to rape her. One court wrote, "In determining the ques­
tion of intention, the jurymay consider social conditions and customs 
founded upon racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix was 
a white woman and defendant -was a Negro man."52 The "social 
conditions and customs founded upon racial differences" which the 
jury was to consider included the assumption that Black men always 
and only want to rape white women, ' 3 and that a white woman 
would never consent to sex with a Black man.,.. 
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,51 (1932); see also C. NoRJUS AS. WASBJNOTON, THE 
LAsT OF THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS 19-25 {1979) . 
•, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (systematic and arbitrary exclusion of Blacks 
from jury lists resulting in exclusion of Blacks from juries constitutes denial of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (state Supreme 
Court must consider defendants' claim of systematic exclusion of Blacks from juries despite 
defendants' failure to rue timely bill of exceptions in light of Supreme Court's decision on 
identical facts in Norris v. Alabama that such c:laims have merit); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932) (defendant accused ofcapital crime has due process right to counsel that includes 
right to consult with counsel and prepare a defense). 
50 C. NoJUUS A S. WASHINGTON, supra note 48. 
" Chastity evidence, for example, was treated differently for Black and white defendants, 
see Infra text accompanying notes 145-155. 
' 
1 McQuirter v . State, 36 Ala. App. 707, 709, 63 So. 2d 388, 390 (1953) (citations omit· 
ted). In this case, the defendant, a Black man who had never before been arrested, was found 
guilty of an "attempt to commit an assault with intent to rape!' Id. at 708, 63 So. 2d at 388. 
Hewas accused ofmuttering something unintelligible and walking within six feet ofMrs. Ted 
Allen, a white woman.Jd. at 708, 63 So. 2d at 389. See Pumphrey v. State, 156 Ala. 103, 
107-Q8, 47 So.156,158 (1908); Kelleyv. State, 1 Ala. App. 133,135,56 So.15,15-16 (1911). 
n See supra notes 33-35. Many opinions graphically illustrate this assumption, for exam· 
pie: "[T]be accused, a negro, under the excitement of lust and with the intention ofgratifying 
it by force, entered the bedroom of Mrs. Crimm, a white woman .••• There was nothing in 
the evidence to indicate that Mrs. Crimm was not virtuous..•."Pumphreyv. State, 156 Ala. 
103, 107, 47 So. 156, 158 (1908). Note the significance to the court, even in this situation, 
that "Mrs. Crimm" is "virtuous." See Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, 3 So. 612 (1878); Kelley 
v. State, I Ala. App. 133,56 So.15 (1911); Dorscyv. State, 108 Ga. 477,34 S.E. 135 (1899). 
See infra text accompanying notes 140-155. 
54 See. e.g., Story v. State. 178 Ala. 98, 5 So. 480 (1912), discussed infra text accompany­
ing notes 149-ISO. 
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The Georgia Supreme Court of 1899 was even more explicit about 
the significance of race in the context of attempted rape, and par· 
ticularly about the motivations of Black men. It held that race may 
properly be considered ''to rebut any presumption that might other­
wise arise in favor of the accused that his intention was to obtain 
the consent ofthe female, upon failure of which he would abandon 
his purpose to have sexual intercourse with her."'s Such a rebuttal 
denied to Black defendants procedural protection that was accorded 
white defendants. 
Judicial attitudes toward the rape of white women by Black men 
are also manifested in the factual descriptions ofthe crime in opinions. 
Courts sometimes created pornographic images of the events of the 
rape." One court, for example, wrote, "[The victim,] while clad 
only in her pajamas was forced to a remote spot some two blocks 
from her home, where battered, bruised, bleeding and exhausted she 
was overpowered ...."" The sense of disgusted fascination that 
such opinions convey is not paralleled in cases where offender and 
v.ictim are both white.58 • • 
The outcome ofthis disparate treatment ofBlack men by the legal 
system was often the same as lynching-death.'9 Between 1930 and 
1967, thirty-six percent of the Black men who were convicted of raping 
a white woman were executed. 60 In stark contrast, only two percent 
"Dorsey v. State, 108 Ga. 477, 480, 34 S.E. 135, 136-37 (1899). This rule was not used 
where both parties were Black. See Washington v. State, 138 Ga. 370, 75 S.E. 253 (1912); 
see infra text accompanying notes 106-108. 
" That the descriptions were pornographic was pointed out to the author by Karen 
Getman. 
$7 Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 697, 370 S.W. 2d 113, 115 (1963); see Vanleeward v. 
State, 220 Ga. 135, 136, 137 S.E. 2d 452, 453 (1964). 
,. For example, in Rice v. State, 35 F1a. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895), the court drily notes "the 
plaintiff in error was convicted ofthe crime ofrape upon one Helen Smith, his stepdaughter." 
s9 In 1965, 18 American jurisdictions allowed the death penalty for rape. Wolfgang & 
Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty 401 ANNAlS 120 (1973). Hugo Bedau 
has written that most criminologists think capital punishment for rape was "introduced in 
order to Keep the Nigras in line" and "had nothing to do with its deterrent effect." Bailey, 
Rape and the Death Penalty: A Neglected Area ofDeterrence Research, in CAPJTAL PtmiSH­
l!ENT IN THE UNITED STATES 336 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eels. 1975) (citing unpublished letter} 
(emphasis in the original). 
60 Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in EXECUTIONS IN 
Ala.JuCA, supra note 13, at 116. A systematic analysis of 1238 convictions for rape between 
1945 and 1965 examined many variables in addition to race, such as presence of a weapon 
and prior record of the defendant, to attempt to account for the disparate numbers of e:~ccu­
tions. The study concluded that race was the only factor that accounted for the disparities. 
/d. at 114-20. The Wolfgang study is unique in its methodology and conclusiveness. It sup­
ports a larger body of prior research summarized in id. at 110-11. 
113 1983] Rape and Racism 
of all defendants convicted of rape involving other racial combina­
tions were executed.61 As a result ~f such disparate treatment, 
eighty-nine percent of the men executed for rape in this country were 
Black.Q While execution rates for all crimes were much higher for 
Black men than for white men, the differential was most dramatic 
when the crime was the rape of a white woman. 63 
The Legacy Today 
The patterns that began in slavery and continued long afterwards 
have left a powerful legacy that manifests itself today in several ways. 
Although the death penalty for rape has been declared 
unconstitutional,64 the severe statutory penalties for rape65 continue 
to be applied in a discriminatory manner. A recent study concluded 
that Black men convicted of raping white women receive more serious 
sanctions than all other sexual assault defendants. 66 A recent 
attitudinal study found that white potential jurors treated Black and 
white defendants similarly when the victim was Black. However, 
61 /d. at 110-13; see Mann & Selva. supra noteS. 
62 Wolfgang & Reidel, supra note 59. 
63 Wolfgang, supra note 60, at 110-13. The NAACP-LDEF challenged the constitutionality 
of the death penalty partly on the grounds that the execution rate disparities for rape con­
stituted racial discrimination. M. MELTSNEP., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 73-105 (1973). This argu­
ment was not accepted by the Supreme Court in its decision limiting the circumstances inwbic:h 
the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
92S. Ct. 2726 (1972). A striking example ofopposition to this type of argument is the response 
of the Supreme Court ofArkansas in 1962to evidence that over a recent 47 year period, 95% 
of the executions for rape had been ofBlack men {19 out of 20) and 72.90Jo of the executions 
for murder had been of Black men or women (108 out of 148). See Maxwell v. State, 236 
Ark. 694, 370 S.W.2d 113 {1963). The court rejected the idea that such statistics proved 
discrimination, concluding: 
Certainly there was no evidence offered even remotely suggesting that the ratio ofviolent 
crimes by Negroes and Whites was different from the ratio of the executions. There 
was no testimony suggesting that the State's attorneys in the various judicial districts 
had not been asking for the death penalty in their prosecutions for rape, whether the 
accused be black or white. 
Id. at 701. This demonstrates an llcceptanc:e of the stereotypes of Blaclc male criminality, see 
supra note 34, and rapaciousness, see supra note 35. 
64 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 {1977). 
63 In almost half the states today, the maximum punishment for rape is life imprisonment. 
J moRS, supra note 16, at 207-458. 
~ LaFree, The Effect ofSexual Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 
AMEll. Soc. REv. 842, 852 (1980). 
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Black defendants received more severe punishment than white defen­
dants when the victim was white. 67 
The rape of white women by Black men is also used to justify harsh 
rape penalties. One of the few law review articles written before 1970 
that takes a firm position in favor of strong rape laws to secure con­
victions begins with a long quote from a newspaper article describ­
ing rapes by three Black men, who at 3 a.m. on Palm Sunday "broke 
into a West Philadelphia home occupied by an eighty-year-old widow, 
her forty-four-year-old daughter and fourteen-year-old grand­
daughter," brutally beat and raped the white women, and left the 
grandmother unconscious "lying in a pool of blood."68 This 
introduction presents rape as a crime committed by violent Black 
men against helpless white women. It is an image of a highly atypical 
rape-the defendants are Black and the victims white, the defendants 
and victims are strangers to each other, extreme violence is used, and 
it is a group rape. Contemporaneous statistical data on forcible rapes 
reported to the Philadelphia police department reveals that this rape 
case was virtually unique. 69 Use of this highly unrepresentative 
image of rape to justify strict rape laws70 is consistent with recent 
research showing that it is a prevalent, although false, belief about 
rape that the most common racial combination is Black offender and 
white victim. 71 
67 JURORS, supra note 16, at 117-18. This difference is not solely attributable to the type 
of crime nt issue, since many studies show that Black defendants usually receive stricter sentences 
than white defendants for crimes committed against whites other than rape, id. at 117, and 
that white jurors are generally lenient on Black defendants who commit crimes against Blacks. 
Note, The Case for Black Jurors, 79 YALE L.J. 531,534 (1970). But the denree of misinfor­
mation and sensationalism associated with the accusation of rape is unique. See iflfra note 71. 
63 Schwartz, 11te Effect in Philadelphia ofPennsylvania's Increased Penalties for Rope and 
Attempted Rape, 59 J. Clw.f. L., C!uMJNoLOOY,Il PouCE BEHAVIOR 509 (1968). The author 
concludes that the increased penalties for rape did not reduce the incidence of rape. 
69 M. Aldm, iflfro note 116. Out of 343 rapes reported to the Philadelphia poUce, 3.30Jo 
involved Black defendants accused of raping white women, id. at 44; 420Jo involved complaints 
of stranger rape, id. at 250; 20.SOJo involved brutal beatings, id. at 155-56; 43cro involved group 
ra~es, id. at 200. 
In October 1969, 11te 11tunderbolt, the newspaper of the National States Rights Party, 
carried a strikingly similar image. At the bottom of the page was a drawing of the FBI's crime 
time clock, with a caption proclaiming: "Every thirty minutes, a woman is RAPED somewhere 
in the U.S.A." Dominating the top of the page was the phrase ''THE BLACK PLAGUE," 
next to a drawing of a large unkempt Black man with a knife, running toward the reader 
and away from a tangled pile of grass. On close examination, what appeared initially ns grass 
was revealed as the virtually subliminal image of a partly disrobed, prone blonde white woman. 
This image is reproduced in L. CORns, CP.n.DNAL VIOLENCE 22 (1974). 
' 
1 In answer to the question, "Among which racial combination do most rapes occur?" 480Jo 
ofrespondents stated Black males and white females, 30Jo stated white males and Black femnles, 
160Jo stated Black males and Black females, 330Jo stated white males and white females. JURORS, 
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Charges of rapes committed by Black men against white women 
are still surrounded by sensationalism12 and public pressure for 
prosecution. Black men seem to face a special threat ofbeing unjustly 
prosecuted or convicted.73 One example is Willie Sanders.74 Sanders 
is a Black Boston man who was arrested and charged with the rapes 
of four young white women after a sensational media campaign and 
intense pressure on the police to apprehend the rapist. Although the 
rapes continued after Sanders was incarcerated, and the evidence 
against him was extremely weak, the state subjected him to a vigorous 
twenty-month prosecution. After a lengthy and expensive trial, and 
an active public defense, he was eventually acquitted.75 Although 
Sanders was clearly innocent, he could have been convicted; he and 
his family suffered incalculable damage despite his acquittal. 
Another recent example is the Alabama case of Thomas Lee 
Hines.76 Hines is a young mentally retarded Black man who was ac­
cused ofraping several white women. The trial judge granted a change 
ofvenue, noting, ''tb.e facts of the race of the defendant and victims 
have so overpowered the case as to make it appear to the community 
as a racial incident.,, Hines' trial was transferred to a nearby coun­
ty, where he was convicted by an all-white jury in proceedings marked 
by frequent outbursts from spectators, sensationalist press coverage, 
supra note 16, at 80. Recent victim survey data contradicts this prevalent belief; more than 
four· fifths of illegal rapes reported to researchers were between members of the same race, 
and white/Black rapes roughly equaled Black/white rapes. Bowker, supra note 2, at 172. In 
that text, there is a misprint so that the sentence reads: "nearly four-futbs of all rapes were 
interracial." Id. While the context makes clear that "intraracial" is intended, it is fascinating 
that this particular typographical error slipped past all proofreaders. For a discussion of rape 
statistics, see supra note 2. 
12 See Abbott & Calonico, Black Man, White Woman- The Maintenance ofa Myth: Rape 
and the Press in New Orleans, in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: Dn.mNstoNs Ol' DEVIANCE 141 
(M. Riedel & T. Thornberry eds. 1974); Evans, supra note 13, at 75; Stem, The Right ofthe 
Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HAllv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming 1983). 
13 Several commentators have noted recent rape convictions of Black men accused of raping 
white women that seem to be based on inadequate evidence. See A. DAVIS, WoMEN, RAcE 
AND Cuss, 172-75 (1981); SOCLWST WoMEN•s CAUCUS OP LoUISVll.I.E, THE R.ACtST USE Or 
RAPE AND THE RAPE CHARGE (July 1975) (on flle at the HARv. WoldEN's L.J.); BRADEN, A 
Second Open Letter to Southern White Women, 4 SoUTHERN EXPOSURE 50 (Winter 1977); 
Evans, supra note 13, at 80. 
74 Suffolk Superior Court Indictnient No. 025027·36, 025077 (1980).
15 See Stem, supra note 72; Sands, Rape and Racism in Boston: An Open Letter to White 
Feminists, 01'1' OuR BACKS, Jan. 1980~at 16-17; THE WILLIE SANDERS I>EF.ENSE CoMMlTTEE, 
FROW ScoT'l'SliORO 1930 TO BOSTON 1980: TBB FRAME·UP CoNTINUES (1980).
76 Hines v. State, 384 So. 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). This case was brought to the 
attention of the author by Stephanie Y. Moore. 
71 Id. at 1183. 
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and extensive security ta protect the courtroom participants.'8 The 
appellate court granted a new trial because police behavior coupled 
with the degree of Hines' retardation called into question the volun­
tariness ofhis statements to the police, and stated that the court found 
that the racially charged trial conditions justified a second change 
of venue.79 Hines was eventually declared incompetent for trial and 
committed to a state institution. 80 
Conclusion 
From slavery to the present day, the legal system has consistently 
treated the rape ofwhite women by Black men with more harshness 
than ·any other kind of rape. The punishment for Black of­
fender/white victim rape has ranged historically from castration, to 
death by torture and lynching, to executions. Today Black men con­
victed of raping white women receive longer prison sentences than 
other rape defendants. Innocent Black men also face the threat of 
racially motivated prosecutions. 
This selective focus is significant in several ways. First, since 
tolerance ofcoerced sex has been the rule rather than the exception, 
it is clear that the rape ofwhite women by Black men has been treated 
seriously not because it is coerced sex and thus damaging to women, 
but because it is threatening to white men's power over both "their" 
women and Black men.8' Second, in treating Black offender/white 
71 Id. at 1183. 
19 Id. at 1181, 1183. 
10 N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1980, at A17, col. 4. 
11 Part of the reason for this social meaning of rape is that laws against rape originate in 
the conception of women as property. SeeS. BROWNldiLt.ER, supra note 13, at 7-10, 201; L. 
Cl.ARK .t D. LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUAIJTY 115-32 (1977); THE SECOND 
AssAULT, supra note 3, at 24; Comment, supra note 2, at 924-25. 
In nineteenth century cases and literature, this notion sometimes took the form of discuss­
ing women as "goods." For example, in one rape case where a slave was accused of raping 
a white woman, force was an element of the crime, but since there was no evidence of force, 
the Alabama Supreme Court wrote: 
There was, in this case, at least some evidence tending to show that the act of the prisoner 
was an attempt to accomplish his object by fraudulent personation of the husband•••• 
[W]e depart from our usual course, for the purpose of inviting the attention of the 
legislature to this subject. Under our penal laws, one who obtains the goods of another 
under false and fraduJent pretenses, is held guilty ..•as if he had feloniously stolen 
them. He who contaminates female purity under like fraudulent pretenses, goes un­
whipped of justice. 
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victim illegal rape much more harshly than all coerced sex experienced 
by Black women and most coerced sex experienced by white women, 
the legal system has implicitly condoned the latter forms of rape. 
Third, this treatment bas contributed to a paradigmatic but false con­
cept of rape as being primarily a violent crime between strangers where 
the perpetrator is Black and the victim white. Finally, this pattern 
is perverse and discriminatory because rape is painful and degrading 
to both Black and white victims82 regardless of the attacker's race. 83 
PART II: THE DENIAL OF THE 

RAPE OF BLACK WOMEN 

Who knows what the black woman thinks ofrape? Who has asked 
her? Who cares? -ALicE WALKER84 
The selective acknowledgement of the existence and seriousness 
of the rape of white women by Black men has been accompanied 
by a denial of the rape of Black women that began in slavery and 
continues today. Because of racism and sexism, very little has been 
written about this denial. Mainstr~am American history has ignored 
the role of Black people to a large extent; systematic research into 
Black history has been published only recently. 85 The experiences of 
Black women have yet to be fully recognized in those histories,86 
although this is beginning to change.87 Indeed, very little has been 
written about rape from the perspective of the victim, Black or white, 
Lewis, a slave, v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 56-51 (1857). For explanations of bow the conception 
of women as property links with the creation of myths about the Black male as rapist, see 
A. DWORXIN, Rlam:-WING WoMEN 124 (1983); Mann & Selva, supra noteS, at 170. 
11 Powerful poems about the effects of rape on its victims have been published in the last 
decade, by both Black and white women. See, e.g., Jordan, Poem About My Rights, AEGIS, 
March-Apr. 1979, at 31; M. PIEltCY, Rape Poem, in LIVING IN THE OPEN (1976); Shange, 
is no{so gd to be born a girl, 10 Tm BLACK ScHoLAR, May-June 1979, at 8-9. This is not 
to assert that Black and white women's experiences have been identical. See Part II, infra 
text accompanying notes 84-124. 
13 Evans, supra note 13, at 81. 
14 A. WALKEk, Advancing Luna-and Ida B. Wells, in You CAN'T KEEP A GooD Wo'JdAN 
DoWN 85, 93 (1981). 
as Beale, Slave ofa Slave No More: Black Women in Struggle, 12 THE BLACK ScHoLAR, 
Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 16. 
"Id. 
17 G. l.aNElt, supra note 28; BuT So:a.m oF Us ARE BRAVE: BLAcK WoMEN's STUDIES (G. 
Hull, P. Scott & B. Smith eds. 1982); CoNDmONs: F'Iv£, Autumn 1979 (Tbe Black Women's 
Issue); 2 HEREsiES, Falll979 (Third World Women: ThePolitics ofBeing Other); 8 SoJOURNEB., 
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until quite recently. 88 Research about Black women rape victims en­
counters all these obstacles. 
Slavery 
The rape of Black women by white men during slavery was 
commonplace and was used as a crucial weapon of white 
supremacy.89 White men had what one commentator called "institu­
tionalized access" to Black women. 90 The rape of Black women by 
white men cannot be attributed to unique Southern pathology, 
however, for numerous accounts exist of northern armies raping Black 
women while they were "liberating" the South.91 
The legal system rendered the rape of Black women by any man, 
white or Black, invisible. The rape of a Black woman was not a 
crime.92 In 1859 the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed the indict­
ment of a male slave for the rape of a female slave less than 10 years 
old, saying: 
[T]his indictment can not be sustained, either at common law 
or under our statutes. It charges no offense known to either 
system. [Slavery] was unknown to the common law ...and hence 
its provisions are inapplicable .... There is no act (of our 
legislature on this subject) which embraces either the attempted 
or actual commission of a rape by a slave on a female slave .•.. 
Masters and slaves can not be governed by the same system or 
laws; so different are their positions, rights and duties. 93 
Jan. 1983 (Special Issue: Women of Color); Jones, My Mother was Much ofa Woman: Black 
Women. Work and the Family Under Slavery, 8 FEMIN1ST STUDIES 235 (1982); 9 THE BLAcK 
SociOI.OGtST, Spring/Summer 1982 (special issue entitled New Thoughts on Feminism. Race 
Relations and Social Change); Reagan, My Black Mothers and Sisters or On Beginning a 
CulturalAutobiography, 8 FEld:oosT STUDIES 81 (1982); Smith, Racism and Women's Studies, 
S FRoNTIERS, Winter 1980, at 48; Spelman, The Erasure ofBlack Women 5 QUEST 36 (1982). 
13 See infra note 212. , . 
89 S. BaoWNWLI.ER, supra note 13, at 165; A. DAVJS, supra note 73, at 24-27 (1981); B. 
HooKS, AIN'T I A WoMAN: BLACK WoMEN AND FEMlNlSM 24-27 (1981); G. LERNER, supra 
note 28, at 149-SO; J. NoBLE, BEAUTIFUL ALso ARE THE SoUlS OF MY BLACK SISTERS 35 (1978); 
see DuBois, Divine Right, in DOCUMENTARY HisroaY, supra note 26, at 53. (
90 L. CURm, supra note 70, at 22. 
H. Gtm.IAN, Tm BLACK FAMILY JN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 175D-1925, at 386-87 (1978). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
93 George, a slave, v. State, 37 Miss. 306 (1859). The following year the state legislature, 
evidently shocked by the decision, outlawed attempted or actual rape of a Black or mulatto 
female under 12 by a Black or mullato male, and made it punishable by death or whipping. 
1860 Miss. Laws 62. The legislature refused to recognize the rape of adult Black females and 
the rape of any Black females by white men. 
91 
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This decision is illuminating in several respects. First, Black men are 
held to lesser standards of sexual restraint with Black women than 
are white men with white women.94 Second, white men are held to 
lesser standards of restraint with Black women than are Black men 
with white women. 9s Neither white nor Black men were expected to 
show sexual restraint with Black women. 96 
The Post-Civil War Period 
Mter the Civil War, the widespread rape of Black women by white 
men persisted.97 Black women were vulnerable to rape in several 
ways that white women were not. First, the rape of Black women 
was used as a weapon of group terror by white mobs and by the Ku 
Klux Klan during Reconstruction.98 Second, because Black women 
worked outside the home,99 they were exposed to employers' sexual 
aggression as white women who worked inside the home were 
not.100 
The legal system's denial that Black women experienced sexual 
abuse by both white and Black men also persisted, 101 although 
IN "Whites, perhaps originally to perpetuate breeding, encouraged the identity of Black 
males in terms ofuninhibited sexuality •.• . It seems clear that the Black male was given sc:x­
uallicense by the White patriarchy in exchange for his economic and political autonomy." 
THE SECOND AssAULT, supra note 3, at 30-31; seeB. HooD, supra note 89, at 35; G. LERNER, 
supra note 28, at 194. The"sexual license" ofcourse did not extend to white women. Jd. at 31-33. 
The comparison between masters and slaves in George v. State, 37 Miss. 306 (1859), implies 
that real standards of sexual restraint were applied to white men's behavior toward white women, 
an assumption questioned in Part Ill of this Note, infra text accompanying notes 138-180. 
"See supra text accompanying notes 5-17. 
96 R. STAPlES, THE BLACJC WoMAN IN AMERICA 40 (1973); B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 
32-34. 
97 See H. Gunu.N, supra note 91, at 390; B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 52, 56-59; G. 
LERNmt. supra note 28, at 173-93. 
91 See 0 . LUNER, supra note 28, at 172-81. 
99 See B. Hooxs, supra note 89, at 22, 71-72; G. LERNER, supra note 28, at xxiv; J. NOBLE, 
supra note 89, at 46; Beckett, Working Women: A Historical Review ofRacial Differences, 
9 THE BLACK: SoaoLOCIJST 5 (1982). Analyses of women's situations which assume the "tradi­
tional women's role" to be that of housewife, and treat "women's" introduction into the 
workforce as a relatively recent phenomena, effectively deny the existence of Black women. 
While this denial bas been pointed out in many publications, recent examples ofit exist. See, 
e.g., Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women~ Subordination and the Role ofLaw, in 
THE Poxmc:S OF LAw, supra note 8, at 125-26. 
100 See B. Hoon, supra note 89, at 56-59. The myths concerning Black women's promis­
cuity probably contributed to the sc:xua1 abuse of Black women by white employers. 
101 Bell Hooks discusses newspaper articles urging the public to take action in opposition 
to the rape of Black women, B. Hoon, supra note 89, at 56-59. The author of this Note 
bas been unable to f'md any legal literature on the rape of Black women either during orafter 
slavery. 
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statutes had been made race-neutral. 102 Even if a Black victim's case 
went to trial-in itself highly unlikely103 - procedural barriers and 
prejudice against Black women protected any man accused of rape 
or attempted rape. 104 The racist rule which facilitated prosecutions 
ofBlack offender/white victim attempted rapes by allowing the jury 
to consider the defendant's race as evidence of his intent, 105 for in­
stance, was not applied where both persons were "of color and there 
was no evidence of their social standing." 106 That is, the fact that 
a defendant was Black was considered relevant only to prove intent 
to rape a white woman; it was not relevant to prove intent to rape 
a Black woman. By using disparate procedures, the court implicitly 
makes two assertions. First, Black men do not want to rape Black 
women with the same intensity or regularity that Black men want 
to rape white women. 107 Second, Black women do not experience 
coerced sex in the sense that white women experience it. 108 
These attitudes reflect a set of myths about Black women's sup­
posed promiscuity which were used to excuse white men's sexual abuse 
IC!l See supra note 18. 

103 The process that white rape victims must go through in pursuing a rape complaint has 

· been shown to be arduous and taxing. See L. Hei.MSTROM 11. A. BURcress, THE VICTIM OF RAPE: 
!NsnronoNALRE.AcnoNS 30-62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as THE VICTIM OF RAPE]; Note, supra 
note 17, at 347-Sl; Comment, supra note 2, at 937-38; Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim 
ofSociety and the Law, 11 WJI.LAM:E:Tl'E L.J. 36, 43-49 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Comment, 
The Rape Victim]. The treatment by the legal system of a Black rape victim in the first half 
of this century was incalculably worse. SeeS. GlUFFIN, RAPE: THE PowER Ol' CONSCIOUSNESS 
14 ~979) (description ofthe treatment Billie Holiday received after having been raped at age 10).
1 Traditional common-law rules which made rape generally a difficult crime to prove pro. 
tected the defendant. See infra note 159. In addition, Black women's claims were not taken 
seriously regardless of the offender's race. In a 1971 study on judges' attitudes towards rape 
victims, a judge was quoted as saying: "with the Negro community, you really have to redefine 
rape. You never know about them." Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Towards Rape Victims, 51 
JUDICATURE 303 (1974). A vivid example of the judicial sYStem's response to Black women's 
claims of sexual harassment is the account by a nurse published i~ 1912: 
I remember well the flTSt and last work place from which I was dismissed. I lost my 
place because I refused to Jet the madam's husband kiss me.. • . I didn't know then 
what bas been a burden to my mind and heart ever since; that a colored woman's vir· 
tue in this part of the country has no protection. When my husband went to the man 
who had insulted me, the man •.•had him arrested! I. ..testified on oath to the insult 
offered me. The white man, of course, denied the charge. The old judge looked up 
and said: "'Ibis court will never take the word of a nigger against the word of a white man.• 
More Slavery at the South, 12 THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 25, 1912, at 197-200, reprinted in 
G. LERNER, supra note 28, at 155-56. 

IO$ See supra text accompanying notes 52-SS. 

106 Washington v. State, 38 Ga. 370, 15 S.E. 253 (1912). 

107 See supra note 35. 

108 See B. HooKS, supra note 89, at 52. 
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of Black women.109 An example of early twentieth century assump­
tions about Black women's purported promiscuity was provided by 
the Florida Supreme Court in 1918. In discussing whether the prior 
chastity of the victim in a statutory rape case should be presumed 
subject to defendant's rebuttal or should be an element of the crime 
which the state must prove, the court explained that: 
What bas been said by some of our courts about an unchaste 
female being a comparatively rare exception is no doubt true 
where'the population is composed largely of the Caucasian race, 
but we would blind ourselves to actual conditions ifwe adopted 
this rule where another race that is largely immoral constitutes 
an appreciable part of the population.110 
Cloaking itself in the mantle of legal reasoning, the court states 
that most young white women are virgins, that most young Black 
women are not, and that unchaste women are immoral. The tradi­
tional law of statutory rape at issue in the above-quoted case pro­
vides that women who are not "chaste" cannot be raped.111 Because 
of the way the legal system considered chastity, m the association of 
Black women with unchastity meant not only that Black women could 
not be victims of statutory rape, but also that they would not be 
recognized as victims of forcible rape. 
The Legacy Today 
The criminal justice system continues to take the rape of Black 
women less seriously than the rape of white women. Studies show 
that judges generally impose harsher sentences for rape when the vic­
tim is white than when the victim is Black.113 The behavior of white 
109 Id. at 54-85; G. l.mwml, supra note 28, at 163-71; J. NoBLE, supra note 89 .at 47. 
110 Dallas v. State, 76 Fla. 358, 79 So. 690 (1918), quoted in Note, Statutory Rape: Previous 
Chaste Character in Florida, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 201, 203-04 (1960). 
111 Jtmo:as, supra note 16, at 167; Bienen, supra note 8, at 192. ~ 
ru The operation of traditional laws and conceptions of rape that depend on vi~' prior 
chastity is discussed in greater detail at infra text accompanying notes 140-155. 
113 LaFree, supra note 66, at 847-48. A 1968 study of rape sentencing in Maryland revealed 
that in all SS cases where the death penalty was imposed the victim had been white. and that 
between 1960 and 1967, 47o/o ofall Black men convicted ofcriminal assaults on Black women 
were immediately released on probation. The average sentence received byBlack men, exclusive 
ofcases involving life imprisonment or death, was 4.2 years ifthe victim was Black, 16.4 years 
if the victim was white. Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121, 
123 (1975). 
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jurors shows a similar bias. A recent study found that sample white 
jurors imposed significantly lighter sentences on defendants whose 
victims were Black than on defendants whose victims were white. 114 
Black jurors exhibited no such bias. m 
Evidence concerning police behavior also documents the fact that 
the claims of Black rape victims are taken less seriously than those 
of whites. 116 A 1968 study of Philadelphia police processing deci­
sions concluded that the differential in police decisions to charge for 
rape "resulted primarily from a lack of confidence in the veracity 
of Black complainants and a belief in the myth of Black 
promiscuity." 117 
The thorough denial of Black women's experiences of rape by the 
legal system is especially shocking in light of the fact that Black 
women are much more likely to be victims of rape than are white 
women.118 Based on data from national .surveys of rape victims, 119 
"the profile of the most frequent rape victim is a young woman, 
divorced or separated, Black and poverty stricken." 120 
Recent victim survey data shows that of the roughly one-fifth of 
illegal rapes that are interracial, Black men were as likely to rape 
white women as white men were to rape Black women . 121 The 
statistics concerning Black women's rape by white men, however, may 
be too low. Black women apparently underreport illegal rape to the 
police-especially rape by white men122-and may do the same with 
114 JURoRS, supra note 16, at 106. 
m /d. at 119. 
116 See M. AMIR, PATI'ERNS IN FoR.cmLE RAPE 11 (1971); Peters, Tire Philadelphia Rope 
Survey, in VJCTIMOI.OOY: A NEw Focus, VoL. III, CR.JME.s, VJCTJ:MS AND JusnCE 186 (I. Drapkin 
& E. Viano eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as VJCTJMOLOOY Ill]; Note, supra note 17, at 343. 
The relatively high credibility accorded white women's accusations of rape against Black men 
was mitigated if the woman was known to socialize with Blacks. 
117 Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime Has Been Committed­
Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 277, 304 (1968). 
118 Recent data from random citizen interviews suggest that Black women are much more 
likely to be victims of illegal rape than are white women. Bowker, supra note 2, at 164; see 
Karmen, Women Victims ofCrime: Introduction 185, 188, in THE CRWJNAL JusnCE SYSTEM 
AND WoMEN: OFFENDEllS, VICTIMS, WoRKERS (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds . 1982). 
119 See supra note 2. 
J2D Kannen, supra note ll8, at 188. 
m Bowker, supra note 2, at 172. 
02 There is conflicting commentary as to whet.her Black women are more or less likely than 
white women to rep ort rape to the police. Lee Bowker explains that the Nationa1 L.E.A.A. 
Survey published in 1976 found that, "[w]hite rape victims were much more likely to report 
the crime to the police (59%) than were Black rape victims (36<7Jo)." Bowker, supra note 2, 
at 173. Allen Johnson, however. claims, "the available evidence suggests that nonwhites are 
more likely than whites to report their assaults." Johnson, On the Prevalence ofRape in the 
123 1983] Rape and Racism 
victim survey interviewers. Even if the victim survey data were 
accurate, the type of forced sex it studies is only a small fraction 
of the various kinds of sexual subordination to which women are 
subjected,123 some of which are available disproportionately to 
white men. 124 
Conclusion 
From slave~ -the present time; the rape of Black women has 
been denied by the legal system. During slavery, the rape of Black 
women by Black men was legal. The rape of Black women by white 
men was frequent, legal, and a crucial weapon of white supremacy .. 
After the Civil War, the legal system~s continued denial of the rape 
of Black women was manifested in discriminatory doctrinal rules and 
judicial language. Today Black women continue to suffer rape in 
disproportionate numbers, while the criminal justice system still takes 
the claims of Black rape victims less seriously than the claims ofwhite 
victims. 
PART III: THE DENIAL OF THE 

SIGNIFICANCE OF SEXUAL COERCION 

The legal system and American society have acknowledged the 
existence and seriousness of one racial combination of rape-that 
United States, 6 StoNs 136, 145 (1980). See infra notes 116 and 117, suggesting that police 
behavior may be an especial deterrent to Black women's reporting. When the race ofthe assailant 
is taken into account, there is agreement that Black women tend not to report rapes by white 
men. In a 1971 study of rape in Oakland, California, few Black women reported being raped 
by white men. One respondent told the questioners: "No Black woman would report being 
raped by a white man to the police in Oakland. They might report it to the Panthers, but 
never the police." Agopian, Chappell & Geis, Black Offender and White Victim: A Study 
ofForcible Rape in Oakland, Cafifomia, inVtCTJMOLOOY Ill, supra note 116, at 101 [hereinafter 
cited as Black Offender]. See L. Ctntns, supra note 70; see a/.sp THE RAciST USE OF RAPE 
AND TEE RAPE CH.u.os, supra note 73, at S-6 {discussion of the rape of Black women by 
Alabama police during the Civil Rights movement); A. DAVIS, supra note 73,.at 173 {the rape 
of Black women by Chicago police in 1974). 
au See ilifra text accompanying notes 171-178. 
l2A The opportunity for sexual harassment of womsn employees by their employers or 
supervisors is disproportionately available to white men, who disproportionately hold such 
positions of power. See A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 197-200. To acknowledge this is not to 
claim that Black men do not sexually harass women; both Black and white women have com­
plainedofsexual harassment by Black men. C. MAcKINNoN, SEXUAL HAllAssHENTOF Wou:­
n~o WoKEN 30-31 (1979). 
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of white women by Black men. 125 Courts and commentators 
justified this focus by exaggerating the trauma white women face 
when raped by Black men.126 This chacterization allowed the crime 
of rape to be narrowly defined and treated in a way that denied to 
all women an effective legal shield against rape. 121 Moreover, the 
myth that rape is only a crime committed by Black men against white 
women has obscured and deflected attention from the varied nature, 
pervasiveness, and influence of the sexual subordination to which 
all women are subjected.128 
Characterizing White Women's Experiences 
Part of the justification given by white men for treating Black 
offender/white victim rape with special severity was that rape by a 
Black man felt worse, was worse, than rape by a white man. An 1889 
law review note on lynching bid its readers to "consider how pro­
foundly humiliated any woman must feel who has been the victim 
of an. outrage of this character, and how, under existing social con­
ditions, this humiliation must be greatly intensified by the wrong 
having been committed by a negro."m 
White men also told white women that death was preferable to 
rape by a Black man. In one of the Scottsboro opinions130 the 
Alabama Supreme Court wrote, "some things may happen to one 
worse than death by an assassin. One of those things happened to 
this defenseless woman." 131 Thirty years later, in 1964, the Georgia 
l:tS See Part I, supra text accompanying notes 1-83. 
124 See infra text accompanying notes 129-132. 
m See infra text accompanying notes 140-175. 
128 While there bas been virtually no recognition that Black women experience any kind of 
sexual coercion, the illegal rape of white women bas been recognized to some extent, albeit 
within the limits discussed in this Pan. 
129 Reynolds, supra note 31, at 21. Note that, although the author refers to the humilia· 
tion of "any woman," be means only white women. The notion that a Black woman could 
have been humiliated by a rape would have been virtually inconceivable. See notes 92-112 
and accompanying text. To the extent that the definition "woman"was limited by the helpless 
white woman image, Black women were excluded. The stereotype of the delicate, helpless 
white woman bas never applied and bas never been applied to Black women. Part of the reason 
for this is that Black women have been workers outside their households from slavery to the 
present. See supra note 99. But even with the recent recognition ofthe introduction ofwomen 
into the workforce, the notion that Black women are not feminine persists, see B. Hooxs, 
supra note 89, at 83. 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 43-50. 
m Powetl v. State. 224 Ala. 540, 551. 141 So. 201. 211 (1932). 
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S~preme Court descnoed the rape ofa white woman by a Black man 
as. "a crime more horrible than death[,] .. .the forcible sexual inva­
sion of her body, the temple of her soul," which "soil[ed] for life 
her purity, the most precious attribute of all mankind."1n In foster­
ing racism, these characterizations presented a rationalization for the 
brutal murder of Black men. 133 Yet they also created fear in white 
women and thus helped maintain their powerlessness134 - both by 
encouraging white women's physical dependence on white men, and 
by robbing women of the power to define their own sexual 
experiences.m 
The unstated converse of these characterizations is that for white 
women, rape by white men is better than death and not nearly as 
bad as rape by Black men. Indeed, the criminal justice system in prac­
tice has virtually denied the seriousness of the rape of white women 
other than in the rare circumstances where the offender is a violent 
Black man who is a stranger to the "virtuous" victim. 
The Legal System~ Denial of Rape 
The 1897 law review article on lynching demonstrates great sym­
pathy for the rape complainant136 and does not explicitly doubt her 
an Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E. 2d 766, 769 (1964). 
m See Part I supra text accompanying notes 1-83. 
sse lt is important to acknowledge that to say that something furthers racism is not to deny 
that it can also b e sexist. Likewise, to say that something contributes to sexism is not to deny 
that It can also b e racist. Racism and sexism are complementary, not contradictory. For fur. 
ther discussion, see Part IV, infra text accompanying notes 181-233. 
us These characterizations embody two types of disempowerment. First is the disempower­
ment involved simply in having one's own experience dermed by someone else. Second is the 
disempowering content of the definltions imposed. Here, the treatment of the rape victim 
after the rape is that of a stigmatized, ruined woman. An early description of the purported 
effect of rape on a virgin is Camp v. State, 3 Oa. 417, 422 (1847), which stated that after 
the loss of her virginity, "all is gone: her love of justice, sense of character, and regard for 
troth."This extreme stigmatization is perhaps decreasing, Sagarin, Forcible Rope ond the Pro. 
blem ofthe Rights ofthe Accused, FoRciBU RAPE, supra note 2, at 142, but it nonetheless 
persists in powerful forms. The stigma is often internalized, which is also disempowering. 
See J. BARKAS, Y IC'mlS 126 (1978); Peters, supra note 116, at 197. 
sJ6 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Reynolds argues that society>s desire to spare 
the white woman the extreme humiliation she suffers from public cros~amination is the 
force behind lynching. Reynolds, supra note 31, at 21. This characterization of the causes 
of lynching is obviously incorrect. It uses false stereotypes ofwhite women's extreme delicacy 
and the false idea that society sincerely aimed to protect white women from rape (this idea 
is refuted in Part Ill, supra text accompanying notes 125-180) to malce lynching seem understan· 
dabie and even noble. 
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veracity. 137 These "feminist" attitudes are anomalous in the 
pre-1970s legal Iiterature.138 Except for the lynching article, the legal 
literature on rape shows concern solely for the defendant and 
invariably implicitly or explicitly favors acquittal. 139 
Until recently various rules and attitudes made rape an extremely 
difficult crime to prosecute. The issue of chastity, or virginity, was 
one such barrier. Chastity was legally relevant in rape cases for three 
reasons. First, in many jurisdictions it was an element of the crime 
of statutory rape that the victim be chaste. 140 Second, in most 
jurisdictions the chastity ofthe rape complainant was considered pro· 
bative on the issue of consent, the assumption being that a sexually 
experienced woman was likely to have consented to this particular 
act of intercourse regardless of her words or actions to the 
contrary •141 Third, evidence as to a rape complainant's chastity was 
thought to bear on the woman's general character, and, hence, on 
her credibility. A woman's propensity for falsehood was assumed 
to increase proportionately to her sexual experience. 141 
The concept of chastity was not race-neutral. 143 According to 
governing sterotypes, chastity could not be possessed by Black 
women.144 Thus, Black women's rape charges were automatically 
m See Reynolds, supra note 31, at 20-21. 
ua It should be noted that lynching played a strikingly minor role in legal literature, as did 
rape, until recently. The INDEX TO LEGAL PERioDICALS lists a total of 39 entries for lynching 
between 1791 and 1949 (the last year containing an entry on lynching). During the same time 
period there were 53 entries for rape. By comparison, there were 775 entries under murder 
and homicide during those years. From 1949 until1970 there were S1articles about rape com· 
pared to 511 about murder or homicide. Between 1970 and Fe)>ruary 1982 there were 187 articles 
about rape and 362 about murder/homicide.
139 Rife, Scientific Evidence in Rape Cases, 31 J. CP.IM. L . .t CJUMJNOLOGY 232 (1940) is 
an exception. Recognizing the difficulties in proving rape, Rife detaUs methods of obtaining 
evidence to corroborate victims' testimony. 
140 JUJto:as, supra note 16, at 168. For a discussion of statutory rape roughly contem­
poraneous with thePatlerson decision, see Comment, Criminal Law: Rape 19 KY. L.J. 339 
(1931). See generally, Note, Statutory Rape: Previous Chaste Character in Florida, 13 U. Fu.. 
L . REv. 201 (1960); Note, Statutory Rape-Previous Chaste Character, 51 W.VA. L. REv. 
199 (19SS); Comment, Recent Decisions-CrimiMI Ltrw-No Defense To Statutory Rape That 
Victim Is Married Woman Below The Age Of Consent, 21 MD. L. REv. 84 (1961). 
141 See, e.g., Evidence-SpecifiC Acts ofUnchastity by Prosecutrix, 14 GA. B.J. 362 (1953). 
For a detailed and critical discussion, see Berger, supra note 17, at 15-22; see also J. BAJUCAS, 
supra note 135, at 104; Holmstrom&Burgess,Rape: The Victim Goes on Tria/in VrcmsoLOOY 
Ill, supra note 116, at 37-38; Note, supra note 17, at 338; Comment, The Rapz Victim, supra 
note 103, at 41; Comment, supra note 2, at 935, 938. 
141 Berger, supra note 17, at 16; Note, supra note 17, at 335; Comment, supra note 2, at 
931; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 39, 40. 
1 
4.1 See supra text accompanying notes 109-112. 

144 See supra note 103. 
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discounted, and the issue ofchastity was contested only in cases where 
the rape complainant was a white woman. 
For white women, evidence of unchastity was given less weight 
when the defendant was Black.14S A blatant example of the courts' 
willingness to ignore victims' lack ofchastity appeared in the Scotts­
boro opinions. The Alabama Supreme Court demonstrated its deter­
mination to affirm the defendants' convictions by its vigorous pro­
tection of the reputation and credibility of the white woman who 
claimed she was raped. It ruled that evidence pertaining to her marital 
status,146 her previous chastity, 147 and her general reputation 148 had 
been properly excluded as irrelevant. 
A less famous but equally vivid case also illustrates this dynamic. 
In Story v. State, 149 where a Black man was charged with the rape 
of a white prostitute, the Court found that her unchastity with white 
men was not relevant to her unchastity with Black men, commenting 
that: "The consensus of public opinion, unrestricted to either race, 
is that a white woman prostitute is yet, though lost ofvirtue, above 
the even greater sacrifice of the voluntary submission of her person 
· to the embraces of the other race. " 150 
These rulings shielding the victim's reputation were Contrary to the 
weight of authority at that time.151 Indeed, the debate in the legal 
literature prior to the 1970s concerned not whether evidence of the 
complainant's sexual history should be admissible, but rather the type 
of evidence that should be admissible-specific sexual acts or only 
the victim's general reputation. 1'z 
Many feminists favor excluding evidence of the rape complainant's 
sexual history because the admission of such evidence reflects and 
"' In the 19th century, evidence of a white woman's lack ofchastity sometimes convinced 
courts to treat Black defendants with relative leniency. See, e.g., Cato, a slave, v. State, 9 
Fla. J63 (1860) (rape conviction ofslave based on partly contradicted testimony ofwhite pros­
titute set aside and new trial granted). But see Barnett v. State, 83 AJa. 40, 3 So. 612 (1888) 
(rape conviction of Black defendant on uncorroborated testimony of white prostitute upheld). 
'~Weems v. State. 224 Ala. 524, 521. 141 So. 215, 217 (1932). 
•n Patterson v. State, 224 Ala. 531, 536, 141 So. 195, I97fl93Z). 

,.. Powell v. State, 2.24 Ala. 540. 550-51, 141 So. 201, 210 (1932)• 

... 178 Ala. 98, 59 So. 480 (1912). 

uo ld. at 104, 59 So. at 482. 

lSI 1 WIGMOU, EVIDENCE § 200 (2d ed. 1923). 

m See Recent ctzSes-Evidence-Admi.ssability ofPrior Acts ofUnchastity Upon Issue of 

Consent ofProsecutrix in a Rape Prosecution, 9 TEx. L. REv. 98 (1930). The author argued 
that the better practice was to admit evidence of prior acts rather than general reputation "in 
view of the gross injustice which might result from placing an innocent man at the mercy of 
a lewd and unsc:rtJpulous woman., See Cross-examination ofProsecutrix in RapeProsecution, 
l9·0A. B.J. 95 (1956); 14 GA. B.J., supra note 141. 
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reinforces misogynistic views of women153 and allows defendants to 
discredit easily the victim's testimony. •s.t Yet, in the Scottsboro con­
text, other considerations are also important. The complainant was 
allowed to testify without being cross-examined as to her sexual 
history only because the defendants were Black. Had they been white, 
such evidence would have been admitted, the reputation of the witness 
discredited, and the defendants probably freed. us 
Another barrier to successful rape prosecutions has been the 
statutory requirements that the testimony of a rape complainant be 
corroborated by other evidence.156 The corroboration requirement 
was introduced "for the purpose of protecting against false 
accusations."m To justify the stricter standards of proof required 
in rape cases than for other crimes, commentators claimed women 
asJ These include stereotypes that women are especially likely to lie and to be deluded. see 
supra note 142; that sexually experienced women are likely to have actually consented to sex 
with the man they now are accusing, see Note, supra note 17, at 41; Comment, supra note 
2, a t 932; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 41; that sexually experienced women 
are apt to lie, see Berger,supranote 17, at 16; Note, supra note 17, at 345; nnd that sexually 
experienced women cannot be raped, Comment, supra note 103, at 44. 
154 See infra text accompanying notes 209-210. 
m Susan Brownmiller notes sexist attitudes manifested in the case, since the white women 
were threatened with vagrancy and prostitution charges, S. Bllowmm.J.ER, supra note 13, at 
251-58, and since defense counsel tried to destroy the complainant's credibility by claiming 
she was a prostitute, id. at 254. Brownmiller's discussion ofthe cases is misleading and disturb­
ing because of its singlemindcd focus on sexism with its attendant sympathy for tb e white 
women, its belittlement of racism, and its lack of sympathy for the Black defendants sen· 
tenced to death. H er distortions are well discussed in A. EDwAP.Ds, RAPE, R.AcJSM AND THE 
WBITE WOMEN's MoVEMENT: AN ANSWEll TO SuSAN l'ROwmm.Ll!R, 8-15 (2d printing 1979) 
and A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 198-99. Although Brownmlller is correct that white women 
were under pressure to cry rape because they were often stigmatized or ostracized if they were 
discovered in a voluntary relationship with a Black man, A. Rom, supra note 26, at 30S, these 
hardships on women do not justify false rape charges. Susan Griffin claims, without citation. 
that if a white woman discovered with a Black man did not cry rape, "she herself would be 
subject to lynching." S. GRimN, supra note 103, at 18. This is refuted by the NAACP study 
cited supra at note 28, that found that only 16 out of the 4951 people lynched between 1882 
and 1927 were white women. (The reasons for the lynchings were not given.) The number 
is so small that it is highly unlikely that lynching could have posed a meaningful threat to 
white women who refused to claim that seXual contact with Black men was rape. 
156 See, e.g., Comment, Co"oborating Charges ofRape, 61 Couw. L . REv. 1137 (1967); 
Comment, Nebraska's Co"oboration Rule, S4 NEB. L . REv. 93 (1975); Comment, The 
CorroborationRuleandOimesAccompanyingaRape,l18 U. PA. L. REv. 458 (1970); Oiminol 
Law-AttemptedRape-Mergerand Corroboration, 14 BROOJCLYN L. REv. 122 (1948}; Recent 
Criminal Cases-Rape-Corroboration ofProsecutrix, 26 J. CJwd. L. & CJUMINoLOOV 463 
(1935-36); Recent cases, 18 OR. L. REv. 264 (1939). 
m 26 J. Clm.l. L . a: Clm.aNoLOOY, supra note 156, at 463. It was incorrectly thought that 
the number of reported rapes exceeded th.e number of actual rapes due to fal se accusations 
brought by deluded or malicious women. ~Comment, supra note 2, 919, 931 ; infra note 
158. It is now well known that rape is underreported, see supra note 2. The justifications for 
the corroboration requirement became more complex, far-fetched, and misogynist in the late 
1960s, apparently through the influence ofFreudian psychology, seeS. BROWNWUER. supra 
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frequently made malicious rape charges and easily duped juries into 
awarding COnVictiOnS.IS8 
One result of the chastity and corroboration rules was that rape 
was often a very difficult crime to prove.1s9 Rapes where the woman 
made her report too soon or not soon enough, 160 rapes where the 
woman knew her assailant,161 rapes where the woman did not resist 
enough,162 rapes where the woman was sexually experienced, 163 were 
all difficult to prosecute successfully. 
The attitudes manifested in the rape laws and expressed in the legal 
literature extend to other areas of the criminal justice system. Police 
have· often been extremely insensitive to rape victims .164 Rape com­
note 13, at 415- 20; Berger, supra note 17, at 28. For example, a 1970 comment claimed that 
.. [wJomen often falsely accuse men of sexual attacks to extort money, to force marriage, to 
satisfy a childish desire for notoriety, or ~o attain personal revenge. Their motives include 
hatred, a sense of shame after consenting to illicit intercourse, especially when pregnancy results, 
and delusion." Comment, 118 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 1 S6, at 460; see Comment, 67 COL· 
UM. L . RBv., supra note 156, at 1138-39. 
m See, e.g., Note, Criminal Law-Rape-Evidence-Corroboration of Female­
Pregnancy, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 184, 185 (1934-35) ("Because of the difficulty of refuting the 
testimony of the prosecutrix, because of the tendency of juries to convict without weighing 
carefully the evidence, and further, because the crime is one which is often maliciously pros­
ecuted"). A 1967 commentator stressed the umordinate danger that innocent men will be con­
victed." Comment, 67 CouJM. L. REv.,supranote 1S6, at 1137. For a more thorough discus­
sion of this notion see Berger. supra note 17, at 22. Feminist writers had responded that the 
conviction rate for rape was actually extremely low. See Note, supra note 17, at 338; Com­
ment, supra note 2 , at 931, 93S; see also infra note 187. 
159 JUll.oRS, supra note 16, at 100-01; Berger, supra note 17, at 29-32; Comment, The Rape 
Victim, supra note 103, at 38-40. 
160 Holmstrom & Burgess, supra note 141, at 41, report that a victim must make a "fresh 
complaint" but if she does it is assumed by the police that she reported promptly merely in 
order to get back in her husband's or boyfriend's good graces, not because the claim is real. 
161 See Note, supra note 17, at 343-45; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at41. 
The incidence of illegal rape by acquaintances is high; in victim survey data for 1973-1976, 
approximately half the sexual assaults were by men their victims knew; Bowker, supra note 
2, at 166, 169. 
IU The resistance requirements for rape are an excellent example of the ways that the legal 
system fail$ to protect women from rape. On the one hand, modem rape statutes require that 
the victim's resistance be overcome by force or by violence or by threats of imminent bodily 
harm. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 130.00(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981); WASH. REv. CoDE 
ANN. § 9A. 44.010(5) (West Supp. 1981). On the other hand, rape victims who do resist are 
more likely to be seriously injured than are victims who do not. See NAnONAL lNSTJTtJ're FOR 
LAw ENFoaCEWENT AND ClmnNAL JusnCE, LEAA, FollcmLE RAPE: FINAL PRoJECT REPORT 
(1978) cited in Field, Rape, inENCYCLOPEDIA OF CluME AND Jusnc£ (S. Kadish ed. forthcom· 
ing 1983); Black Offender, supra note 122, at 134; Note, supra note 17, at 345-47. 
161 See infra text accompanying notes 209-210. 
164 S. BRoWNMJJ.I.ER, supra note 13, at 408; S. GJUJ'FJN, supra note 103, at 13-14; Note, 
supra note 17, at 348;seeYork v . Stocy, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 
939 (1964). Traditionally police were trained to expect that rape was one of the most falsely 
reported crimes. G . PAYTON, PATROL PROCEDUll.E 283 (1967), cited in Comment, supra note 
117, at 277 n.6. Several recent studies claim that police have become more sensitive. See, e.g. , 
THE V1cms OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 38-41; W. SANDERS, RAPE AND WoMAN's IDENTITY 
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plainants have been disbelieved by police more frequently than 
complainants of other crimes. 165 
Women~ Actual Experiences 
While denial of any experience is a significant indication of 
powerlessness, the widespread denial of women's experiences of 
coerced sex is the denial of a phenomenon which deeply affects every 
woman's life. 
The crime o f illegal rape is a terrifying, traumatic experience which 
often has long-term damaging effects on its victims.166 Illegal rape 
is much more widespread than is reported to police. A recent study 
concluded that twenty to thirty percent of girls currently aged twelve 
will suffer a sexual attack during their Iifetimes.167 A recent random 
survey of San Francisco households revealed that forty-four to forty­
six percent of women in that city had been victims of rape or at­
tempted rape. 168 
Additionally, the fear and threat of rape influences many women 
who are never actually raped. 169 It restricts movement and forces 
82 {1980). The accounts of negative treatment experienced by many women become notorious 
and thus have a disproportionately large impact on victims' reluctance to report and on the 
image of the police, THE VICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 53-55. These studies do not 
indicate whether police sensitivity towards women ofcolor has increased; see supra note 122. 
165 In one study, the "unfounding" detennination by the poli.ce for forcible rape was 180/o, 
while for larceny it was only two percent. G. NETTLEll, ExPLAlNJNo CRIME 45 (1974), cited 
in Robin, Forcible Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System in THE 
ClmnNAL JusncE SYSTEM AND WoMEN, supra note llS, at 246. 
166 See J. BARKAs, supra note 135, 107-29; S. BRoWNMII..LER, supra note 13, 404-07; E. 
HllJIERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM 17-19, 33-40 (1976); T. McCAHll.L, L. MEYER ll A. FISCHMAN, 
THE AnElwATH oF RAPE {1979); 1'BEVICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103; Burgess & Holmstrom, 
Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FoRCIBLE RAPE, supra note 2 at 315 [hereinafter cited as Rape 
Trauma); Note, supra note 17. 
1157 Johnson, supra note 122, at 145. 
Jas Russell & Howell, Revisions/Reports: The Prevalence of Rape in the United States 
Revisited, 8 SJONS (forthcoming Summer 1983). The researchers concluded that there is a 260Jo 
probability that a woman will be a victim of a completed rape at some point in her lifetime, 
and that there is a 460/o probability that a woman will be a victim of a completed or attempted 
rape at some point in her life, see Russell, Sexual Assault: The Prevalence and Incidence of 
Forcible Rape and A ttempted Rape ofFemales, 7 VICTIMOLOGY (forthcoming 1983).
169 
"I have never been free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, like most women, 
have thought of rape as part of my natural environment-something to be feared and prayed 
against like rue or lightning." S. GJUFFIN, supra note 103, at 3; seeS . BROwmm.t.ER, supra 
note 13, at 449; Riger, Gordon & LeBailly, Women~Fear ofCrime: From Blaming to Restrict­
ing the Victim, 3 VJCTD40LOOY 274, 278-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Women~Fear ofCrime] . 
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women to maintain a special wariness about the situations in which 
they place themselves. 170 
Illegal rape is neither the only nor necessarily the most harmful 
kind of coer ced sex for women. 171 Although the definition of rape 
has been expanded in many statutes, 172 the requirement of penetra­
tion remains in some states.173 Spousal rape is legal in most states, 174 
and its incidence is widespread. 175 Other forms of sexual coercion 
are also pervasive. The incidence of incest is difficult to calculate, 
but it is certainly widespread; whatever the exact incidence, there is 
unanimity among researchers that the victims are overwhelmingly 
female, the perpetrators male. 176 A large proportion of working 
170 A recent study found that women feared crime more than men, and that their greater 
fear was rooted in a fear of rape. 930J'o of women expressed fear of the thought of rape. The 
major practical effect on women of the fear of rape is a restriction of freedom of action. 
Women~Fear of Crime, supra note 169, at 282-83 . The researchers concluded: "The effect 
ofwomen's greater fear ofcrime is to produce social constraints upon them; women not heeding 
those constraints may be punished not only by direct victimization, but also by being blamed 
for their own victimization. The irony of course, is that these restrictions do not guarantee 
that safety." Id. at 282-83; see Reynolds, Rape as Social Control, 8 CATALYST 62 (Winter 1974). 
171 An essential element of the traditional common-Jaw definition of rape is sexual inter­
course including penetration by the penis, see S. B:a.oWNMIU.ER., supra note 13, at 424-25; 
L. CLAJUt a D. LEWJS, supra note 81, at 130-32, 160; Bienen, supra note 8, at 174-75; 
MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 15-16; Comment , supra note 2, at 83. Ignored by such a defini­
tion are forced oral sex, fondling, and penetration with an object, for example. 
172 E.g., acts other than sexual intercourse, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-l (West Supp. 1982); 
sexual assaults with an object, S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-22-2 (Supp. 1982). 
173 E.g., IDAHO CoDE 18-6101, 6103 (1979); MISSOURI REv. STAT. § 566.040 (1979). 
174 The spousal rape exemption has been abolisbed in only three states (New Jersey, 
Nebraska, Oregon). JURoRS, supra note 16, at 196. All other states retain some version of 
it, based on a notion that the decision to marry implies continual consent to sexual intercourse. 
Id. at 165. The exemption originated in a conception of the wife as the sexual property of 
the husband. Lord Hale explained, "[The] husband cannot be guilty ofa rape committed by 
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife 
hath given up herself in this kind into her husband, which she cannot retract," Bien en, supra 
note 8, at 184, quoting M. HALE, THE HISTOR.Y OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn 
ed. 1778). 
175 The incidence of spousal rape is difficult to estimate, partly because it is legal in most 
states. JURORS, supra note 16, at 163-66; see note 174. However, estimates of wife-battering 
run as high as SOo/o of marriages, R. LANGI.EY & R . LEvY, Wrir. BEATING 4 (1977); and most 
battered wives are apparently also victims of rape by their husbands, S. ScHECTER., WoMEN 
AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VtsroNs AND SnuaGI.Es oF THE BATTERED WoMEN's MoVEMENT 
17, 223 (1982); L . \VAI.KER, THE BATTERED WoMAN 108 {1979).
176 One estimate is that at least 200,000 girls a year are sexually molested, overwhelmingly 
by men. L. SANFORD, THE SILENT Clm.DREN: A PARENT's GUIDE ro THE PREVENTION OF CHILo 
ABuSE 83 (1980). Another source estimates the number ofincest victims at one million a year. 
F. RusH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: THE SEXUAL ABuSE OP ClmDREN, 2, 4-5 (1980). An estimate 
by the Children's Division ofthe American Humane Association is that a minimum of80,000 
to 100,000 children are sexually molested each year. The pattern appears to be 97% male 
offenders, 92% female victims. In the majority of the cases the molester is well-known to 
the child; in one quarter, the molester is a relative. The Humane Association's figures were 
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women are sexually harassed on the jobY' Women also face 
harassment on the street. 178 
Very little is done about these forms of sexual abuse, and what 
has been done has largely been done by women themselves, in the 
last decade. 179 Widespread societal ignorance and general denial of 
sexual coercion by the legal system persist. 180 
Conclusion 
The legal system's treatment of rape is not designed to protect 
women from sexual coercion. Through discriminatory punishment, 
the language of opinions, scholarly writing, and the manipulation 
of doctrine, the legal system has implicitly defined rape so as to limit 
it to the rape of white women by Black men. The social meaning 
of rape is thus limited to a Black offender and white victim. In addi­
tion, because ofthe legal system's traditionally narrow definition of 
rape, coupled with the widespread acceptance of other forms ofsexual 
~ 	 coercion, the legal system has also implied that illegal rape is the only 
form of sexual abuse. In fact, both of these implications are false. 
The great majority of rapes of white women are committed by white 
men; and women are subjected to a range of sexual coercion in 
. 	 . 
addition to illegal rape. 
Because of the specific social meaning of rape, sole responsibility 
for the coerced sex of white women has been placed on the shoulders 
of Black men, ~d Black women have been ignored as rape victims. 
based on poor and disorganized families who came to the attention of social service agencies. 
Most incest, however, probably occurs in intact families which escape fiocial service agencies' 
attention; thus the actual incest incidence is probably much higher. Herman & Hirschman, 
Father-Daughter Incest, 2SIGNs 735, 736 (1977); seeS. BJtOWNldlllER., supra note 13, at 307-12. 
For personal analyses, see VoicES IN THE NIGHT: WoMEN SPEAXINo ABoUT INcEST (T. McNaron 
&Y. Morgan eds. 1982); and Cottom, Resistance to Incestuous Assault, in FJOBTBAcxl26-27 
(F. Delacoste & F. Newman eds. 1981). 
177 C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 124, at 26-SS. 
171 Despite its ubiquitousness, very little has been published concerning street harassment. 
See L. WALEER, supra note 175, 107-08; Benard & Schlaffer, The Man in the Street: Why 
He Harasses, Ms., May 1981, at 18; di Leonardo, Political Economy ofStreet Harassment, 
AEOJS, Summer 1981, at Sl-56. 
119 See, e.g.• FlG:BT BAcx:!, supra note 176. 
•to The problems of sexual harassment, incest, and spousal abuse have received very little 
attention and action until very recently. For examples of recent discussions of these prob­
lems, see C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 124 at 158-74 (1979) (sexual harassment); F. RUSH, supra 
note 176, at 137-38 (incest); L. WALXE.ll, supra note 175, at 212-13 (spousal abuse). 
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Those who work against rape and other forms of sexual coercion 
must be vigilant not to support this racist social meaning. Activists 
must realize that the false image of rape sustained by the legal system 
fosters fear and resentment between white women and Black people. 
It is not true that efforts to fight x:acist abuses of rape charges 
necessarily deny the reality of women's experiences of sexual coer­
cion. Nor is it correct that efforts to fight sexist denials of women's 
experiences of sexual coercion necessarily deny the reality of racist 
abuses of rape charges. 
PART IV: RECASTING THE FORM OF THE 
DEBATE-BEYOND LEGAL REFORM 
The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House 
- AUDRE LORDE181 
The pervasiveness of racism and its historical connection to rape 
raise complex issues for those who oppose sexual coercion. As leaders_ _ _ 
of the movement against rape, 182 feminists are responsible for ex­
amining closely the implications of their actions and proposals. 183 
The foregoing analysis raises considerations often neglected in 
feminist writing184 and thus leads to some conclusions about 
strategies to fight sexual coercion that differ in emphasis from other 
feminist work. 
111 Lorde, The Masle~s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS BRIDGE 
CAlLED MY BACK 98 (C. Moraga & G. Anzaldua eds. 1981). 
182 See Rose, Rape as a Social Problem: A By-Product ofthe Feminist Movement 25 Soc. 
PROBS. 15, 75-77 (1977). 
113 Various commentators have noted that white feminists often demonstrate ignorance of 
the racist uses of the rape charge, and have pointed out the limitations of anti-rape theories 
and strategies that fail to deal with issues of racism. See, e.g., A. DAVJS, supra note 73, at 
178-82, 196-99; A. EDwARDs, supra note ISS; Tm RACJST USE oF RAPE AND THE RAPE OIARoE, 
supra note 73; Braden, supra note 73; Does the Women~Movement Compromise the Struggle 
ofMinorities? 4 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 27,31 (1977); Frjedman, Rape, Ra~ism and Reality, 
AEotS, Summer 1981, at 14; Hare, Revolution Without A Revolution: The Psychology ofSex 
and Race 13, THE BI.Acx ScsoLAJt, Summer 1982, at 14; Sagarin, supra note 135, at 146; 
Sands, supra note 15. 
184 A fairly common analogy in feminist literature is between lynching and rape. S. 
BaoWNMil.LER, supra note 13, at 281 ("Rape is to women what lynching was to blacks: the 
ultimate physical threat by which all men keep all women in a state of psychological intimida­
tion."); D. RussELL, THE Pouncs OF RAPE 231 (1974) ("Just as lynching may be seen as the 
supreme political act of whites against blacks, so rape may be seen as the supreme political 
act of men against women."); Karmen, supra note 118, at J96 ("Rapes serve, as other crimes 
against women, to remind them of their 'appropriate' place in society- beneath men, just as 
the lynchings of blacks by whites in the south carried the message-accept your Jot in life­
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The legal system has historically ignored or denied the claims of 
women who have been victims of rape.1" At the same time, women 
have been traumatized by the criminal justice system, 186 few men 
have been convicted of rape,187 and women continue to be victim­
ized by rape in appalling numbers. 181 
Feminist strategies to combat rape have included encouraging self­
defense and protection, 189 improving the treatment rape victims 
receive after their attack, 190 and reforming rape laws so as to 
increase the conviction rate. 191 
Improving the Treatment ofRape Victims 
One of the most degrading aspects of rape for victims has been 
the treatment they receive from the criminal justice system. 192 One 
don't s1ep out ofline."); MacMillan & Klein, FAAR Editorial, AEGIS, Summer 1981, at 5 ("Rape 
is a mechanism used to terrorize and subjugate women in much the same way that lynching 
has been used against blacks."). 
This comparison between the functions ofrape and lynching is problematic in several respects. 
First, it suggests that it is simple to compare raCism and sexism, and in fact implies that they 
function in the same way. Actually, the two operate in complex and different, but related 
ways, as this Note demonstrates. Second, the comparison in itself is ill-chosen. Rapes rarely 
end in murder while lynchings by defmition are murder, so from the potential \ictim's perspec­
tive, the terror created by the threats of lynching and rape must be different. Third, the com­
parison ignores the fact that the usual excuse for lynching Black men was actually the rape 
of white women, so that to glibly compare the two is insensitive at best. 
Certain aspects of lynching and rape may be meaningfully analogous. For example, the 
fact that lynching was illegal but socially acceptable, Reynolds, supra note 170, at 64, is also 
true of rape. Also, the seemingly random nature of both crimes and the attendant fear and 
denial by potential victims that the randomness makes possible may make them comparable 
in that respect. But much more historical analysis is needed before such parallels can be con· 
structively drawn. Works that begin this process include Aptheker, Woman Suffrage and the 
Crusade Against Lynching 189Q-1920, in WoMAN's LEGACY 53 (1982); Hall, supra note 30. 
•as See Parts II and III, supra text accompanying notes 84-180. 

116 See supra notes 164, 192 and accompanying text. 

111 NATIONAL INSllTUTE FOR. LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CluMINAL JusnCE, LEAA, Fo:RCJDLE 

RAPE: FINAL PaoJEcT REPoRT (1978) (one in 50 chance that a conviction will result if the rape 
is reported) . 
113 See supra note 168. 
119 D . R•JssELL, supra note 184, at 284-86; Note, supra note 17, at 352. The philosophy 
and implic:.ations of the women's self-defense movement are beyond the scope of this Note; 
for a discussion of the movement, see Telsey, Karate and the Feminist Resistance Movement 
in FrGBT BAcx!, supra note 176, at 184; see also James, Do It Yourself Self-Defense in id. 
at 201; and Telsey, Some Facts on Self-Defense in id. at 197. 
190 See TilE VICini OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 264-65; D . RuSSELL, supra note 184, at 
287-88; Bienen, supra note 8, at 171; Rose, supra note 182, at 75-76; Note, supra note 17, 
at 351-54. 
191 SeeS . BR.OWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 436; J. MARsH, A . GEIST & N. CAPlAN, RAPE 
AND THE LWITS OF LAw REFoiW 22-23 (1982) [bere.inafter cited as RAPE AND THE LWITS OF 
LAw REFoiW]; BJENEN, supra note 8, at 171; Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 54. 
191 SeeS . B:Rowmm..I.ER, supra note 13, at 408-10; THE VICTIM OF RAPE, supra note 103, 
at 1-4; Berger, supra note 17, at 23-24; Note, supra note 17, at 347-51. 
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of the critical contributions of feminist anti-rape work has been to 
increase public awareness ofthis unsympathetic treatment. One pro­
posal to improve the treatment rape victims receive has been to 
increase the representation of women who deal with rape victims 
within the criminal justice system. 193 A second proposal has been to 
exclude evidence of a complainant's prior sexual experiences at 
trial. 194 • 
The first proposal is a positive one as far as it goes, but placing 
more women in law enforcement is not in itself adequate to improve 
the treatment victims receive. Ifthe women participants are all white, 
or have little understanding of racism, many of the problems pointed 
out in this Note will remain. 195 Black women's rape claims will con­
tinue to lack credibility because white women share with white men 
notions of Black people's promiscuity and untrustworthiness. 196 The 
special harshness reserved for Black men who are accused of raping 
white women will also continue.197 
193 SeeS. BROWNMILLER, supra note 13, at 434-37; Note, supra note 17, at 352. 
1
" See RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAw REFORM, supra note 191, at 22-23: THE VicTIM OF 
RAPE, supra note 103, at 279; Rose, supra note 182, at 80; Note, supra note 17, at 353. 
195 Howard, Battered and Raped: The Physical/Sexual Abuse of Women, in FtaHT BAcK!, 
supra note 176, at 80-81. · 
196 See Tms BRIDGE CAuED MY BACK, supra note 181 (especially pp. 61-101 including And 
When You Leave, Take Your Pictures With You). See generally ToP RANKING (J. Gibbs & 
S. Bennett eds. 1980) (especially Cornwall, Notes From a Third World Woman 61; Gwendolyn, 
Righteous Anger in Three Parts: Racism in the Lesbian Community-One Black Lesbian's 
Perspective 10; Calderone & Charoula, The Personal is Political Revisited: An Exploration 
ojRacism in the Lesbian Community 79); Bethel, What chou mean we, white girl? 86 CoNDI­
TIONS: FIVE, Autumn 1979 (The Black Women's Issue); Smith, supra note 87. 
l!n Both men and women were included in the studies of beliefs about rape, supra note 71, 
which showed that most people incorrectly believed the most common racial combination in 
rape cases was Black offender/white victim. Similarly, the study ofwhite jurors which showed 
that the heaviest sentences were given to Black men accused of raping white women, supra 
note 67, was based on a sample ofboth female and male jurors. Many white feminists have 
been reluctant or have refused to support Black men falsely accused of raping white women. 
See Braden, supra note 73; Sands, supra note 75. Angela Davis eloquently exposes the con­
t ributions of several white feminists' work to the perpetuation of racism with respect to rape. 
A. DAVIS, supra note 73, 178-82, 198-99. Even more recent writings which have ideological 
roots in feminism contain inaccurate statements which perpetuate racism. A most striking 
example appears in WoMEN AND CRIME IN AMERicA, supra note 1. This book, published in 
1981, is intended to fill the need for a text on women in the criminal justice system, id. at v. 
When an interracial rape occurs today, it is most likely to be a black rapist and a white 
victim, which is a reversal of the historical situation that existed in the United States 
during the days of slavery and the decades that followed its termination. During this 
period, it was black women who were constantly in danger of being sexually assaulted 
by white men. 
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If increasing the number of women involved in the legal and 
criminal justice systems is to create a system more sympathetic to 
all women, it is imperative that substantial numbers of these women 
be Black and that all individuals working with rape victims are keenly 
aware of, and strongly opposed to, racism.198 
Another proposal for improving the legal system's treatment of 
rape victims has been the reform of rape statutes to exclude evidence 
of rape victims' sexual history from trial. 199 Cross-examination on 
the details of one's sexual history, a common defense technique, is 
one of the victim's most traumatic contacts with the legal system.200 
Another rationale for this proposal is that the introduction of the 
rape victim's sexual history as evidence reflects and reinforces 
misogynistic attitudes about women and sexuality.201 
In Michigan, where the law has forbidden the introduction of 
evidence of past sexual behavior since 1975,202 the overall 
experiences ofvictims, as reported by rape crisis center workers and 
criminal justice participants, seem to have improved markedly .203 It 
does not appear from the Michigan study, however, that attitudes 
about the right of women to be free from sexual coercion have 
changed as a result of the statutory change.204 
I d. at J82. First, this statement is empirically false, as is acknowledged severnl pages earlier: 
"[Based on the 1975 LEAA crime survey data] Blacks were about as likely to rape whites as 
whites were to rape blacks in the limited proportion of rapes that were interracial." I d. at 
172. Second, even if.it were true that the number of illegal rapes committed by Black men 
against white women outnumbered white rapist/Black victim rapes, the wlnerability of white 
women would not b e analogous to the wlnerability of Black women to white masters during 
slavery. To suggest such a comparison is offensiv~ because it denies the seriousness of Black 
women's sexual victimization. See Part 11, supra notes 89-124 and accompanying text. In ad· 
dition, the analogy resonates with a mythology· that defines Black men as rapists of white 
women. See supra note 35. 
1111 In one recent study only about three percent of the rape victims commented specifically 
on the sex of the police officers who investigated their cases, although all were male; most 
of the victims' responses about the police were positive, although 100'/o bad serious complaints 
about their treatment by police. THE Vxcml oF RAPE, supra note 103, at Sl, 53-54. 
199 See supra note 194. 
200 THE VJcrw OF RAPE, supra note 103, at 179-83; Note, supra note 17, at 3So-51; 
Comment, The Rape Victim, supra note 103, at 45-46. 
201 See note 153. 
m Michigan's sexual assault statute, which took effect in 1975, is widely considered one 
of the nation's most innovative and comprehensive rape Jaws and has served as the model 
for many states. Bienen, supra note 8, at 172. The most detailed published research on the 
impact of rape laws deals with Michigan. See RAPE AND THE Ln.ms OF LAw Rm:oJW, supra 
note 191. For these reasons, the discussion on reforming rape laws is limited to Michigan.
203 RAPE AND TBE LDm'S OF LAw REFoRM, supra note 191, at 68-71. 

20C Id. at 106-107. 
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Increasing the Conviction Rate 
Another major goal of feminists has been to increase rape 
convictions.205 Law reform proposals offered to accomplish this 
have included limiting the admissibility ofevidence of a victim's sexual 
history,206 reducing the penalties allowed for rape,207 and introduc­
ing degrees of rape.208 
In Michigan, the conviction rate for sexual assaults has increased 
markedly since the passage of its law making sexual history inad­
missible as evidence and introducing degrees of rape.209 Apparently 
the increase is largely due to the provision limiting admissibility of 
prior sexual activities. 210 
It is understandable that many white feminists initially perceive 
an increased rape conviction rate as a victory. Rape has been denied 
so consistently by the criminal justice system211 until so recently212 
that any type of recognition of it by the legal system seems positive. 
Also, upperclass white women until recently have been fairly isolated 
in a private sphere in which their subordination to men has been fur­
thered by the law's absence, 213 so that the prospect of the law's 
presence in an area, seemingly acting on behalf of women, is 
attractive. 
However, the subordination of other groups has been furthered 
by the law's presence,214 and rape laws in particular have functioned 
w See note 191. 
206 1U.PE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFOIW, supra note 191, at 23. 
1M Many reformers favor reducing penalties for rape because they think the severity of 
traditional penalties deters juries from convicting. Bienen, supra note 8, at 173. 
lOS S. Baowmm.LER, supra note 13, at 425; Note, supra note 17, at 353. 
209 RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAw REFOIW, supra note 191, at 29- 33, 62. 
210 /d. at 57-62. . 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 138-165. 
211 The anti-rape movement began scarcely more than a decade ago, see Rose, supra note 
182, at 76. Susan Griffm's essay Rape: The All-American Crime in RAMPARTS, September 
1971 , was one of the fll'St major pieces published. The essay is reprinted in FORCIBLE RAPE, 
supra note 2, at 47. The first law review pieces that had roots in the movement against rape 
also appeared in the early 1970s, e.g., Note, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 2. 
213 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 99, at 117, 121-24. Examples cited by the authors 
include tort law's family immunity provisions, the marital rape exemption, and contract law's 
failure to deal with financial commitments relating to marriage, id. at 121-22. "For example, 
when the police do not respond to a battered woman's call for assistance or when a civil court 
refuses to evict her husband, the woman is relegated to self-help, while the man who beats 
her receives the law's tacit encouragement.... By declining to punish a man for inflicting in­
juries on his wife, for example, the law implies she is his property and he is free to control 
her as he sees fit." /d. at 122. 
214 The criminal justice system allows women to be victimized in their homes and actively 
victimizes people of color. A recent survey of seven geographically diverse U.S. cities found 
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to further white supremacy. 215 In light of the racist history sur­
rounding the legal system's treatment of rape, the goal of increasing 
the rape conviction rate must be examined in more detail. 
Working to increase the conviction rate for rape is not necessarily 
a constructive tactic in the struggle against sexual coercion for several 
reasons. First, most pragmatically, raising the conviction rate has 
not been shown to have any impact on the incidence of rape, although 
long-term data are not yet available. 216 Second, given the existing 
disparities in punishments between whites and Blacks, an across-the­
board increase would simply reproduce these disparities.217 Third, 
the increasingly racist political climate, 218 and the Supreme Court's 
destruction of various constitutional procedures to protect 
defendants,219 •suggest that the punishment disparities are likely to 
increase. Fourth, to the extent these disparities implicitly indicate that 
men are being punished on racial grounds and not because .they com­
mitted rape, the credibility of the underlying claim of sexual abuse 
is undermined. 220 Fifth, to press for convictions under rape laws 
suggests that women accept the narrow definitions and limited con­
ceptions of sexual abuse that underlie those laws. Finally, to say that 
rape should be treated like other crimes is problematic in that it im­
plicitly validates the way other crimes have been and are treated. The 
criminal justice system has radical shortcomings-the treatment,221 
that 780Jo of persons fatally shot by police during 1973 and 1974 were Black. C. Mn.TON, J . 
HALI.Ecx, J. LARDNER ll G. Al.BRECBT, POLJCE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 19, 22 (1975). Black 
women are not immune from police violence. SeeR. KNooHU12!EN, R. F .AHJn. " D. P AJ.MER, 
THE POUCE AND THEIR UsE OF FATAL FORCE IN CIDCAOO 20 (1972); Los Angeles Board of 
· 	Police Commissioners, Concerning the Shooting ofEula Love, reprinted in 14 CR.WE & Soc. 
JuST., Winter 1980, at 2. See generally D. BELL, supra note 18; A. L. HJoOJN1101'H.Uf, supra 
note 13; Bums, supra note 8. 
215 See Parts I and II, supra text accompanying notes 1-124. 
216 F •E AND THE LIMITS oF Li.w REfoRM, supra note 191, at 27. 
217 See supra note 67. 
211 See Braden, The Ku Klux Klan Mentality-A Threat in the 1980's, 20 FREEDOJ>t\VAYS 
7 (1980). 
liJ For example, for limitations on federal habeas corpus rights, see Engle v. Isaac, 102 
S. Ct. lSSS (1982), reh. den., 102 S. Ct. 2286 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), reh. den., 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465 (1976), reh. den., 429 U .S. 874 (1976). 
220 \VJ.lliams and Holmes claim that "To a great extent, the lack of credibility given the 
charge of rape today is attn'butable to the interwoven history of rape and racism where all 
involved know from their own experience (whether that of White male oppressor. White female, 
or Black male) that rape has been a technique ofsocial control to maintain the White Patriar­
chy." THE SECOND AssAULT, supra note 3, at 35. 
221 See Rudovslcy, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, Tm Pouncs 
OF LAw, supra note 8, at 242-52. For example, the shooting of civilians by police officers, 
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definition,222 an4 punishment223 of many other crimes should be 
deplored rather than endorsed. It has refused to protect and indeed 
has consistently worked against the interests of Black men, Black 
women, and white women. 224 
The Sanders and Hines cases discussed earlierW illustrate the 
risks of pressuring the criminal justice system to "do something" about 
specific rapes, especially rapes committed by Black men against white 
women. Rather than leading to apprehension of the actual rapist, 226 
such pressure can lead police to scapegoat an innocent Black man. 
This is not to argue that Black men never rape white women; but 
rather that, where such a rape claim is being prosecuted, white 
feminists must not overlook the circumstances surrounding the event 
in order to be certain that the prosecution is not a racial act against 
the wrong man in an attempt to defuse community pressures. 227 
Such prosecutions not only hurt Black people, 228 they also divide 
women along color lines, and do nothing to halt rape. 
Conclusion 
Attempting to reform rape laws to increase convictions thus has 
numerous shortcomings as a feminist strategy. Improving the criminal 
see supra note 214, almost invariably goes unpunished-out of 1500 killings of civilians by 
police from 1960-1970, only three resulted in criminal punishment, according to a study by 
A. Kobler, Police Homicide in a Democracy, 31 J . OF Soc. IssUES, Winter 1975, at 163-64. 
m The illegality of consensual sexual acts other than penis·vagina intercourse between 
unmarried persons is an excellent example. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980), cert. 
denied, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981) (New York's prohibition against consensual sodomy held 
unconstitutional on privacy and equal protection grounds); Note, The Constitutionality of 
Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MicH. L. REV. 1613 (1974). 
w Strong evidence suggests that Black defendants generally receive longer sentences than 
do white defendants for most crimes. See Jmtotu, supra note 16, at 117; Owens, Looking 
Back Black in BuCKs AND CluMINAI. JuSTICE, supra note 13, 7 at J1. 
214 See Rudovsky, supra note 221, at 244; Taub & Schneide_r, supra note 99, at 117. Janet 
Howard notes that "given the history and nature ofthe 'justice' system, [using the legal system] 
can only bring small concessions to women's safety, and is more likely to strengthen the 
repressive, racist power of the police, the courts, and the prisons." Howard, supra note 195, 
at 82. 
w See supra text accompanying notes 74-80. 
zu See Sands, supra note 75. 
m Sagarin, supra note 135, at 148. 
2ll The targetting of Black men for punishment also affects Black women. Alice Walker 
writes, "Whenever interracial rape is mentioned, a black woman's first thought is to protect 
the lives of her brothers, her father, her sons, her lover. A history of lynching has bred this 
in her." A. WALKEJl, supra note 84, at 93; see A. DAVIS, supra note 73, at 173-74. 
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justice system's treatment of the victim is a positive goal but does 
not change the fact of women's victimization. A problem with both 
approaches is that they only address the problems of women who 
are known victims of illegal rape. This focus is insufficient. First, 
even if the activity forbidden by rape laws stopped, other powerful 
forms of women's sexual subordination would persist. 229 Second, 
given the racist content ofthe social meaning of rape, struggles limited 
to illegal rape are likely to have the racist repercussion of targeting 
Black men. 230 
A response must be devised which goes beyond the formulation 
of rape as an extraordinary crime to which only some unlucky women 
fall victim, to a conception that the sexual coercion of women is per­
vasive, multivariate, and wholly unacceptable in every form. 231 If 
women go beyond the formulation given by the legal system they 
may be able to escape some of the traps of racism, and claim their 
own lives and sexuality. 
This means linking rape issues with other issues of sexual coer­
cion such as incest/32 spousal abuse, and sexual harassment. It also 
means recognizing that rape will be treated by the criminal justice 
system in a racist way as long as this society is racist. 
CONCLUSION 
. . • Eyes that only see the bruises inflicted by men miss seeing other 
bruises and deep scars. -JANET HowARD233 
The legal system's treatment of rape both bas furthered racism and 
has denied the reality of women's sexual subordination. It has 
disproportionately targetted Black men for punishment and made 
Black women both particularly vulnerable and particularly without 
m See supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text. 
230 See Part I, supra text accompanying notes 1-83. 
211 See supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text; see also Hoagland, Violence, Victlm­
izotion, Violation , 15 SINJSTEll WJSDOY, Fall 1980, at 70. 
m Susan Brownmiller observes that "If protection of the bodily integrity of all children 
is to be genuinely reflected in the law, and not simply the protection of patriarchal interests, 
then the current division ofoffenses (statutory rape for outsiders; incest for a member's fam­
ily~must be erased." S. Baowmm.I.ER, supra note 13, at 429. 
J Howard, supra note 195, at 80. 
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redress. It has denied the reality of women's sexual subordination 
by creating a social meaning of rape which implies that the only type 
of sexual abuse is illegal rape and the only form of illegal rape is 
Black offender/white victim. Because of the interconnectedness of 
rape and racism, successful work against rape and other sexual coer­
cion must deal with racism. Struggles against rape must acknowledge 
the differences among women and the different ways that groups 
other than women are disempowered. In addition, work against rape 
must go beyond the focus on illegal rape to include all forms of 
coerced sex, in order to avoid the racist historical legacy surroun­
ding rape and to combat effectively the subordination of women. 
